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My Mission to Russia 


and 


Other Diplomatic Memories 


By 
The Right Hon. 
Sir GEORGE BUCHANAN 


G.C.B., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O. 
British Ambassador, Petrograd, 1910-1918 


With Maps and Illustrations 


VOL. I. 


Boston 


Little, Brown and Company 
1923 


Ana oD, chs! Y 


Printed in Great Britain, 


t 











4 
Ted 


Go 
MY WIFE 


In Wemoriam. TApril 21-25, 1922. 


She knew not Death was at the door, 
But lay transfigured, while her eyes 
Glowed with a light from Paradise, 

Where her sweet soul so soon would soar. 


She looked so vadianily fair 
And younger by a score of years, 
As, smiling at me through her tears, 
She raised her hands in silent prayer. 


With that smile lingering on her face, 
She passed into another land; 
I pressed a lily in her hand, 
And laid her in her resting-place. 
G. W. B. 





PREFACE 


F the making of many books there is at present 

no end; any more than there was in the days of 
the Preacher. If I am now adding to their number, 
it is not so much for the purpose of recounting all 
that I saw and did during the forty-five years of my 
diplomatic life, as of endeavouring to throw fresh hght 
on some of the great political events with which I have 
been either directly or indirectly associated. From the 
point of view of political work Sofia and Petrograd 
were my two most important posts, and, though I have 
given sketches of my earlier ones, it is with Bulgaria 
and Russia that the major part of this book is con- 
cerned. During my five years’ mission to the former I 
assisted at the declaration of Bulgarian independence 
and the subsequent recognition of Prince Ferdinand 
as King. At the latter, where I spent rather more 
than seven years, I witnessed the outbreak of the Great 
War, the overthrow of the Empire, the rise and fall 
of the Provisional Government, and the Bolshevik 
Revolution. 

It was while I was Second Secretary at Vienna 
that I first met Prince Ferdinand—then an officer 
in an Austrian cavalry regiment—and I was there 
when he, in 1887, offered himself as a candidate 


Vii 


viii Preface 


for the Bulgarian throne, which had become vacant in 
consequence of Prince Alexander’s abdication. So 
few people now remember what happened in the 
Balkans forty years ago that I have briefly sketched 
the history of Bulgaria between 1885 and 1904—\the 
year in which I was appointed Agent and Consul- 
General at Sofia—in order that its later developments, 
as well as the mixed feelings of gratitude and suspicion 
with which Russia was regarded by many Bulgarians, 
may be the better understood. This sketch, and the 
chapters covering the period of my mission, are 
founded on the official reports written by me at the 
time, and I have adhered to the views expressed in 
those reports without allowing myself to be influenced 
by the part which Prince Ferdinand and his country 
played in the war. I have, indeed, followed this rule 
throughout my book, and in writing about Russia and 
the Russians I have been guided by the views recorded 
either in my official or in my private correspondence 
when I was at Petrograd. 

I left Sofia in 1909, and after a year’s interlude at 
The Hague I found myself once more drawn into the 
vortex of Balkan politics when I took up my appoint- 
ment as Ambassador at Petrograd at the end of 1910. 
For the first year or so the Balkans remained more or 
less quiescent, and it was to questions affecting the 
maintenance of the Anglo-Russian understanding that 
I had to give my immediate attention. For the general 
reader the chapters dealing with the so-called Potsdam 
Agreement and the oft-recurring controversies about 
Persia may seem unattractive ; but they are of historical 


Preface ix 


interest, since there were, as I have shown, moments 
when those two questions threatened to shipwreck that 
understanding. Had they done so, the whole course 
of recent history might have been changed. ‘The 
situation was fortunately saved, thanks to the untiring 
efforts of Sir Edward Grey and M. Sazonoff; and 
when, in 1912, the Balkan question once more entered 
on an acute stage, the two Governments worked whole- 
heartedly together for the maintenance of European 
peace. 

I have passed in review each successive phase of 
that crisis: the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty of Alhance 
of 1912, the formation of the Balkan Confederation, 
the first Balkan War, the rival claims of Austria and 
Russia that so nearly involved all Europe in the con- 
flict, the conclusion of peace on terms that constituted 
the triumph of Slavdom and then the mad quarrel of 
the Balkan allies over the spoils, the second Balkan 
war and the Treaty of Bucharest which undid all that 
had been achieved by the first war. I have shown how 
Russia, torn between the wish of furthering Slav 
interests and the fear of international complications, 
more than once during the crisis had to readjust her 
policy ; and, though loath to criticize my old friend and 
collaborator, I have pointed out certain mistakes which 
Sazonoff, in my opinion, committed. 

I have, on the other hand, had the satisfaction 
of vindicating his conduct of the negotiations which 
followed the presentation of the Austrian ultimatum 
at Belgrade, and of being able, from personal know- 
ledge, to affirm that he left no stone unturned in his 


x Preface 


desire to avoid a rupture. I have, at the same time, 
refuted the charges advanced by certain German 
writers and shown how utterly unfounded is their con- 
tention that Russia wanted war and that we egged her 
on by promising her our armed support. As regards 
the war itself, I have but outlined the course of the 
military operations so as to explain their bearing on 
the internal situation, more especially after the army, 
left almost defenceless before the enemy, had in 1915 
suffered disaster after disaster. 

It has been a melancholy task to trace the gradual 
decline of a great Empire—to contrast the enthusiasm 
and the promise of the early war-days with the depres- 
sion and progressive collapse that followed; to picture 
a united nation rallying in loyal devotion round its 
Sovereign, and then to depict the same nation, weary 
of the sufferings and privations imposed on it by an 
utterly incompetent administration, turning against 
that Sovereign and driving him from the throne. Nor 
has it been less sad to follow in the Emperor’s footsteps 
and to watch him, with his inbred fatalism, deliberately 
choosing a path that is to lead him and his to their 
doom. I have not attempted to screen his faults; but 
I have portrayed him as I knew him—a lovable man, 
possessed of many good qualities, a true and loyal ally, 
having, in spite of all appearances to the contrary, his 
country’s true interests at heart. In explaining the 
role played by the Empress, I have shown how she, 
though a good woman, actuated by the best of 
motives, was instrumental in bringing about the final 
catastrophe. Her fatal misconception of the meaning 


Preface xi 


of the crisis through which Russia was passing made 
her impose on the Emperor Ministers who had no 
other recommendation than that they were prepared 
to carry out her reactionary policy. Those of my 
readers who expect to find new and sensational revela- 
tions of Rasputin’s doings at the Russian Court will 
be disappointed. I have told what I believe to be the 
truth about him without retailing all the unfounded 
gossip that has gathered round his name. 

I have described in detail the progress of the 
Revolution, the constitution of the Provisional Govern- 
ment, its long-drawn-out struggle with the Soviet, its 

_ failure to arrest the demoralization of the army, its 
deplorable weakness in dealing with the Bolsheviks, 
its tactless handling of the Korniloff episode, and its 
final collapse before the Bolshevik onslaught. My 
work in treating of this period has been facilitated by 
the permission, kindly given me by Sir Eyre Crowe, to 
consult my official correspondence in the archives of 
the Foreign Office; and by the valuable assistance 
which the librarian, Mr. Gaselee, was so good as to 
lend me in the matter. As the Provisional Govern- 
ment and the old Autocracy have both disappeared 
from the scene, I have been able to tell the story of 
my mission to Russia with far greater freedom than 
would otherwise have been possible. I have approached 
the subject from the objective standpoint, and have 
endeavoured, in my judgment of men and things, to 
play the part of an impartial observer, whose views on 
the great Russian tragedy may be of service to the 
future historian. 


Xii Preface 


If I have given this book the form of memoirs, and 
have said much more about myself than I had originally 
intended, the responsibility lies with that great master- 
critic, my friend Edmund Gosse. He has shown such 
a kindly interest in the progress of my work, and has 
so impressed me with the importance of the personal 
equation, that I have recast some of the chapters so 
as to satisfy his craving for ‘* more personal touches.”’ 
Though I could never induce him to put life into my 
poor prose with a touch of his magic pen, he has given 
me a much needed moral encouragement for which I 


shall always be grateful. 
G. W.B. 


January 25, 1923. 


CONTENTS 
VOL. I. 


CHAPTER 


1, 


We 


1876-1880 
Vienna—Rome—My seiner across erie 
periences in the U.S.A.—On the way to Tokio. 


1880-1888 
Tokio—Vienna se THe Setcdes Gee in the 
Balkans—Bulgarian situation reviewed—Prince Alex- 
ander’s abdication and Prince Ferdinand’s election. 


1888-1900 


Berne—Darmstadt and Cueto Rersenal rela- 


tions with Queen Victoria. 


1888-1903 


Agent on the Venezuela A chitration Tribunals Coun- — 


sellor at Rome and Berlin—Anglo-German Relations 
—Agent and Consul General at Sofia. 


1887-1904 

Review of Prince Ferdinand’: ceiearie Princes S 
marriage—The era of Personal Government—Con- 
version of Prince Boris—Bulgaria and the Macedonian 
Insurrectionary Movement. 


1904-1908 


My reception by Prince Penuifande Buleare s rela- 


tions with Greece, Serbia and Roumania—Prince 
Ferdinand’s visit to London—German, Austrian and 
Russian influence—Better relations with Russia. 


1908-1910 

Bulgaria and the Young Turkish Rereienterancs 
Ferdinand recognized as King by the Powers—My 
mission to the Netherlands—My appointment as 
Ambassador at St. Petersburg. 


xiii 


PAGE 


14 


26 


38 


50 


61 


76 


X1V 


CHAPTER 


Contents 


8. 1911 


Russia’s relations wie ereila and Gechinriy ane first 
conversations with the Emperor Nicholas—The Pots- 
dam Agreement and its genesis—Persian crisis— 
Russia claims extension of her maritime jurisdiction 
—The Povagé case. 


9. 1912-1914 


Visit of representative British Delesatien o St. 
Petersburg—Improvement of Anglo-Russian rela- 
tions—Persian question—Action of Russian Consuls 
in Persia—Conversation with the Emperor thereon— 
Trans-Persian Railway. 


10. 1912-13 . 


Austro-Russian peations “Growing reat in ie Bal- 
kans—Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty of February, 1912— 
Formation of the Balkan Confederation—Balkan 
crisis — Balmoral Meeting — First Balkan War — 
Russia’s attitude regarding the Balkan States—Ser- 
bian port on the Adriatic—Danger of an Austro-Rus- 
sian conflict—Prince Godfried Hohenlohe’s mission to 
St. Petersburg—Tension relaxed—Albania—Confer- 
ence on Bulgaro-Roumanian Frontier question. 


Il. 1918-14 . 


Review of Russia’s nouey durme the First Balkan War 
—Lack of solidarity in Triple Entente, as compared 
with Triple Alliance—Sazonoff in favour of Anglo- 
Russian Alliance—I am offered the Vienna Embassy 
—Second Balkan War—Treaty of Bucharest—General 
Liman von Sanders’ appointment to Command of 
First Army Corps at Constantinople. 


12. 1910-1914 


Internal situation of Rnssin--Palitical oeets in the 
Universities—M. Stolypin, M. Kokovtsoff, M. Gore- 
mykin—Growing gravity of the situation. 


13. 1896-1914 


My relations with the eneene nor rioeetat amily 
The Empress Alexandra—First audiences with the Em- 
peror, 1896—His great personal charm—The Empress 
Marie—The Grand Duchess Marie Pawlowna—The 


PAGE 


91 


107 


119 


136 


Contents 


CHAPTER 


14, 


ery 


"oma. © 


FD. 


16. 


a hy 


18. 


Grand Duchess Victoria and the Grand Duchess Xenia 
—The Grand Duke Nicholas Michaelowich. 


1914 ; : ; : : : 
German criticism of Entente attitude—Russia’s and 
Great Britain’s desire for good relations with Ger- 
many—Presentation of Austrian Ultimatum at 
Belgrade. 


1914 : . : : ; ‘ . ; 
Conversation at the French Embassy—Sazonoff urges 
war can only be averted by our declaring our com- 
plete solidarity with France and Russia—H.M.G. 
assumes role of Mediator—Russia’s conciliatory atti- 
tude—Course of negotiations—Austria declares war 
—Russia’s mobilization—Germany threatens Russia— 
Ultimatum and declaration of war. 


1914 P : : : : : : : 
Rebuts statement respecting my attitude with regard 
to our participation in the war—Emperor’s War 
Manifesto—The nation rallies round the throne— 
Patriotic scenes at Moscow—The offensive in East 
Prussia—Battle of Tannenberg—Campaign in Poland 


—Russian shortage of munitions and rifles—Count 


Witte’s peace campaign. 


1914-15 ° ° e r ° e ° ° 
Turkey’s entrance into the war—Closing of Straits— 
Russia asks sanction to eventual acquisition of Con- 


stantinople—My audience with the Emperor on the ' 


subject—Negotiations with Bulgaria—Serbia is asked 


to make concessions in Macedonia—Allies and Serbia’ 


—Political agreement reached with Roumania. 


1915 ‘ : : ; : : : ° 

Russians in Carpathians—German counter measures 
—Mackensen assumes command—wWarsaw and other 
fortresses surrender—The Emperor assumes supreme 
command—Rasputin’s influence, his life and char- 
acter—Reactionary Ministers dismissed—The Duma 
—Union of Zemstvos favour a Government possess- 
ing confidence of the nation—Peace overtures—I am 
given G.C.B. 


XV 


PAGE 


178 


190 


208 


223 


236 


LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 
VOL. I. 


THe Ricut Hon. Sir GEORGE BUCHANAN, 
G.C.B., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.0O.  Photogravure frontispiece 


FACING PAGE 


THE Emperor Nicnouas II _. : . : RD © 
Tue British EmpBassy, ST. PETERSBURG . : . 108 
THE KREMLIN, Moscow . : ; : : . 108 
THE EMPRESS WITH THE TSAREVITCH : ; . 166 
THE Empress MARIE : : : : : . 174 


M. PitrrimM, METROPOLITAN OF PETROGRAD : . 244 


My Mission to Russia 


CHAPTER I 
1876—1880 


HOUGH diplomats cannot, like poets, claim the 

distinction of being born and not made, I may in 
a certain sense be said to have been born into diplomacy, 
for I was born at the Legation at Copenhagen, where 
my father was then Minister. He had begun his career 
under Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, after the latter’s 
appointment as Ambassador at Constantinople in 1825, 
and when, half a century later—in April, 1876—the 
doors of the diplomatic service were opened to me, the 
great Elchi, mindful of the above fact, sent for me and 
gave me his blessing, wishing me God-speed on my 
journey through life. A strikingly handsome man in 
spite of his ninety years, he still retained that com- 
manding personality which had, for good or for evil, 
made him so long the dominating factor in the Ottoman 
Empire. 

In my day entrance into the diplomatic service was 
by nomination, with a qualifying examination that did 
not impose a severe tax on a candidate’s intelligence, 
while the work allotted to a newly joined attaché during 
his preliminary training at the Foreign Office was of a 


purely clerical kind, such as the copying of despatches 
B i 


2 My Mission to Russia 


and the ciphering and deciphering of telegrams. It 
had, however, its compensations, for it was a novel 
and interesting experience to be admitted behind the 
scenes and to get a glimpse into the inner workings of 
diplomacy, more especially at a moment when the 
Eastern question was looming large on the horizon and 
when the famous Berlin Memorandum was being drawn 
up by Prince Bismarck without previous consultation 
with Her Majesty’s Government. The Queen, I 
remember, was so indignant at the slight thus passed 
on her Government by Prince Bismarck that she gave 
vent to her feelings in the following minute, which I 
read at the time on a despatch from Berlin: ‘* Prince 
Bismarck is treating England as if she were a third- 
rate Power, and this makes the Queen’s blood boil.’’ 
I only remained at the Foreign Office for a few 
weeks, as my father, whose term of service as Ambas- 
sador at Vienna was drawing to a close, had asked for 
me to be attached to that Embassy. For a young 
attaché Vienna was then a delightful post, more 
especially when he had, as the Ambassador’s son, the 
entrée into its exclusive society, where one was either 
Du und Du with all one’s contemporaries or else more 
or less ignored. The Viennese were so keen about 
dancing that I remember once going to a ball at Prince 
Schwarzenberg’s which began at eleven o’clock in the 
morning and continued till six in the evening; but the 
dances then in vogue and the etiquette that had to be 
observed with regard to them would hardly appeal to 
the fox-trotters of the present day. At the Court balls 
even the trois temps was vetoed as being peu conven- 
able, while at every ball there was a Comtessin Zimmer, 
into which no married woman was allowed to penetrate. 


Vienna in 1876 3 


There the girls gossiped with their partners between 
the dances, keeping a jealous and watchful eye on any 
erring sister who ventured to overstep the bounds of 
the most innocent flirtation. 

Dancing engagements, moreover, were booked for 
the whole season, so that one always had the same set 
of partners at every ball; while if one was prevented 
going to any ball, one had to find a substitute to fulfil 
one’s engagements. 

But, despite some of its old world ways and 
customs, I shall always retain the pleasantest recollec- 
tion of Austrian society, of its kind and generous 
hospitalities, and of its Gemiithlichkeit—that untrans- 
latable Viennese expression that has no equivalent in 
English. Apart, moreover, from its pleasant social 
life, Vienna could boast of a number of theatres of a 
very high order, which to an ardent playgoer like 
myself were a source of endless enjoyment. The Burg 
Theater was then still in its old quarters, adjoining 
the Palace, where, in spite of the smallness of its old- 
fashioned house, the actors were far more at home and 
in their element than they afterwards were in the more 
spacious and sumptuous theatre that was built for them 
a few years later. Sonnenthal and Frau Wolter were 
still at the zenith of their fame as exponents of the 
dramatic art, and with them and with a whole troupe 
of consummate artists the Burg Theater was no 
unworthy rival of the great French theatre in the Rue 
Richelieu. 

Nor were one’s amusements confined to Vienna, 
for in the autumn my father and I frequently went 
to hunt at Gédollé, near Buda Pesth, where even 
a humble attaché like myself was brought into imme- 


4 My Mission to Russia 


diate personal contact with the Emperor and Empress 
and the ill-fated Crown Prince Rudolph. Count 
Andrassy and many of the Hungarian magnates were 
also constantly to be met in the hunting-field, so that 
my father combined business with pleasure, while I 
spent most of my evening ciphering the results of his 
conversations with the Emperor and the Chancellor. 
But of all the followers of the hunt it was the Empress, 
with her radiant beauty, her fine seat on a horse and 
her wonderful figure, who was the cynosure of all eyes. 
Horses and the care of her figure were her two chief 
interests in life, and she carried her love of equestrianism 
so far that she even practised circus-riding in her private 
riding school at Gédoll6. 

Horses, too, furnished her favourite topic of con- 
versation, and on one occasion my stepmother, who was 
no respecter of persons, after listening for some time 
to what the Empress had to say on the subject, dryly 
remarked : ‘* Est-ce que Votre Majesté ne pense qu’ aux 
chevaux ?’’ History does not record Her Majesty’s 
answer, but I should imagine that the conversation was 
brought to a speedy close! 

After serving a year as attaché at Vienna I returned 
to the Foreign Office, and in 1878 I was appointed 
Third Secretary at Rome, where I spent a happy year 
and a half under the best and kindest of chiefs—Sir 
Augustus Paget. 

Rome will always cast its spell over all who come 
within its walls, but the Rome of forty-five years 
ago was more entrancing even than the Rome of 
to-day. It had not yet become a great modern capital, 
and was still to a large extent the Rome of Papal 
times. The new town, which now encircles old Rome, 


At Rome 1878-9 5 


was still in its infancy. The beautiful grounds of 
the Villa Ludovisi had not yet been transformed 
into countless streets of commonplace houses. ‘The 
builder had not yet laid a sacrilegious hand on the 
domain of the Campagna, which then almost reached 
the walls. The excavations in the Forum, which have 
added so much that is of interest to our knowledge of 
classical times, had, it is true, hardly begun; but, from 
the purely esthetic point of view, the Forum was even 
more picturesque than at present. 

Our Embassy was already installed in its present 
quarters at the Villa Torlonia, but a parsimonious 
Government had not yet sold the lower portion of its 
delightful garden, which was half as large again as 
at present. Flanked on the one side by the Aurelian 
wall, it was within a stone’s throw of Porta Pia, 
so that, riding out through that gate, one could 
reach the Campagna in a few minutes and gallop 
for miles over its vast plain. In the winter, too, not 
being overburdened with work, I could generally 
manage to hunt twice a week, though, as one often 
danced till five in the morning, an early start for a 
distant meet was not always an unmixed pleasure. For 
Rome was a very gay place in spite of the division of 
its society into Blacks and Whites. The great palaces 
of the aristocracy, most of which are now closed, were 
then the scene of constant entertainments, more 
especially during the ten days immediately preceding 
Lent, when the carnival was celebrated. Society 
danced and feasted every night, while in the afternoon 
King Carnival, who has long since died a natural death, 
made merry in the Corso. The whole street was hung 
with gorgeous draperies, and there, from one of the 


6 My Mission to Russia 


many balconies, one watched and took part in the battle 
of flowers and confetti, as the revellers, in every sort of 
fancy dress, passed in their gaily decorated cars. Then, 
when the Corso had been cleared, the festivities closed 
with the curious spectacle of a race of riderless horses | 
known by the name of ‘* Barberi.’’ 

By the end of 1879 my term had come for service 
at a distant post, and I was appointed Second Secretary 
at Tokio. Sorry as I was to leave Rome, I was en- 
chanted with the idea of seeing the Far East and of 
being able to spend a couple of months in the United 
States on my way there. Among the many good inten- 
tions, with which I have helped to pave the abode of the 
wicked in the nether world, is that of keeping a diary. 
As, however, my journey to Japan was one of the few 
occasions on which I did carry out this good intention, 
I am able to record some of the impressions which the 
United States of forty years ago made on me. Wash- 
ington, as a town, did not smile on me, though the 
Thorntons, with whom I stayed at the Embassy, were 
kindness itself. New York I found much more amus- 
ing. Its cafés, I noted, could compare favourably with 
those of Paris, and its social life was altogether more to 
my taste. I was given dinners, taken to theatres and 
dances and introduced to all the pretty young ladies. 
Like so many of my countrymen, I fell a victim to their 
charms, and in less than a fortnight I became engaged 
—but only for twenty-four hours. My prospective 
father-in-law, whom I had never seen till I was ushered 
into his bedroom, where he was laid up with a bad 
attack of gout, told me, on my asking for his blessing, 
that he had no use for me as a son-in-law. He added, 
however, that I would live to thank him—and I have. 


Journey Across America 7 


After leaving New York I spent a few days with 
some acquaintances near Boston. America, unfor- 
tunately for me, had not then gone dry, and my host’s 
idea of hospitality was to take me round the various 
clubs and bars where I had to drink cocktails with his 
friends. On one occasion—it was a national anniversary 
of some kind—TI actually drank thirteen before lunch ; 
or, to be accurate, in the course of the morning, for 
luncheon did not see me that day. From Boston I went 
to Niagara, where I was joined by my friend Sydney 
Campbell, who was travelling with me to Japan; and, 
after paying the homage of our unstinted admiration 
to the Horse Shoe Fall, we proceeded together to 
Chicago. Here we got into touch with the business 
side of American life and devoted our short stay to 
visiting its stockyards and granaries. Continuing our 
journey, we crossed the Mississippi and the Missouri 
and soon found ourselves in the open prairie—one 
enormous plain, without a sign of life save a few stray 
cattle grazing, with now and then a grove of trees and 
an occasional farmhouse. ‘‘ It reminds me,’’ I wrote 
in my journal, ‘‘ of the Campagna on a large scale—but 
of the Campagna stripped of all its beauty—of its ruins, 
its aqueducts, of the hills it up by the warm Italian 
sun and of that glorious dome with its background of 
deep blue sky. Here all is cold, grey and melancholy 
—and so monotonous. You wake up in the morning 
and seem to be just where you were the evening before. 
Last night it looked better, as there were several large 
prairie fires, which relieved the dreariness of the endless 
plain.’’ After passing Cheyenne we got our first sight 
of the Rocky Mountains—a pleasant change after the 
prairie—and we kept on ascending till we reached 


8 My Mission to Russia 


Sherman, more than 8,000 feet above the sea. The 
scenery, on the rest of our journey to Ogden and Salt 
Lake City, was very picturesque, with much red sand- 
stone and many fine rocks. 

The following description of the Mormon city is - 
taken from my journal : ‘* It is a very clean, prosperous- 
looking place, with unpretentious, neat houses sur- 
rounded by gardens or orchards. On the morning after 
our arrival we took a carriage; and our driver, an 
Englishman, acted as our guide and informant. First 
we went to the Tithe House, where all Mormons, in- 
cluding even the ladies of the demi-monde, have to pay 
in the tenth of what they earn. We next visited 
the ‘ Temple ’—a granite building which it will take 
another four or five years to finish—and then proceeded 
to the ‘ Tabernacle.’ This is a long, ugly, wooden 
building, some two hundred and fifty feet long, of an 
oblong shape, with a low roof. It can hold twelve 
thousand people, and, so remarkable are its acoustic 
properties, that we could hear a pin fall which our guide 
dropped some seventy yards from where we were stand- 
ing. All the roof is hung with festoons of leaves so 
as to prevent the slightest echo. After leaving the 
‘ Tabernacle’ we called on Mr. Taylor, the president 
of the Mormons, at the Lion House. He is a man 
between sixty and seventy, with nothing remarkable 
about him. He received us very courteously and kept 
us talking for some twenty minutes. He comes from 
Westmorland, and was in prison with Joe Smith when 
the latter was killed by the mob at Nauvoo. He was 
fortunate enough to escape himself with only a gunshot 
wound. 

‘** As president he is not regarded with the same 


Salt Lake City 9 


feelings of awe and reverence as was his predecessor. 
Brigham Young, unlike Mr. Taylor, was a man of 
genius and iron will who, when he donned the prophet’s 
mantle on the death of Joe Smith, conceived the idea 
of a great emigration to the West, where the Mormons 
could live in peace, safe from the persecution of the 
mob. To carry out this plan he had to lead them across 
the prairies of Nebraska, through the mountain paths 
of the Rockies, and over the great American desert. 
This he successfully accomplished, and in July, 1847, 
the promised land was reached, though not without the 
loss of many lives. In the choice of a settlement he 
again showed his wisdom, and the extraordinary pros- 
perity which Salt Lake City has attained is due to his 
energy, shrewdness and powers of organization. He 
was an extraordinary man, but coarse and entirely 
unscrupulous as to the means which he employed to 
maintain his autocratic rule. Since his death the 
influence of the Mormon chiefs over the people has 
sensibly declined. 


** Brigham Young had sixteen wives and about as 
many more who were ‘ sealed’ to him—an expression 
which seems to mean that, though not his wives in 
the strict sense of the term in this world, they aspire 
to be so in the next. Thus a woman may be sealed to 
one husband for this life and to another for the life to 
come. At present no one seems to have more than 
four wives, and most people find two enough, as the 
expenses of keeping them is greater than it was owing 
to the ‘ Gentiles’ having introduced a more expensive 
style of living than formerly. Where there are two 
wives in one house the house generally has two doors, 


IO My Mission to Russia 


and the two establishments are thus quite distinct. 
Our guide pointed out a house from which wife number 
one had driven wife number two and pursued her, flying 
down the street in her nightgown. Brigham Young 
built a very fine house for his last favourite, which is. 
called, after her, the Amelia Palace, and which is the 
house in the city. Utah is not a State, but a territory, 
and the United States Government appoint a governor. 
It makes its own municipal laws, subject to the veto of 
the governor. Drunkenness is punished by a fine of 
from five to ten dollars, and in the event of the offender 
being unable to pay his fine he has to make up the 
amount due by working on the roads. Judging, how- 
ever, by the state of the roads, there must either be 
very few poor people or very little drunkenness in the 
Mormon settlement.”’ 


Continuing our journey to San Francisco, we 
crossed the Sierra Nevada, where our train was blocked 
by the snow slides, and we had to spend sixteen hours 
in the bar room of a miserable little station, sleeping, 
or trying to sleep, on the bare planks. One of the 
curious sights of San Francisco in those days was the 
Chinese quarter, round which we were taken one night 
by a policeman. The Chinese lived there quite apart, 
in a town of their own, with their own butchers, bakers, 
chemists, jewellers, etc. Although it was past ten 
o’clock, we found all the shops still open, and after 
looking in at some of them we visited the temple, 
theatre and women’s quarter. 

On April 24 we started on a trip to the Yosemite 
Valley, in spite of being warned that we should be 
stopped by the deep snow. We slept the first night 


The Yosemite Valley II 


at Merced, and then, hiring a buggy and pair, drove 
to Mariposa, where we passed the night. There we left 
our buggy and crossed the mountain on horseback, and 
after breaking our journey at Hite’s Cove, a little 
mining village, had a delightful ride through the Merced 
Canyon into the Valley. I append my impressions as 
recorded in my journal at the time: 


** Our path lay through woods sloping down to the 
river, which was tumbling over the rocks fifty feet 
below. ‘The grass was a brilliant green and sparkled 
in the sunlight, the trees were all bursting into life, 
flowers of every hue covered the ground, while a shrub 
with the appropriate name of ‘ Red Bud’ gave life and 
colour to the woods. ‘There were ranunculi of the most 
delicate yellow, campanulas of the forget-me-not blue, 
there were red flowers, white flowers, purple flowers, 
and flowers of every colour under heaven. The hillside 
across the river was one blaze of bright orange, but we 
were not near enough to distinguish the flower itself. 
As we approached the Yosemite the scenery became 
wilder, and we once more began to ascend a narrow 
stony path as the hillsides became steeper and rocks 
took the place of grass. At three o’clock we entered 
the valley. My first impression was one of disappoint- 
ment. I could not see what there was to rave about 
in those great rocks rising up so straight to heaven; 
they were grand and savage, but where was their 
charm? I failed at first even to realize their size. I 
soon, however, learned to understand and appreciate 
their unique beauty. It grew on me hour by hour, 
especially in the evening light. At the part of the 
valley where Bernard’s Hotel is, one feels rather 


12 My Mission to Russia 


oppressed and imprisoned by the hills, but some two 
miles down the river the valley broadens. There we 
got on to a little sand island, at the foot of ‘ El 
Capitan,’ and laid down for an hour after dinner. 
Lying there, looking up at that gigantic rock rising 
over three thousand feet straight into the air, faced on 
the other side by rocks of almost equal grandeur—the 
two forming a sort of frame to the landscape beyond 
—with the dark pines, standing out against the pale 
blue of the sky, so ‘ thick inlaid with patines of bright 
gold,’ I felt how wrong my first impressions had been 
and how all that has been said of the valley falls short 
of the reality.’’ 


Re-reading the above description of the Yosemite 
after a lapse of more than forty years, I ask myself 
whether, could I be transported there once more, I 
should be equally impressed by its beauty and whether 
I should be prompted to give expression to my feelings 
in the same poetic language as when I was young. 
Sainte Beuve once wrote : 


Il existe, en un mot, chez les trois quarts des hommes, 
Un poéte, mort jeune, a qui ’homme survit. 


Alfred de Musset replied in a sonnet in which he con- 
tested the truth of this dictum, and after taking Sainte 
Beuve to task for having blasphemed ‘‘ dans la langue 
des Dieux,’’ told him to remember 


qu’en nous il eaiste souvent 
Un poéte endormi, toujours jeune et vivant. 


I fear, nevertheless, that as a rule the poet born in 
us sleeps so soundly as we grow older that only some 





Impressions and Reflections 13 


deep emotion, be it of joy or grief, ever rouses him 
from his slumber. For, worn by the battles and 
sorrows of life, we most of us find 


That nothing can bring back the hour 
Of splendour in the grass, of glory in the flower. 


On leaving the valley we tried to return to Merced 
by another route across the mountains, but the snow 
was so deep that we had to get off our horses, and 
after leading them for three hours uphill at a snail’s 
pace we gave up the attempt. Owing to the time thus 
lost we only reached the foot of the mountain that 
separates the Merced valley from Hite’s Cove late in 
the evening, and had to make our way as best we could 
up a narrow bridle path, skirting the edge of a precipice 
which in places went sheer down for some two thousand 
feet. It was so pitch dark when we got to the top 
that we drove our horses before us and followed them 
on foot, as they seemed to be able to find the path 
easier than we could. We only got to Hite’s Cove at 
eleven at night, dead tired and half famished. 


CHAPTER II 
1880-1888 


EAVING San Francisco on board the City of 
Pekin, we reached Yokohama on May 24, after 

a tedious and uneventful voyage of twenty days. Japan 
was then in a transition period. ‘Though she had 
already started on the road that was to lead her, in such 
an incredibly short time, to the high position which she 
now holds among the Great Powers of the world, she 
was not so Europeanized and retained more of the pic- 
turesque charm of the Old Japan than at present. 
Save for the Tokio- Yokohama line, railways were non- 
existent. ‘Though the area of one’s travels was thus 
circumscribed, one saw what one actually did see of the 
country at much greater advantage travelling by jin- 
rickshaw and on foot than one could possibly have done 
by rail. During the long excursions which I made into 
the interior every summer I spent a night on the top 
of Fuji-Yama, that peerless mountain that rises for 
more than 12,000 feet so majestically from the plain ; 
ascended Asama Yama, the great active volcano; went 
to Kioto, the ancient capital; visited Nikko as well as 
other shrines; shot the rapids on some of the rivers, 
and walked hundreds of miles across country, wherever 
my fancy took me, occasionally coming to places where 
Europeans had never been seen. Except on one occa- 
sion, when the keeper of a tea-house displayed the old 

14 


Tokio 1880-83 15 


anti-foreign feeling by refusing to take us in, we met 
with the most friendly reception, and the best rooms in 
the villages where we slept were always placed at our 
disposal. My native cook and manservant accom- 
panied me on these expeditions, and, though when at 
home they never walked a yard, they were never too 
tired to provide me with an excellent repast even when, 
as on the occasion of our ascending Asama Yama, we 
had been seventeen hours on the move owing to our 
guides losing their way and bringing us down on the 
wrong side of the mountain. 

When I was at Tokio the King, then Prince George 
of Wales, and his elder brother the late Duke of 
Clarence, who were midshipmen on board the Bac- 
chante, came to Japan. The entertainments arranged 
in their honour were on much the same lines as those 
given the Prince of Wales during his recent visit. 
They included the, to us, novel sport of catching wild 
duck in butterfly nets as they rose from the water 
trenches into which they had been lured by decoy ducks ; 
Japanese polo; dinners @ la Japonaise, and a garden 
party at the palace. The Mikado also paid them the 
special compliment of going, if I am not mistaken, for 
the first time, on board a foreign ship of war as guest 
at a luncheon on the Bacchante. One expedition on 
which I accompanied them was to the famous bronze 
Buddha at Kamakura, some fifteen or twenty miles 
from Yokohama. We rode out a numerous party, but 
after a sumptuous picnic luncheon no one except the 
two young princes cared to make the return journey on 
horseback, so I had the honour of riding back alone 
with them in the evening. 

Life in Japan was very cheap in those days, and, 


16 My Mission to Russia 


among other luxuries, I had a small stud of racing 
ponies. At Yokohama, where the British and other 
foreign colonies resided, there were two meetings every 
year, with separate races for Japanese and Chinese 
ponies, as the latter are far the better of the two. The 
Japanese, who were very keen on racing, always tried 
to prevent foreigners buying any of their best ponies; 
but at the Autumn ‘Meeting of 1882 I was lucky enough 
to win the Champion Japanese Race, for the third time 
in succession with the same pony, and to keep the £100 
Challenge Cup. At the same meeting I won the heavy- 
weight race, riding myself, while my best China pony 
would have won the Champion China Race had he not 
been fouled by a Japanese jockey. On my appealing 
to the stewards of the Jockey Club, the latter ques- 
tioned the offending jockey and, as he protested that 
he had not fouled my pony on purpose, awarded him 
the race. 

Sir Harry Parkes, who was then our Minister at 
Tokio, was a very able man with a long record of dis- 
tinguished services, and had, when attached to Lord 
Elgin’s Mission in 1860, been treacherously arrested by 
the Chinese and kept in heavy chains for eleven days. 
He refused to purchase his liberty on terms that might 
compromise the success of Lord Elgin’s negotiations, 
and was condemned to be executed. On the seizure of 
the Summer Palace the order for his execution was 
countermanded and he was released. Appointed 
Minister to Japan in 1865, he rendered the Mikado 
great assistance during the early years of the new 
régime and more than once narrowly escaped assassina- 
tion. His temper, however, was not of the best, and 
he sometimes made things very unpleasant for his 


My Marriage 17 


staff. On one occasion—it was before my arrival— 
they could not find a despatch which he had asked 
for. He thereupon went fuming into the Chan- 
cery, pulled all the papers out of the archive press, 
threw them on the floor, kicked them about the room, 
and then, turning to the secretaries, exclaimed : ‘* That 
will teach you to keep the archives in proper order and 
to find despatches when I want them.’’ He was absent 
on leave when I arrived in Tokio, and had, when in 
London, been given a hint by the Foreign Office to 
treat his staff with greater consideration. On his 
return he completely changed his tactics and, in all his 
dealings with me, he was courtesy itself. He showed 
me much kindness, and he never gave me any cause for 
complaint save as regarded the length of his despatches. 
After copying one that covered more than four hundred 
pages of foolscap I felt inclined to remind its author 
of what Sheridan said to Gibbon, when the latter 
thanked him for having spoken in the House of ‘* that 
luminous writer Gibbon ’’—‘‘ Not luminous; I said 
voluminous! ”’ 

I left Japan early in 1883 and returned home, 
stopping on the way at Hong Kong, Ceylon, Cairo, 
Malta and Gibraltar. After taking a long leave 
I once more went to Vienna, where I had been 
appointed Second Secretary, my pleasure in returning 
to my old post being enhanced by the fact that the 
Pagets were about the same time transferred there 
from Rome. 

In the following year I became engaged to Lady 
Georgina Bathurst, in spite of dear Sir Augustus’s 
warning that for a poor man like myself to marry would 
spell ruin for my career. Marriage is always a great 

ee 


18 My Mission to Russia 


adventure, and to embark on it on £1,000 a year in 
one of the most expensive capitals in Europe was no 
doubt a somewhat rash proceeding; but, fortunately, 
Sir Augustus proved a false prophet, for my marriage 
gave me a helpmate, who not only made my life an 
ideally happy one, but who, by her personality and by 
her happy gift of inspiring friendship, largely contri- 
buted to such success as I have achieved in my career. 
How we managed to live for three years at Vienna 
without falling seriously into debt is still somewhat of 
a mystery tome. We had a charming little apartment 
within a few minutes’ walk of the Embassy, and we 
went everywhere and did everything, thanks chiefly to 
the kindness of our many friends. The Pagets always 
took us with them to balls and parties, so that we were 
spared the expense of keeping a two-horse fiacre—for 
one-horse carriages were tabooed in society—while 
other friends drove us to the races and placed their 
boxes at the opera and theatres at our disposal. One 
of the most expensive items in our budget was that 
of country-house visits for shooting and hunting, on 
account of the tips which they entailed, but we paid 
many such visits to the Kinskys, Larisches, Apponyis 
and other friends. 

Princess Pauline Metternich, whose husband had 
been Austrian Ambassador in Paris under the Second 
Empire, was then the recognized leader of Viennese 
society. She had taken the Rothschilds under her 
special protection, and it was thanks to her influence 
that they were for the first time admitted within its 
charmed circle. She organized Blumen-Corsos in the 
Prater, which so captivated the pleasure-loving Viennese 
that they sang her praises in the following quatrain : 


Princess Pauline Metternich 19 


Es giebt nur eine Kaiserstadt, 
Es giebt nur ein Wien; 

Es giebt nur eine Fiirstin, 
Metternich Pauline. 


But amongst all the entertainments which she 
organized in our time the one which I remember best 
was a musical revue given at the Palais Schwarzenberg, 
entitled the Gétterdimmerung in Wien, in which the 
gods and goddesses, bored with Olympus, come to 
Vienna in various disguises in search of Hebe, who had 
fled there. After visiting all the sights of the capital 
and assisting at a variety entertainment that included 
scenes from the Wiener Walzer, Eacelsior, and the 
Zigeuner Baron, they eventually find Hebe in the 
Wurzel Prater and return rejuvenated to Olympus. 
Princess Metternich had herself, in collaboration with 
Baron Bourgoing, a former French diplomat, written 
the libretto, and had, by enlisting the services of. all 
the most beautiful women of the Austrian aristocracy, 
including Prince Kinsky’s two daughters, Princess 
Montenuovo and Countess Wilczek, Countess Czernin, 
Countess Amelie Podstatsky, Baronin Bourgoing and 
Countess Irma Schénborn—who afterwards married 
Prince Fiirstenberg, the Emperor William’s friend— 
converted the final apotheosis into a dream of fair 
women. 

Politically, speaking, Vienna as a post derived its 
main interest from the conflicting ambitions of Austria 
and Russia in the Balkans; and as I shall have so much 
to say about the Balkan question in subsequent chap- 
ters, a brief review of the acute crisis through which it 
was then passing may help to explain its later develop- 
ments. ‘he aim of Russia’s policy ever since the War 


20 My Mission to Russia 


of Liberation had always been to make Bulgaria a 
Russian province, and with this end in view she had 
placed the Government of the principality under the 
control of specially selected generals. Whenever Prince 
Alexander ventured to dispute their authority he was 
reminded that he was but the instrument of the Tsar, 
till, finding his position intolerable, he effected a 
reconciliation with the Liberal party, in the hope 
of emancipating his adopted country from Russian 
domination. 

In September, 1885, a successful coup d’état at 
Philippopolis had resulted in the proclamation of the 
union of the province of Eastern Roumelia with the 
principality, and in the assumption by Prince Alexander 
of the title of Prince of Northern and Southern Bul- 
garia. ‘This was such a flagrant violation of the Treaty 
of Berlin that Europe could not condone it off-hand, 
while Russia at once declined to recognize a union which 
had been effected without her intervention. The Tsar 
marked his disapproval by striking Prince Alexander’s 
name off the roll of the Russian army and by recalling 
all the Russian officers from Bulgaria. At the same 
time, through his ambassador at Constantinople, he 
encouraged the Sultan to restore the status quo ante in 
Eastern Roumelia by force of arms. The idea of such 
a Turkish execution found favour with Russia’s asso- 
ciates in the Drei Kaiser Bund, and the execution was 
only stayed by the firm attitude of Her Majesty’s 
Government, who recognized the advantage of having 
a strong Bulgaria as a bulwark against future 
aggression. 

Had Austria adopted a bolder attitude and recog- 
nized the union as an accomplished fact she might 


Balkan Crisis of 1885 21 


have supplanted Russia at Sofia; but Count Kalnoky’s 
one desire was to avert the danger of a breach with 
Russia, while he was afraid that by supporting Bul- 
garia he might weaken Austria’s influence at Belgrade. 
Meanwhile Greece and Serbia, disturbed by the idea of 
Bulgaria’s aggrandisement, were actively preparing to 
assert their claims to territorial compensation; and 
though, thanks to the intervention of the Powers, the 
former was forced to hold her hand, the latter declared 
war on Bulgaria in November, 1885. ‘The position of 
the Bulgarian army, disorganized by the recall of its 
Russian officers, and stationed for the most part in 
Eastern Roumelia, seemed almost desperate. A small 
number of troops had, however, been posted near the 
Serbian frontier, and by forced marches Prince Alexan- 
der succeeded in bringing up the rest of his army to 
their support and in routing the Serbian army after a 
three days battle at Slivnitza. Following up his victory, 
he occupied Pirot; but his march on Belgrade was 
arrested by an Austrian ultimatum to the effect that, 
if he attempted to advance any farther, he would find 
himself face to face with the Austrian army. Finally, 
after prolonged negotiations, a conference of the 
Powers at Constantinople adopted a formula conferring 
on the Prince of Bulgaria in the abstract, instead of on 
Prince Alexander personally, the Governor-Generalship 
of Eastern Roumelia for a term of five years, in accord- 
ance with Article xvi of the Treaty of Berlin, under 
which the consent of all the Powers would be required 
for its renewal. 

The fact that this union was but a personal one was 
at once exploited by Russia to undermine the power of 
the prince and to represent him as the one bar to the 


22 My Mission to Russia 


real union which Russia was prepared to confer on 
Bulgaria, and a few months later a military conspiracy, - 
working under her auspices, brought about his abduc- 
tion and enforced abdication. Recalled almost imme- 
diately by a counter-revolution, the Prince landed at 
Roustchouk and addressed a last but fatal appeal to 
the Tsar in a telegram which, after announcing his 
return, concluded with the words: ‘* Russia gave me 
my crown. I am ready to return it into the hands of 
her Sovereign.’’ The Emperor’s reply was a crushing 
one. He disapproved of the Prince’s return and de- 
clared that he would abstain from all intervention in 
the affairs of the principality so long as His Highness 
remained in Bulgaria. Despairing of being able to 
reign in the face of Russia’s opposition, and alarmed 
by the discovery of the widespread character of the 
recent plot, Prince Alexander abdicated and, after 
appointing a regency composed of Stambuloff and two 
others, left Bulgaria on February 8, 1886. 

There followed a prolonged crisis fraught with 
danger to the peace of Europe. Russia refused to 
recognize the regency and despatched General Kaulbars 
to Sofia, with the mission of terrorizing the Bulgarians 
into submission. In spite, however, of his declaring 
the elections invalid, the Grand Sobranje met and 
occupied itself with the difficult task of finding a prince 
willing to accept the thorny crown which Prince 
Alexander had laid down. Prince Waldemar of Den- 
mark was eventually elected, but declined the honour, 
while the Prince of Mingrelia, Russia’s candidate, 
whose name had been submitted by the Porte, was 
categorically vetoed by Stambuloff. 

Austria, meanwhile, though the most directly 


Austria, Russia and Great Britain 23 


interested of the Powers, had observed an expectant 
attitude, as Count Kalnoky cherished the hope that 
Russia, if left to herself, would end by estranging Bul- 
garia for all time. Her Majesty’s Government, on the 
other hand, were seriously preoccupied by the prospect 
of an eventual Russian advance on Constantinople, and 
Sir Augustus Paget was consequently instructed to 
sound the Austrian Government as to the steps to be 
taken to avert the danger of Bulgaria’s falling com- 
pletely under Russian influence and to urge the import- 
ance of the two Governments acting in concert. Count 
Kalnoky received these overtures in a friendly spirit, 
but contended that so far there had been no violation 
of the international status of Bulgaria, and that only 
when this happened would the time for intervention 
have arrived. Her Majesty’s Government replied by 
citing all the illegal acts committed by General Kaul- 
bars in support of their view that the time had already 
come for united European action. 

Count Kalnoky, however, did not place sufficient 
confidence in the material support, which he was 
likely to receive from Great Britain, to commit him- 
self to a policy of active intervention; and, though 
both Governments acknowledged the identity of their 
interests, no regular understanding was arrived at. 
He was, nevertheless, somewhat reassured by Lord 
Salisbury’s statement at the Guildhall Banquet on 
November 9, that, if British interests were directly 
threatened, Great Britain would know how to defend 
them with her own right arm, and that in questions 
in which she was only indirectly interested the attitude 
adopted by Austria would largely contribute to shape 
the policy of Her Majesty’s Government. Fortunately 


24 My Mission to Russia 


about this time the situation was somewhat eased by 
Kaulbars breaking off diplomatic relations with the 
Bulgarian Government; and the regents profited by 
his departure to send a delegation to the various 
capitals with a view to ending the interregnum. On 
their arrival at Vienna, Prince Ferdinand of Coburg, 
on his own initiative and prompted by motives of 
personal ambition, offered himself as a candidate for 
the vacant throne, though neither the Emperor nor 
Count Kalnoky approved of his doing so. The latter, 
indeed, remarked in the course of a private conversa- 
tion that the Prince had too much the airs and manners 
of a vieille cocotte to make a suitable successor to 
Prince Alexander. 

Prince Ferdinand had at first attached a condition 
to his acceptance of the princely crown that was almost 
equivalent to a refusal, namely, that he should be con- 
firmed by the Porte and approved by the Powers, and 
it was only six months later, in July, 1887, that he was 
formally elected Prince of Bulgaria. Russia objected 
to his election as being an infraction of Article m1 of 
the Treaty of Berlin, which stipulated that the Prince 
should be ‘* freely elected ’’ ; whereas, according to her 
contention, he had been elected under the dictation and 
tyranny of the regency, itself an illegal body, by an 
assembly illegally constituted, owing to the presence in 
it of deputies from Eastern Roumelia. Count Kal- 
noky’s attitude was very similar to that of Her 
Majesty’s Government. He considered that the Grand 
Sobranje had acted strictly within its legal rights, but 
regretted that its choice had not fallen on a better 
candidate. A few days before Prince Ferdinand’s de- 
parture for Sofia he urged him to adhere to his original 


Prince Ferdinand’s Election 25 


intention and to await the assent of the Powers, point- 
ing out that, if he went without that assent, he would 
be acting the part of an adventurer and would enjoy no 
legal status. Germany’s attitude was one of theoretical 
support of Russia. In Prince Bismarck’s opinion it 
was desirable that there should be an understanding 
between Austria and Russia as to their respective 
spheres of influence in the Balkans, and that, while the 
former should be predominant in Serbia, the latter 
should be allowed to regain in Bulgaria the position 
which she had held prior to 1885. His one object was 
to deprive Russia of any pretext of ill-humour against 
Germany, and he held that, considering the innumer- 
able mistakes which Russia had made in the political 
handling of the Bulgarian question, the larger the scope 
allowed her for action the more certain would she be 
to dig her own grave. The keynote to his policy lay in 
his conviction that France would never attack Germany 
unless the latter was at war with Russia, and he was 
therefore prepared to go all lengths to maintain friendly 
relations with the latter country. He told Count Kal- 
noky, however, that he need not prendre au sérieux such 
theoretical support as he (Prince Bismarck) might give 
to any proposals put forward by Russia, as his only 
object was to keep on good terms with her, while he 
was confident that no Russian proposal would ever 
materialize if seriously opposed by Austria, Great 
Britain and Italy. His confidence in the energetic 
action of those Powers was, nevertheless, not sufficient 
to tempt him to run the risk of offending Russia. 


CHAPTER ITI 


1888—1900 


N the summer of 1888 I exchanged into the Foreign 

Office and worked there till the end of the following 
year, when I was transferred to Berne, and at the end 
of 1892 I was promoted Secretary of Legation and 
offered the post of chargé d’affaires at Coburg. A 
hitch, however, occurred with regard to my appoint- 
ment, as for reasons connected with the past life of the 
then Duke, the Queen objected to a married man being 
sent to Coburg. While the question was still under 
discussion between Her Majesty and the Foreign Office 
the sudden death of our Minister at Darmstadt provided 
a way out of the dilemma, and I was appointed to 
Darmstadt with the rank of chargé d’affaires. 

Darmstadt was in every respect a more desirable 
post, as, owing to its central position and to its proximity 
to Frankfurt and Homburg, one could keep in touch 
with the outside world and extend the circle of one’s 
acquaintances beyond the confines of what was virtually 
but a small garrison town. In spite, however, of its 
limited social resources Darmstadt as a residence had 
much to commend it. One could ride for miles on 
end in the surrounding woods; one could, at no great 
distance, get excellent shooting of almost every kind 
of game—stags, roebucks, wild boar, pheasants, par- 


tridges, hares, and even capercailzie; and when not 
26 


Darmstadt 1893-1900 27 


otherwise engaged one could spend one’s evenings at 
the Court theatre, where plays and operas were given 
on alternate nights. ‘The theatre, which was largely 
subsidized by the Grand Duke, was of a very high 
order, and it was there that I learned to appreciate and 
to understand Goethe’s Faust. It was admirably put 
on the stage and admirably acted, the whole repre- 
sentation being extended over three nights, the first 
concluding with the scene in the Hewen Kiiche, the 
second being devoted to Gretchen’s tragic love story, 
and the third comprising the whole of the second part 
in an abridged form. The social life, too, which 
centred round the Court was pleasant enough with its 
constant little dinners and informal dances; but what 
I look back to with the most pleasure were the days 
which I spent with my friend, Baron Max von Heyl, 
partridge shooting near Worms and stalking deer and 
chamois in the Tyrol. 

Though, after the marriage of Princess Alice of 
Hesse to the Emperor of Russia, Darmstadt acquired 
a certain political importance in consequence of the 
frequent visits of their Russian Majesties, it was only 
what is commonly termed a ‘‘ family post.’’ Both the 
Grand Duke and the Grand Duchess were the grand- 
children of Queen Victoria, the former through his 
mother, the Princess Alice, and the latter through her 
father, the Duke of Edinburgh and Coburg. The 
Queen, who had arranged this marriage, took a lively 
interest in all that concerned them, and during the six 
years which I passed at Darmstadt I had the privilege 
of being in direct correspondence with Her Majesty 
and of being honoured, together with my wife, with 
invitations to Windsor and Osborne whenever we 


28 My Mission to Russia 


were in England. ‘There was, however, a revers de la 
médaille that rendered my position far from an easy 
one. The Grand Duke and Grand Duchess, like most 
young married couples, no matter what their station 
in life, liked to go their own way, and were apt to leave 
undone many things which they ought to have done, 
and to do many things which they had better, perhaps, 
have left undone. Whenever anything of this kind 
happened, and more especially when they had omitted 
to answer letters or to pay befitting attentions to any 
of their elderly relatives who happened to be in their 
neighbourhood, the onus of remonstrating with them 
invariably fell on my shoulders. I was, moreover, 
expected to keep the Queen fully informed of all their 
doings and misdoings—a very invidious task, in view of 
the great kindness which their Royal Highnesses con- 
stantly showed us and of the terms of intimate friend- 
ship on which they admitted us into their family circle. 
We were constantly invited to dine with them at the 
palace and to stop with them for weeks on end at 
their summer residence at Wolfsgarten, while they 
frequently honoured us with their presence at dinner. 

Unfortunately their marriage, on account of incom- 
patibility of character and temperament, did not prove 
a happy one, and as they gradually drifted apart it was 
no easy matter for my wife and me to try and smooth 
over difficulties and to prevent the complete separation 
which took place shortly after our leaving Darmstadt. 
We were both devoted to the Grand Duchess, who, in 
addition to the gift of beauty, had a wonderful personal 
charm and a way of saying things that was most attrac- 
tive; and, as reason and right were on her side, she 
had our fullest sympathies. But this did not prevent 


The Empress Frederick 29 


my being perfectly frank and outspoken in the advice 
which I tendered, and as she realized that I only did 
this in her own interest she never resented it, and 
regarded me, as she said on one occasion, as ‘‘ My 
kind schoolmaster.”’ 

During the summer months Homburg, with its 
cosmopolitan crowd of water-drinkers, was a never- 
failing resource, as one was sure to find among them 
friends and acquaintances from almost every country in 
Europe. It was at Homburg that I had the privilege 
of being brought into close relations with the Prince of 
Wales (afterwards King Edward VII), and it was 
thanks to His Royal Highness’s kindness in represent- 
ing to the Queen that my chances of advancement in 
the service would be seriously prejudiced were she to 
keep me indefinitely at Darmstadt that she eventually 
consented to my being given another post. The 
Empress Frederick, whose beautiful schloss at Cron- 
berg was only a few miles distant from Homburg, was 
also most kind to us and often invited us to stay with 
her. Those visits were always as interesting as they 
were delightful. In the morning I generally rode with 
Her Majesty, and in the afternoon we all took long 
drives and walks among the Taunus Hills. 

In the course of our conversations the Empress 
would often unburden herself on the subject of the anti- 
British feeling in Germany and of the difficulties with 
which she was consequently beset. As the mother of 
the future Queen of Greece she was naturally intensely 
interested in the critical situation in which that country 
found itself placed after the Turkish War, and I used 
sometimes to serve as the channel through which Her 
Majesty communicated her views on this question to 


30 My Mission to Russia 


Queen Victoria. But what interested me most was 
when the Empress, who was extremely well read, 
turned her conversation on to literary subjects and 
discussed the respective merits of some of the great 
English and German poets. One day, however, her 
memory played her false and she made a slip which 
rather embarrassed me. I had happened to quote some 
lines from the ‘‘ Ancient Mariner,’’ and Her Majesty 
at once said: ‘‘ Oh yes. I remember them quite well. 
They are from Longfellow’s ‘ Ancient Mariner.’ ”’ 
Though it was hardly a courtier-like proceeding to 
contradict her, I could not help saying: ‘* Your 
Majesty, I think, means Coleridge’s ‘ Ancient 
Mariner.’’? A somewhat heated argument followed 
that ended in a drawn battle, as neither of us would 
admit that the other was right. Our last visit to 
Cronberg was saddened by the knowledge of the fatal 
illness to which the Empress succumbed in the follow- 
ing year, but the courage and patience with which she 
bore her sufferings did but enhance the admiration and 
respectful sympathy which I had always entertained for 
Her Majesty. 

Among the many Royal personages, whom we 
frequently met during our visits to Cronberg, were the 
Duke and Duchess of Sparta (afterwards King and 
Queen of Greece) and Prince and Princess Frederick 
Charles of Hesse. Princess Frederick Charles, who, 
like the Duchess of Sparta, was a daughter of the 
Empress Frederick, had married a younger brother of 
the Landgraf of Hesse, and the latter’s name recalls 
to my mind an incident which is typical of the 
mentality of some Germans. The Prince of Wales 
had charged me with the mission of representing him 


German Manners 31 


at the christening of one of the Princess’s children, of 
whom His Royal Highness was the godfather, and I 
accordingly proceeded on the appointed day to the 
Landgrat’s schloss, where the ceremony was to take 
place. Some forty persons were present at the 
luncheon that followed the christening, and knowing 
how punctilious Germans are, I was careful, as I 
thought, to get presented to all of them. After 
luncheon the Landgraf engaged me in conversation 
and finally asked me whether I liked shooting. On my 
replying in the affirmative he said: ‘‘ Then come and 
shoot pheasants here in December,’’ without, however, 
fixing any particular day. As it happened, I had 
already arranged to go home on leave at the end of 
November, and I was trying to explain this, with many 
expressions of my regret, when he turned his back on 
me, saying: ‘* You may go to h——.”’ [I was natur- 
ally somewhat taken aback, and as I saw a gentleman 
standing near me, whom I took for his equerry, I went 
up to him in order to explain and expostulate. As 
bad luck would have it, not only was this gentleman 
not his equerry, but he was also the one person out of 
the whole company to whom, by some oversight, I had 
not been presented. After looking me up and down, 
he interrupted my explanations by frigidly remarking : 
** Sir, in Germany it is customary that a gentleman 
does not speak to another gentleman without first being 
presented to him by a third gentleman.’’ He then also 
turned his back on me. I was quite dumbfounded by 
this lesson in German manners, when the Princess’s 
lady-in-waiting came up to me and said: ‘* Mr. 
Buchanan, I have by chance overheard what passed in 
both your conversations, and all that I can say is that 


32 My Mission to Russia 


I am ashamed of my countrymen.’’ The Princess 
afterwards sent for me and apologized in the most 
charming way for what had happened. 

The Court of Carlsruhe, to which I was lao 
accredited, was in all respects the direct opposite of 
that of Darmstadt. While, in the latter, etiquette was 
more honoured in the breach than in the observance, 
it was in the former rigidly enforced and reduced almost 
to a fine art. When invited to luncheon with the 
Grand Ducal family, one had to don an evening coat, 
with a black tie; and on the occasion of the celebration 
of the Grand Duke’s seventieth birthday I remember 
beginning the day at eight o’clock in the morning in 
my blue dress coat, with brass buttons, and only dis- 
carding it at seven o’clock in the evening in favour of 
my full uniform. But the most trying ordeals were 
the interminable circles which followed a dinner at the 
palace, when one had to stand for two or three hours 
while the Grand Duke and Grand Duchess went the 
round of their guests. Nor was one always left in peace 
when one got to one’s hotel, for on one occasion I was 
woke at eight o’clock by a royal lackey knocking at my 
bedroom door to tell me that, as I was no doubt going 
to the English church service at ten-thirty, the Grand 
Duchess had given orders for me to be shown over an 
adjoining hospital at ten o’clock; and as this amounted 
to a royal command, I had no choice but to submit. 

If ever lambent dullness played around a Court, it 
was surely round that of Carlsruhe, and the town itself 
reflected the dullness of the Court. 

Matters were not improved by the fact that during 
the concluding years of the nineteenth century, more 
especially after the outbreak of our war in South Africa, 


= J 


Grand Duke and Duchess of Baden 33 


public feeling throughout Germany was strongly anti- 
British, and one was constantly exposed to having 
unpleasant things said about one’s country. ‘The Grand 
Duke of Baden was himself far too much of a gentle- 
man ever to do this. A grand seigneur of the old 
school, he was courtesy itself; and if in the course of 
our conversations he alluded to the somewhat strained 
relations between Germany and Great Britain, he 
spoke rather in sorrow than in anger, and attributed 
our misunderstanding to the irresponsible language of 
the British and German Press. He even on one 
occasion put forward the somewhat fantastic suggestion 
that, in order to render the Press less potent for evil, 
the Powers should agree not to allow themselves to be 
influenced by what the Press of foreign countries might 
say about international questions, and not to use their 
own Press as the channel for their official utterances on 
such questions. He was, unfortunately, possessed with 
the idea that the important position secured by Great 
Britain in the world was due to the long-sighted and 
Machiavellian policy pursued by successive British 
Governments. Nor did he take me seriously when I 
remarked that His Royal Highness was paying our 
diplomacy an unmerited compliment, for British 
Governments were not, as a general rule, in the 
habit of looking far ahead. ‘They rather, I added, 
adapted their policy to the requirements of the 
moment, and their practice of muddling through as 
best they could had on the whole proved most 
successful. 

The Grand Duchess, who was a daughter of the 
old Emperor William, was, on the other hand, far less 


considerate and gave free expression to her feelings. 
D 


34 My Mission to Russia 


As an ultra-German she held that Germany could do 
no wrong and that, consequently, Great Britain was 
entirely to blame if the relations between the two 
Governments were not so good as they should be. It 
was in vain that I tried to persuade her that there might 
be faults on both sides and that, if our two countries 
were to remain friends, they must each show due con- 
sideration for the other’s national interests. On one 
occasion—either immediately before or immediately 
after the outbreak of the Boer War—she lectured me 
before the whole Court and marked her displeasure by 
not giving me her hand to kiss, as was usual at such 
an official reception. 

I happened shortly afterwards, on going on leave 
to England, to be invited to Osborne for a couple of 
nights, and to be placed at dinner one off the Queen, 
when, much to my surprise, Her Majesty, who had 
been talking of the anti-British feeling in Germany, 
turned to me and said: ‘*‘ The dear Grand Duchess of 
Baden is the only friend whom we have in Germany.’’ 
I ventured to reply that if Her Royal Highness had 
represented herself as our friend she had been careful 
to mask her true feelings; and I then proceeded to tell 
Her Majesty of my recent visit to Carlsruhe and how — 
the Grand Duchess had gone out of her way to let me 
know that she fully shared the views then prevalent in 
Germany with regard to Great Britain. The Queen 
was quite taken aback at hearing this, and on my going 
on to describe how, both at Carlsruhe and Darmstadt, 
the crowds in the streets gloated over the telegrams 
announcing our reverses, which were posted up in the 
windows of the post office, Her Majesty said: ‘‘ We 
shall not forget.’ 


Personal Relations with Queen Victoria 35 


In July, 1898, Lord Salisbury offered me the 
post of British agent on the Venezuelan Arbitration 
Tribunal, that had become vacant by Michael Herbert’s 
appointment as Ambassador to Washington. As it 
was the Queen’s wish that I should nevertheless con- 
tinue to act as chargé d’affaires at Darmstadt, I paid 
a flying visit to London, in order to settle how I could 
best combine the discharge of the duties of my new 
post with those of my old one. It was characteristic 
of Her Majesty’s thoughtfulness that, knowing how 
short my stay in England was to be, she should have 
sent the following telegram through the Foreign 
Office : ‘* The Queen wishes Mr. Buchanan to come to 
Osborne any day he likes.’’ Sovereigns are not, as a 
rule, in the habit of showing such consideration for the 
convenience of one of their subjects, more especially 
when that subject happens to be but a junior member 
of the diplomatic service; but, judging by my personal 
experience, no Sovereign was ever more thoughtful for 
others or more grateful for the smallest service rendered 
than was Queen Victoria. 

I had been fortunate enough from the outset to win 
Her Majesty’s confidence. After the first rather alarm- 
ing interview, when, on my appointment to Darmstadt, 
I had to wait in the gallery at Osborne for Her Majesty 
to pass on her way to dinner and to fall on one knee 
and kiss her hand, I was never again afraid of her. I 
fell at once under the charm of her wonderful smile, 
and was always perfectly natural and frank in all my 
conversations with her. I nearly always found the 
Queen very easy to talk to and easily amused. On 
my telling her once that by a curious coincidence not 
only was November 25 the common birthday of the 


36 My Mission to Russia 


Grand Duke and Grand Duchess of Hesse, but mine 
as well, Her Majesty asked: ‘‘ And were you born 
in the same year as they were?”’ I replied, with a 
smile, that that was an honour to which I could not 
aspire, as I was, unfortunately, old enough to be 
the Grand Duke’s father. ‘*‘ How very stupid of » 
me!’’ replied the Queen, laughing heartily at her 
mistake. There were, however, occasions when it was 
not so easy for me to reply to Her Majesty’s questions 
with regard to affairs at Darmstadt. I remember more 
especially how embarrassed I was at a long audience, 
which I had during a Saturday to Monday visit to 
Windsor early in 1898, when I could no longer conceal 
from Her Majesty the growing tension in the relations 
of the Grand Duke and the Grand Duchess. After 
listening to what I had to tell her the Queen remarked : 
**T got up that marriage. I will never try to marry 
anyone again,’’ and then proceeded to ply me with 
questions. When, however, I ventured to say that I 
had always tried to do my duty both by Her Majesty 
and by the Grand Duke and Grand Duchess, and that 
I trusted that she would understand how difficult it was 
for me, after being confided in by their Royal High- 
nesses, to betray their confidence by repeating what 
they had told me, Her Majesty at once said: ‘* I quite 
understand, and I am very grateful.’’ Both my wife 
and I had several further conversations with the Queen 
during this visit, and before leaving I received a charm- 
ing letter from Her Majesty, enclosing two Jubilee 
Medals, which ‘* She hopes they will accept as a mark 
of her gratitude for their great kindness to her grand- 
children.”’ 


The last time that I saw the Queen was at Balmoral 


My Last Audience with Her Majesty 37 


in October, 1900, on my relinquishing my appointment 
as chargé d’affaires at Darmstadt, when Her Majesty 
conferred on me the C.V.O.—a decoration which at 
that time was but rarely given. A few months later 
the great Queen, who had always inspired me with 
feelings of veneration and devotion, as well as of 
intense gratitude for the kindness and consideration 
which she had constantly shown me, entered into 
her rest. 


CHAPTER IV 
1888—1903 


EW people, I imagine, now remember anything 

about our dispute with Venezuela respecting the 
boundary between her territory and that of the 
British Colony of Guiana, though it constituted at 
that time one of the burning questions of the day. 
It derived its importance from the fact that in 1895 
President Cleveland had, in a message to Congress, 
espoused the cause of Venezuela, with the result that 
the question threatened to embroil our relations with 
the United States of America. It was to avoid this 
danger that, after prolonged negotiations, a treaty was 
signed at Washington in February, 1897, between 
Her Majesty’s Government and the Government of 
Venezuela, under which the question of the territory 
in dispute was to be submitted to arbitration. 

When in July, 1898, I took up my appointment as 
British Agent to the Arbitration Tribunal, the two 
contracting parties had already exchanged their cases 
and counter cases ; and at the end of the year the respec- 
tive arguments, which summed up the documentary 
evidence, were also exchanged. After a preliminary 
meeting held early in the New Year to settle certain 
questions with regard to procedure, the tribunal 
assembled at Paris on June 15, 1899. The court was 
composed of two British arbitrators (Lord Chief Jus- 

38 


Arbitration Tribunal 1898-99 39 


tice Russell and Lord Justice Henn Collins) and of two 
American judges (the Hon. Melville Webster Fuller, 
Chief Justice of the United States, and the Hon. David 
Brewer, a Justice of the Supreme Court), with the well- 
known Russian jurist, M. de Martens, as president. The 
leading counsel on our side were the Attorney-General, 
Sir Richard Webster (afterwards Lord Alverstone and 
Lord Chief Justice) and Sir Robert Reid (afterwards 
Lord Loreburn and Lord Chancellor), assisted by the 
present Lord Askwith and the present Mr. Justice 
Rowlatt, while Venezuela was represented by General 
Harrison (an ex-President of the United States) and 
other eminent American lawyers. 

The history of the territory in dispute went back 
as far as the end of the sixteenth century. As heir to 
Spain, Venezuela claimed the whole territory between 
the Orinoco and the left bank of the Essequibo—a 
claim which we contested on the ground that the 
greater part of that territory had for more than two 
centuries been successively under the control of the 
Dutch and British, and that since our formal occupa- 
tion of the colony in 1814 it was by Great Britain 
and not by Venezuela that it had been developed. 
Counsel for Venezuela further contended that though, 
according to Article 4 of the Treaty of Washington, 
adverse holding or prescription legalized a title, 
that rule had been intended to apply to the fifty 
years prior to 1814 and not to the fifty years imme- 
diately preceding the signature of the treaty. This 
would have constituted such a serious modification of 
the conditions on which Her Majesty’s Government 
had consented to arbitration that, had the arbitrators 
accepted the American interpretation of the article in 


40 My Mission to Russia 


question, we should have refused to proceed with the 
arbitration. 

The Attorney-General, who was the first to address 
the court, presented the British case in a masterly 
speech that occupied thirteen sittings, marshalling all 
the facts of our case with extraordinary ability. He 
made the mistake, however, of dealing with it too 
much in detail and, as I ventured to remark at the 
time, he pulled down our house in order to show of 
what good bricks it had been built. This gave counsel 
for Venezuela the opportunity of seizing on the weak 
points in our argument and of demonstrating the 
inferior quality of some of our boasted bricks. When 
Sir Robert Reid rose to reply to two of the counsel for 
Venezuela, who had spoken for twenty-two days, the 
outlook was by no means promising ; but, in a short and 
brilliant speech, he raised the discussion to a higher level 
and concentrated into it the very essence of the British 
case. He succeeded, moreover, in throwing ridicule on 
the plea of the prior right of Spain that formed the 
corner stone of the Venezuelan argument, and in 
drawing a telling contrast between the action of the 
Spaniards and the Venezuelans on the one hand and of 
the Dutch and the British on the other. Mr. Askwith 
next spoke and was followed by General Tracy on 
behalf of Venezuela. The Attorney-General then 
summed up for Great Britain, while General Harrison 
brought the oral argument to a close with a speech 
which, despite its force and eloquence, failed to make 
any serious impression on the court. The absence, 
indeed, of any affirmative evidence forced the General 
to found the Venezuelan case almost entirely on the 
contention that, as successor to Spain, Venezuela was 


The Arbitral Award AI 


vested with a prior and paramount title to the territory 
in dispute and to supplement this argument with 
criticisms of the British case. 

Had the case been tried by an impartial court of 
justice, that would have decided it in the light of the 
evidence laid before it, the whole of the territory in 
dispute would in all probability have been awarded us. 
As it was, the boundary line fixed by the award did 
not entail the sacrifice of any serious British interests, 
though the mouth of the Barima was not left, as we had 
hoped, in the absolute possession of Great Britain. 
But with an arbitral tribunal, in which the litigant 
parties are represented by arbitrators appointed by 
themselves, the neutral president is naturally tempted 
to find some compromise that will secure a unanimous 
decision. Such unanimity had been lacking in all the 
arbitral awards that had been delivered between that 
on the Alabama claims in 1878 and that on the Behring 
Sea Fisheries some twenty years later, and Monsieur 
de Martens had special reasons for desiring to break 
through this rule in the case of the Venezuelan arbitra- 
tion. The first Peace Conference, convoked on the 
initiative of the Emperor Nicholas, had met at the 
Hague in the month of July, and he was anxious to 
second his Sovereign’s efforts in the cause of peace by 
securing a unanimous award that would go far to 
encourage other States to submit their differences to 
arbitration. Such a desire was laudable in itself, but 
the means which he employed to give effect to it were 
not above criticism. Having decided in his own mind 
on a boundary line that would constitute a fair com- 
promise between the conflicting claims of the parties to 
the dispute, he approached their respective arbitrators 


42 My Mission to Russia 


in turn, and intimated that if either side declined to 
accept it he would give his casting vote in favour of the 
opponent’s extreme claim. 

The oral argument had occupied fifty-four sittings 
of the court, and, if the proceedings were unduly pro- 
longed, the responsibility lay with the counsel for 
Venezuela, who had spoken for ten days more, than 
with our counsel. ‘Though the most cordial personal 
relations were maintained throughout, there were, as 
was but natural, many sharp passages of arms between 
the opposing counsel. The Attorney-General, in spite 
of his able conduct of the case, did not like facing a 
difficult situation, and would always try to get round it 
by returning an evasive answer to any awkward ques- 
tion that was addressed to him. ‘These tactics so 
annoyed General Harrison that on one occasion he rose 
and caused considerable amusement in court by remark- 
ing: ‘** The Attorney-General reminds me of a large 
bird that has alighted on a branch too weak to hold him, 
so he spreads out his wings and goes flap, flap with 
them to keep himself in position.’’ The General at the 
same time was moving his arms up and down like a 
bird’s wings, and every time the Attorney-General 
tried to burke a question he quietly rose and repeated 
this pantomimic action. 

It was with some diffidence that I had accepted the 
post as agent, as, apart from the novelty of the work, 
the position of an agent on a big arbitration case is 
rather an anomalous one unless he is prepared to be a 
mere cipher. The preparation and the conduct of the 
case were naturally in the hands of the great lawyers 
employed on it, and, though I took part in all their 
discussions, my réle was rather to keep the Government 


My Duties as Agent 43 


informed of the result of their deliberations and of the 
line of argument which it was proposed to adopt. The 
Attorney-General, however, was always ready to listen 
to anything which I had to say, and when, as sometimes 
happened, I was not in entire agreement with him on 
some important question, I did not hesitate to say so, 
and on more than one occasion I succeeded in carrying 
my point. During the sittings of the court at Paris 
our respective positions were never quite clearly defined. 
While the Attorney-General was in the habit of speak- 
ing of me as ‘*‘ my agent,’’ Lord Justice Collins resented 
his dubbing the Government’s representative his agent, 
and urged me to retort by referring to ‘‘ my Attorney- 
General ’’—a piece of advice which I naturally did not 
follow. 

Besides having to arrange for the housing of all the 
members of the British delegation at Paris, I had to 
settle with the Treasury the amount of their salaries and 
subsistence allowances. This was rather an ungrateful 
task, as we are all inclined to rate our services at a 
somewhat higher figure than the Government attaches 
to them; but by making graceful concessions to the 
Treasury in minor matters I generally succeeded in 
getting what I wanted. ‘To quote but one instance. 
The Lord Chief Justice protested that five guineas a 
day was not sufficient to enable him to live in Paris in 
a style befitting his high office, and pressed me to raise 
his own subsistence allowance to six guineas and that 
of his clerk from twenty-five shillings to thirty shillings. 
In submitting his request to the Treasury I said that 
I considered that Lord Russell’s claim reasonable, but 
that I could not conscientiously support his request 
for an extra five shillings for his clerk. The Treasury 


44 My Mission to Russia 


thereupon not only granted his lordship the six guineas 
which he had asked for, but remarked, much to my 
amusement, that it was refreshing to deal with someone 
like myself who had the public’s interest at heart. ‘The 
clerk, however, did not suffer in the end, as on the con- 
clusion of the arbitration I secured for him a bonus of 
fifty pounds. 

My most difficult task at Paris was preparing for the 
Foreign Office a report of each successive sitting of the 
court, as, in such a lengthy and complicated case, it was 
no easy matter to summarize in a despatch the speeches 
of counsel and to appraise the value of their respective 
arguments. ‘The labour which I bestowed on these 
reports was, however, amply rewarded by the Govern- 
ment’s cordial appreciation of my services. I was given 
the C.B. and offered the choice of a small Legation or 
the post of counsellor of embassy. As I was anxious 
to get back to political work I opted for the latter, and | 
at the end of 1900 was appointed to Rome, where Lord~ 
Currie was then our ambassador. During four out of 
the eleven months I spent there I was in charge of the 
embassy ; but Rome in those days was a very easy post. 
Political interest centred round the Cretan question, 
which was dealt with in a conference of the representa- 
tives of the Powers more immediately interested under 
the presidency of the Italian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, Signor Prinetti. Tempora mutantur—and in 
these days of storm and stress one looks back with envy 
to the time when such a question as the Government 
of Crete was one of our chief preoccupations. 

In the autumn of 1901 I was transferred to the 
embassy at Berlin, the post which I had originally asked 
for. I was anxious to go there not only because Frank 


Counsellor of Embassy, Berlin 1901-3 45 


Lascelles, our ambassador, was a very old friend, but 
because Berlin was at that particular moment the most 
important of all our embassies. All who have read 
Baron Eckhartstein’s remarkable revelations will re- 
member how the repeated attempts made by our 
Government to come to an understanding and to con- 
clude some sort of defensive alliance with Germany had 
been frustrated by the folly and insincerity of the 
Anglophobe clique in the Wilhelmstrasse. Great 
Britain was then at the parting of the ways, as the time 
had come when it was impossible for her to pursue any 
longer her policy of splendid isolation. She had either 
to range herself on the side of the Triple Alliance or 
to throw in her lot with France and Russia. During 
the Boer War Anglo-German relations had been 
strained almost to the breaking point by such incidents 
as the holding up and searching of the German steamers 
Bundesrath, General and Hertzog; and, while the 
excitement produced by these incidents in Germany 
was intense, the threatening attitude adopted by the 
Imperial Government had provoked a counter-irritation 
in Official circles in London. In spite of this, however, 
the idea of a defensive arrangement with Germany was 
not altogether abandoned by His Majesty’s Govern- 
ment, and as late as the spring of 1901 the question was 
once more broached by Lord Lansdowne. ‘The recep- 
tion, however, accorded to this tentative proposal by 
the Wilhelmstrasse was not encouraging, and the 
negotiations which followed only served to convince our 
Government that it was hopeless to look on Germany 
as a possible ally. 

Shortly after my arrival in Berlin in October, 1901, 
Sir Frank went on leave, and I was consequently left 


46 My Mission to Russia 


in charge of the embassy. It was a moment of acute 
tension. In the Press calumnies of every description 
were being circulated respecting the conduct of our 
troops in South Africa, while in the Reichstag the 
latter were being denounced as mercenaries and accused 
of fighting behind a screen of women and children. In 
a speech which he delivered at the end of October 
repudiating these unfounded charges, Mr. Chamberlain 
cited incidents in the War of 1870 which were not to 
the credit of the German army. ‘These counter-charges 
did but add fuel to the flames and provoked a fresh 
anti-British campaign in the Reichstag, to which Count 
Biilow, who had recently succeeded Prince Hohenlohe 
as Chancellor, contributed a speech criticizing Mr. 
Chamberlain in the strongest terms. 

A chargé d’affaires has but few opportunities of 
seeing so exalted a personage as the Imperial Chan- 
cellor; but Count Biilow, to whom I had been recom- 
mended by my friend and colleague at Rome, Baron 
Jagow, was good enough to ask me to dine, and I 
took advantage of a conversation which I had with 
him after dinner to refer to the recent debates in 
the Reichstag. I was, I proceeded to say, prepared 
to admit that, as a fighting force, the British army 
did not bear comparison with the German army. ‘The 
navy ‘was our first line of defence, and our army was, 
relatively speaking, a small one; but this fact did 
not prevent our being proud both of it and its great 
traditions. We resented its being treated as an 
army of mercenaries, and we resented still more the 
calumnious charges that had been made against it in 
the Reichstag. Men who volunteered for active service, 
men who were ready of their own free will to lay down 


Count Bilow and Prince Ito 47 


their lives for their king and country, were, in my 
opinion, on a higher plane than men who were forced 
to do so under a system of obligatory service. His 
Excellency, I was convinced, did not himself give 
credence to the stories which had been told about our 
troops in the Reichstag. I would therefore appeal to 
him, in the interest of the maintenance of good rela- 
tions between our two countries, to intervene in the 
debate and to put matters right by explaining that the 
Reichstag had been misinformed as to the conduct of 
our troops. Count Biilow admitted that he did not 
personally credit the truth of these stories, and spoke 
with his characteristic charm and courtesy. But 
he was not a strong enough man to swim against 
the current, so he turned a deaf ear to my appeal, 
declaring that he could not interfere with the 
Reichstag and that it was impossible for him to say 
anything. . 
In December, 1901, the Marquis Ito arrived in 
Berlin on his way to London, and, as Japan was still 
hesitating between an alliance with Russia and an 
alliance with Great Britain, I was naturally anxious to 
ascertain what had passed between him and Count 
Witte during his stay at St. Petersburg. I had 
known the Marquis when I was a secretary at our 
Legation at Tokio in 1880, and, on renewing acquaint- 
ance with him at a party at the Japanese Legation, I 
tried to draw him by turning the conversation on to 
the subject of his journey. Japanese statesmen, how- 
ever, are never very communicative. The Marquis, 
who had throughout our conversation maintained an 
attitude of studied reserve, declined to be drawn and 
eventually silenced me with the crushing remark: “‘ I 


48 My Mission to Russia 


have had a most interesting journey, but I never 
allowed myself to be interviewed.”’ 

The Anglo-Japanese Treaty, which was signed some 
six weeks later, and the final abandonment of the idea 
of any defensive alliance with Germany, paved the way 
for the understanding with France which was to follow 
two years later. ‘This new trend in British foreign 
policy did not help to improve our relations with Ger- 
many, and, though ostensibly normal and friendly, 
those relations became marked by a growing feeling of 
mutual distrust. Apart from the question of her naval 
programme, that constituted a direct challenge to our 
supremacy on the seas, repeated friction was caused by 
Germany’s provocative action in China. This was more 
especially the case in the autumn of 1902, when I was 
in charge of the embassy, and I remember being 
hurried back from a flying visit to London, where I- 
had gone in order to attend my wife’s operation for 
appendicitis—an operation of so serious a character that 
her life was only saved by Sir Frederick Treves’ con- 
summate skill—in order to ‘‘ rub in’’ the very bad 
impression which some recent step, taken by Germany 
on the Yangtse, had made on His Majesty’s Govern- 
ment. I did so with such effect that the Foreign 
Secretary, Baron von Richthofen, who as a rule was 
the most courteous of men, lost all control of his 
temper and gave vent to his feelings in a torrent of- 
angry words that did not serve any useful purpose. On 
reading the telegram in which I had reported this 
heated conversation King Edward was good enough to 
commend my outspoken language and to tell Sir Frank, 
who happened to be staying at Sandringham, that he 
had got a very good locum-tenens. 


Am Appointed to Sofia 49 


Of all my posts Berlin, despite its political interest, 
was the one which I liked the least, and as I had been 
sent there at my own special request, I sometimes felt, 
with Charles Kingsley, that I had been ‘‘ cursed with 
the burden of an answered prayer.’’ As a town it was 
unattractive and, except for a small circle of intimate 
friends who showed us much kindness, the social life, 
with its tedious afternoon receptions and stiff official 
dinners, was boring in the extreme. I was therefore 
not sorry to leave it on being appointed at the end of 
1903 agent and consul-general at Sofia with the personal 
rank of Minister. 


CHAPTER V 
1887-1904 


REVIEW OF PRINCE FERDINAND’S REIGN 


N August 14, 1887, Prince Ferdinand had taken 

the oath before the Grand Sobranje at Tirnovo, 
the ancient Bulgarian capital, and in a proclamation 
issued on the same day had informed ‘“‘ our free 
people ’’ that he had mounted the throne of the glorious 
Bulgarian Tsars. The circumstances under which he 
had been elected have been already explained, and I 
propose in the present chapter to give a brief sketch of 
his career as a Balkan prince down to the date of my 
arrival at Sofia early in 1904. 

For the first seven years he reigned and Stambuloff 
governed, and it was only after the fall of his all- 
powerful Minister in 1894 that he took the reins of 
power into his own hands. The first of these two 
periods was marked by the open hostility of Russia, by 
the ever-present danger of a Russian occupation, and 
by a succession of plots against his life. With his 
recognition in 1896 and the consequent resumption of 
diplomatic relations, Russia abandoned her openly 
hostile attitude, and endeavoured to regain by more 
insidious means the position which she had lost by her 
own folly. One feature there was common to both 
periods—on the one hand, the wounded pride of Russia 
claiming, by virtue of her sacrifices in the war of libera- 
tion, the right to direct the course of Bulgarian policy 

50 


Attitude of the Powers 51 


into her own channels; and, on the other, a young, 
virile and democratic nation struggling to maintain its 
independence and determined to shape its own destinies 
without the interference of any foreign Power. Prince 
Ferdinand was from the first anxious to reconcile these 
conflicting forces, as he was persuaded that neither 
Bulgaria nor her ruler could exist in the long run with- 
out the good will of Russia. He had, even before 
proceeding to Sofia, made advances to her through the 
Russian ambassador in Vienna, but without success. 
Russia was implacable, and twice in the next six months 
she endeavoured to make the Porte insist on his vacat- 
ing the throne of which he had taken illegal possession. 

Fortunately for Prince Ferdinand, Great Britain, 
Austria and Italy were alive to the danger of the estab- 
lishment of a Panslavist régime in Bulgaria, and they 
not only discouraged the Sultan from taking a course 
that might have led to the employment of force by 
either Russia or Turkey, but they even empowered 
their representatives at Sofia to enter into private and 
unofficial relations with him. ‘Though he thus con- 
tinued to reign as a de facto Sovereign, with the 
unofficial support of the so-called friendly Powers, his 
position was long a precarious one. The army had 
never really transferred its allegiance to him, and the 
spring of 1890 was marked by the discovery of an 
extensive military conspiracy to dethrone him. The 
doubtful loyalty of the army made Stambuloff anxious 
to secure the Prince’s recognition by the Sultan, but, 
in the face of Russia’s opposition, his overtures at 
Constantinople met with no response. He did, how- 
ever, succeed in obtaining berats for the appointment 
of Bulgarian bishops to the sees of Ochrida, Uskub, 


52 My Mission to Russia 


Veles and Nevrokop. He was the one strong man on 
whom the whole situation depended, and he dictated 
the Government’s policy. While not hesitating when 
occasion demanded it to work on the Sultan’s fears by 
means of veiled threats, he pursued a conciliatory policy. 
He restricted his demands to that measure of autonomy, ~ 
to which Macedonia was entitled under the Treaty of 
Berlin, in the conviction that, were that autonomy once 
granted, the union of Macedonia with Bulgaria would 
follow as naturally and as irresistibly as the union with 
Eastern Roumelia. 

Meanwhile the risk of assassination, to which the 
Prince might at any time be exposed in consequence 
of the plots of the Russophil party, rendered it more 
than ever desirable that he should marry and found a 
dynasty. In 1892 negotiations were opened with the 
Duke of Parma for the hand of his daughter, Princess 
Marie Louise. As the Duke insisted that the children 
of the marriage should be brought up in the Catholic 
religion, Stambuloff undertook to secure the revision of 
Article 82 of the Constitution, according to which the 
heir to the throne had to belong to the Orthodox 
religion. Russia at once entered a protest against a 
step which she held to be contrary to the religious 
sentiments of the Bulgarian people. In the country 
itself the idea was unpopular; but so indispensable did 
Stambuloff consider it for the Prince’s marriage that, 
taking all the odium of the measure on his own 
shoulders, he forced its adoption on the Sobranje. 
Prince Ferdinand’s marriage was celebrated in the 
spring of 1898, and, followed as it was at the close of 
that year by the death of his only rival, Prince 
Alexander, greatly strengthened his position. It at 


The Fall of Stambuloff 53 


the same time rendered him impatient of the tutelage 
of a man who could brook no opposition to his will, 
even from his own Sovereign. Feeling that he was 
now strong énough to stand alone, he determined to 
get rid of a Minister whom he regarded as the chief 
obstacle to his official recognition by the Powers. The 
tension that had so long existed between them was 
brought to a climax by an incident connected with the 
resignation of the Minister of War, and Stambuloff 
tendered his resignation, which was at once accepted. 

The fall of Stambuloff marked a turning point in 
the constitutional history of Bulgaria and inaugurated 
an era of personal government by the Prince, more 
especially in the domain of foreign affairs. He was 
succeeded by M. Stoiloff, the leader of the Conservative 
party, as head of a coalition government ; but the Prince 
at once made it clear that he intended to be his own 
Foreign ‘Minister. One of his first steps was to pave 
the way for a rapprochement with Russia by an 
exchange of telegrams with the Emperor Nicholas on 
the occasion of the death of the Emperor Alexander III 
in November, 1894, and by sending a deputation, under 
the Archbishop Clement, to St. Petersburg in the 
following July to place a wreath on the late Emperor’s 
tomb. ‘The reception accorded to the deputation was 
distinctly cool, and the only result obtained was an 
intimation to the effect that the admission of Prince 
Boris into the Orthodox Church would be agreeable to 
the Emperor and that a request for the despatch of a 
Russian agent to Sofia would be favourably entertained. 
But while he was thus endeavouring to regain the good 
will of Russia, his treatment of Stambuloff lost him the 
sympathy formerly felt for Bulgaria at Vienna and in 


54 My Mission to Russia 


London. Though repeatedly warned of the danger to 
which that statesman’s life was exposed, the Prince’s 
Government had not only taken no measures for his 
protection, but had even refused him permission to go 
to Carlsbad, and the cynical indifference which they dis- 
played after his assassination in July, 1895, laid them 
open to the charge of being morally, if not directly, 
responsible for his murder. 

Another cause of difference between the Western 
Powers and Bulgaria was the attitude of tolerance, and 
even of actual encouragement, which the latter Govern- 
ment had, since Stambuloff’s fall, adopted towards the 
insurrectionary Bulgarian movement in Macedonia. 
That movement, in contradistinction to those of the 
Greeks and Serbs, was essentially Macedonian in its 
origin. It was a protest against the geographical 
limitations placed by the Treaty of Berlin on the 
national aspirations, which had been awakened not 
only by the Treaty of San Stefano, but also by the 
recommendations of the conference held at Constanti- 
nople on the eve of the Russo-Turkish War. In the 
Projet du Réglement pour le Bulgarie Europe had 
recognized the ethnographical claims of the Bulgarian 
race as comprising the three northern kazas of the 
Adrianople vilayet, the principality as afterwards 
constituted by the Treaty of Berlin, the Sanjaks of 
Uskub, Monastir (with the exception of its two 
southern kazas), the three northern kazas of Serres, 
and the kazas of Strumnitza and Kastoria. The 
publication of the provisions of the Treaty of Berlin 
was immediately followed by two ineffectual risings in 
the valley of the Struma, and in 1880 a conspiracy of 
a more ambitious character was discovered at Ochrida. 


Bulgarian Movement in Macedonia 55 


No further risings were attempted for more than a 
decade, though the brigand bands, which had always 
existed in Macedonia, showed occasional signs of 
activity. The movement, however, did but slumber, 
and the idea of an eventual, if distant, emancipation 
was kept alive by the steady stream of emigration which 
soon set in towards the principality. The national 
sentiment, moreover, had been stimulated by the 
spread of the influence of the Exarchist Church. 
Prior to 1870 the Patriarchate had been supreme in 
all ecclesiastical and scholastic matters, while politically 
it had been a potent instrument of Hellenization. 
Since the last vestige of a Bulgarian Church had dis- 
appeared with the suppression in 1767 of the see of 
Ochrida, all Orthodox Christians had necessarily been 
Patriarchists, and allegiance to the Patriarchate was 
reputed, though quite erroneously, to carry with it the 
implication of Greek nationality. By the Firman. of 
1870, however, the Exarchate had acquired the right 
to appoint bishops to certain specified dioceses as far 
south as Florina, as well as to others where two-thirds 
of the Orthodox inhabitants acknowledged its juris- 
diction. This right was from the first strenuously con- 
tested by the Patriarchate, and the conflict which 
ensued soon developed into one of races and _ politics 
rather than of churches and religion. The Exarchate, 
supported by Stambuloff, had aimed at establishing the 
preponderance of the Bulgarian element by means of 
bishops, priests and schoolmasters ; but in 1898 a group 
of young Macedonians, finding the methods of the 


schoolmaster too slow, founded the ‘* Internal Organiza- - 


tion.’? While in Macedonia itself it could only exist 
as a secret committee, it established a regular political 


\, 


56 My Mission to Russia 


organization among the Macedonians in Bulgaria. So 
long as Stambuloff was in power the action of the 
latter was kept well in hand, but shortly after his fall 
its activities became more pronounced, and in 1895 the 
“Macedonian Central Committee was founded at Sofia. 
Its methods were openly revolutionary: it collected 
money, enrolled bands and preached insurrection, while 
the Government remained a passive spectator, doing 
nothing to arrest the movement till compelled to do 
so in consequence of the serious representations of the 
Powers. 

Meanwhile the feeling in favour of a reconciliation 
with Russia was gaining ground, and the question of 
the religion of the heir apparent was being openly 
discussed. In thus allowing Prince Boris’s conversion 
to become an article of a political programme, Prince 
Ferdinand had neither gauged the strength of the 
religious objections of his wife’s family nor foreseen 
the political pressure which eventually induced him to 
give effect to it. As a result of his having taken the 
reins of Government into his own hands, the attacks of 
the opposition were now directed against his person, 
and he had come to be regarded as an obstacle to the 
realization of the national wish. Plots for his assassina- 
tion were discovered, and extraordinary precautions had 
to be taken for his safety. A ministerial crisis was 
threatened, and the Sobranje voiced the desire of the 
nation that Prince Boris should pass into the Orthodox 
Church. Before taking a final decision, Prince Ferdi- 
nand went on a pilgrimage to Rome in the hope of 
persuading the Pope to release him from the engage- 
ment which he had contracted on his marriage. His 
Holiness, however, was inexorable, and on his return 


Prince Boris’s Conversion 57 


to Sofia Prince Ferdinand, after first feigning to con- 
template abdication, signed a proclamation providing 
for Prince Boris’s confirmation according to Orthodox 
rites. The Emperor Nicholas accepted the office of 
godfather, while M. Tcharikoff was accredited as 
Russian diplomatic agent at Sofia. The Sultan at the 
same time recognized His Royal Highness as Prince 
of Bulgaria and as Governor-General of Eastern 
Roumelia; the other Powers gave their assent, and 
Prince Ferdinand’s position was formally regularized. 
The recognition of the Powers had, however, been 
purchased by a moral sacrifice which, though imposed 
on him in great measure by reasons of high policy, 
was none the less prompted by motives of personal 
ambition. In breaking the solemn engagement which 
had alone rendered his marriage possible, or, as he 
preferred to put it, in sacrificing his child for the 
welfare of Bulgaria, he had loosened the ties which 
bound him to his own family and to the Western 
Powers. ‘‘ The West,’’? Prince Ferdinand told the 
Sobranje, ‘*‘ has pronounced its anathema on me; the 
day dawn of the East spreads its rays around my 
dynasty and illuminates our future.’’ 

But to return to Macedonia, where the Internal 
Organization had not been idle. The period of secret 
preparation, at which they had been working for five 
years, was in 1897 brought to a close. A period of 
action was inaugurated, while the committee was trans- 
formed into a terroristic organization whose decisions 
were executed by the bands. Every year that passed 
witnessed fresh excesses on the part of the Turks and 
fresh reprisals on the part of the committees. The 
attitude of successive Bulgarian Governments towards 


f 


58 My Mission to Russia 


the insurrectionary movement differed only in degree, 
and, while condemning its criminal practices, they one 
and all sympathized with its aims. Whenever a crisis 
seemed imminent representations were made by the 
Powers at Sofia. Austria and Russia, however, did 
not always act cordially together, and the attitude of 
M. Bakhméteeff, the Russian diplomatic agent, and of 
the Panslavist agents in the Balkans did not tally with 
the assurances of the official Russia at St. Petersburg. 
The presence of a Russian Grand Duke and of General 
Ignatieff at the fétes held in the autumn of 1902 to 
commemorate the taking of the Shipka Pass was not, 
moreover, calculated to damp the ardour of the Mace- 
donian committees, and the language held by General 
Ignatieff was a direct incentive to action. 

In December Count Lamsdorff himself paid a short 
visit to Sofia, during which he made it clear that Russia 
had no intention of allowing the committees to drag 
her into an armed intervention in the Balkans. On his 
journey home via Vienna he elaborated with Count 
Goluchowski a scheme of reforms, of which the princi- 
pal feature was the appointment of Hilmi Pasha as 
inspector-general of the three Macedonian vilayets. 
This scheme, which came into force in February, 1908, 
was not far-reaching enough to satisfy public opinion 
in Bulgaria, and the Stambulovist Government—which 
came into power shortly afterwards—determined to 
resume its party’s traditional policy of cultivating good 
relations with Turkey, while endeavouring to extract 
concessions by working on her fears of foreign inter- 
vention. ‘The Russian Government, however, were 
opposed to a direct understanding between vassal and 
suzerain, and the Bulgarian mission that had been des- 


The Macedonian Insurrection 59 


patched to Constantinople for the purpose of effecting 
such an understanding returned empty-handed. Mean- 
while in Macedonia preparations for a general rising 
were being hurriedly pushed forward, and in August 
the signal was given. 

The Bulgarian Government were not prepared for 
war, and, despite the intense resentment aroused by 
the methods of repression to which Turkey had re- 
course, they so mistrusted the drift of Russia’s policy 
that they were anxious to avoid an open rupture 
with Turkey. Russia, they believed, was playing a 
double game. While the Russian Ambassador at 
Constantinople was advocating a stern repression of 
the insurrection, the Russian agent at Sofia was sup- 
porting the cause of the insurgents—and both seemed 
bent on causing a breach between Bulgaria and Turkey 
that would furnish Russia with a pretext for interven- . 
tion. ‘The only result attained by the insurrection was 
to bring home to Europe the gravity of the situation 
as well as the necessity of adopting measures of a more 
thoroughgoing and practical kind. Thanks in great 
measure to Lord Lansdowne’s initiative, an extensive 
reform scheme was concerted by Count Lamsdorff and 
Count Goluchowski at Miirzteg in October. The 
principal points in this scheme were the appointment 
of an Austrian and Russian civil agent as assessors to 
Hilmi Pasha, the reorganization of the gendarmerie by 
a staff of foreign officers, the reform of the judicial 
administration, financial provision for the return of 
the refugees and so on. 

Though some of its provisions were received with 
satisfaction by the Bulgarian Government, the scheme 
as a whole was vitiated in their eyes by the fact that 


60 My Mission to Russia 


the control of its application was vested in Austria 
and Russia, the two most reactionary and self-interested 
members of the European Concert. Such was the 
position of affairs when the outbreak of the Russo- 
Japanese War caused the Bulgarian Government to 
reconsider their attitude. Despite their apprehension © 
of Russia’s designs, they had always cherished the 
comforting conviction that, should they meet with 
a crushing disaster in a war with Turkey, Russia 
would come to their assistance; while, apart from 
the fear of finding themselves isolated in the hour. 
of defeat, they were preoccupied by the idea that 
Austria might take advantage of Russia’s embarrass- 
ments to occupy the northern districts of Macedonia. 
Negotiations for a direct understanding with Turkey 
were therefore resumed, and in April, 1904, an agree- 
ment was signed that served to place the relations 
between vassal and suzerain on a more friendly footing, 
though, owing to Russian opposition, it failed to secure 
the extension, so much desired by Bulgaria, of the 
Miirzteg reform scheme to the Adrianople vilayet. 

It was while these negotiations were still in progress 
that I arrived in Sofia, shortly after the outbreak of the 
Russo-Japanese War. 


CHAPTER VI 
1904-1908 


O far as my personal relations with the Prince were 
concerned, I began my mission under favourable 
auspices, for, in signifying his agreement to my ap- 
pointment as His Majesty’s agent and consul-general, 
Prince Ferdinand had, in one of those well-turned 
phrases of which he was a past master, written: 
‘*Enchanté de recevoir le fils de son pére, qui état 
Vami du mien.’’ On the other hand, the official relations 
between the two Governments had for some time past 
been marked by a certain coolness owing to the extreme 
Russophil policy initiated by His Royal Highness. 
Nor had these relations been improved by an incident, 
which had led to a personal estrangement between the 
two Courts. On receiving the news of Queen Victoria’s 
death Prince Ferdinand had called at the Legation and, 
in announcing his intention of attending the funeral, 
had stipulated that he should be given the precedence 
due to him as Ruler of Bulgaria instead of being treated, 
as he had been at the time of the Diamond Jubilee, as 
a cadet of the House of Coburg. The Prince had been 
informed in reply that this was not a fitting occasion to 
raise such a question, and that no change could be made 
in the procedure already sanctioned. His Royal High- 
ness thereupon countermanded the arrangements made 


for hisjourney. He sent a deputation to represent him, 
| 61 


62 My Mission to: Russia 


but he himself spent the day of the funeral at Philip- 
popolis, where he celebrated Prince Boris’s birthday 
with a review and a gala luncheon to which the Russian 
representative at Sofia was specially invited. This 
‘‘ painful episode,’’ as Prince Ferdinand termed what 
he regarded as a personal slight, had naturally seriously 
indisposed King Edward against him. 

I had always looked on Bulgaria as the most im- 
portant factor in the Balkans and, in view of the new 
situation created by the Russo-Japanese War, I was 
more than ever anxious to wean her if possible from 
too great dependence on Russia. I had, therefore, 
when presenting my letters of credence, laid stress, 
with Lord Lansdowne’s sanction, on the sympathetic 
interest with which His Majesty’s Government had 
followed her moral and material progress under Prince 
Ferdinand’s rule, and had emphasized their feelings of 
friendship for her people. With a Prince, however, 
who was careful to keep the direction of foreign affairs 
in his own hands and who was, moreover, naturally 
drawn towards any Power that understood how to 
flatter his vanity, a better understanding between the 
two Governments could only be arrived at by placing 
his personal relations with the Court of St. James’s on 
a more intimate footing. 

Before leaving England I had had the honour of 
being invited to Windsor for a couple of nights, and I 
had then endeavoured to induce King Edward to charge 
me with a friendly message to Prince Ferdinand that 
would tend to promote the success of my mission. The 
King, however, was not to be moved. ‘‘ You may tell 
the Prince,’’ he said, ‘‘ that I have not forgotten the 
fact that he is my cousin, but that, so long as he pursues 


King Edward and Prince Ferdinand 63 


his present double-faced policy he cannot count on 
my support.’’ Such a caustic message was not en- 
couraging, and I was rather at a loss what to say when, 
at a dinner given me at the palace shortly after my 
arrival at Sofia, I had to reply to the King’s health 
which the Prince had proposed in very friendly terms. 
I did not dare disturb the harmony of the evening by 
giving His Majesty’s message in its entirety, as that 
would have had the effect of a bombshell. I therefore 
took for my text His Majesty’s reference to the hens 
de parenté existing between him and the Prince, and 
after embroidering this theme, concluded by saying a 
few nice things about the Prince and Bulgaria without 
making it clear whether I was expressing the King’s 
feelings or my own personal views. 

On my sitting down Prince Ferdinand shook me 
warmly by the hand and remarked: ‘‘ Things are then © 
not as bad as I thought.’’ After a moment’s pause 
he looked at me and said: ‘‘ Few Lord Salisbury 
m’a toujours traité en assassin de Stambuloff!’’ I 
began to protest feebly, when it fortunately occurred 
to me to repeat to the Prince, in an amended and 
more palatable form, a story which Lord Sanderson 
had once told me about His Royal Highness’s visit 
to London in the Diamond Jubilee year. Lord Salis- 
bury, I said, had rather a poor opinion of his fellow 
men and was not given to wasting his time on what 
he considered as unprofitable conversations. On its 
being suggested that he ought to call on His Royal 
Highness he had raised every sort of objection, and 
it was only after considerable pressure had been 
brought to bear on him that he had eventually con- 
sented to do so. He had returned, however, in quite 


64 My Mission to Russia 


another frame of mind, and in conversation with Lord 
Sanderson had, like Napoleon after his interview 
with Goethe, said of His Royal Highness: ‘‘ Voila un 
homme.’’? The Prince was delighted and made no 
further reference to his supposed complicity in Stam- 
buloff’s assassination. But he would not have been so > 
pleased had I told him that, though Lord Salisbury 
did really say: ‘* There’s a man,’’ his lordship had 
added: ‘‘but I would not like to be his Prime 
Minister.”’ 

Though the signature of the Turco-Bulgarian agree- 
ment had helped to relax the prevailing tension, the 
atmosphere at Sofia was constantly charged with elec- 
tricity, and never did a winter pass without the oft- 
repeated warning that, when the snows melted in the 
Balkans we should witness the outbreak of the long- 
talked-of war. For the moment, however, the Bul- 
garian Government were anxious to give the promised 
reforms a chance, and were, for other reasons, disposed 
to exercise a restraining influence on the insurgent 
leaders. The state of exhaustion, to which the Bul- 
garian element in Macedonia had been reduced by the 
disorganization reigning in the ranks of the committees, 
had encouraged the Greeks to recruit bands in Crete 
and Greece which, thanks to the connivance of the local 
Turkish authorities, were able to strike crushing blows 
at their Bulgarian rivals. Their crowning exploit—the 
destruction of the village of Zagorichani in the spring 
of 1904 and the massacre of the majority of its inhabi- 
tants—provoked a serious anti-Greek movement in 
Bulgaria that resulted in the seizure of many of the 
Greek Patriarchate churches. 

On the other hand, Bulgaria’s relations with Rou- 


Prince Ferdinand and King Charles 65 


mania showed signs of improvement. ‘Though both 
were exposed to the common danger of Russian aggres- 
sion, the good understanding, which had been estab- 
lished while Prince Alexander was on the throne, had 
not been maintained during the reign of his successor. 
It would indeed have been strange had men of such 
entirely different characters as King Charles and Prince 
Ferdinand remained friends; as it was, each of the two 
Sovereigns disliked each other personally, and each 
distrusted the other’s policy. The fall of Stambuloff 
had completed the breach. Roumania was credited by 
the one with a wish to extend her frontier to a better 
strategical line at the expense of the principality, and 
Bulgaria was believed by the other to have designs on 
the Dobrudja and to resent the attempt being made 
there to Roumanize the Bulgarian population. King 
Charles blamed Prince Ferdinand for allowing himself . 
to be entangled in the meshes of his old enemy Russia 
and for deserting his former friends Austria and Rou- 
mania; while Prince Ferdinand, who regarded with 
suspicion Roumania’s military convention with Aus- 
tria, spoke of King Charles as a puppet in the hands of 
the Austrian and German Emperors and as their watch- 
man on the Danube. The King, moreover, was strongly 
opposed to the idea of any territorial aggrandisement 
which would disturb the balance of power in the 
Balkans, and had even on one occasion told the Prince 
that if the Bulgarian army crossed the Rhodope the 
Roumanian army would occupy Silistria. Since 1902, 
however, when King Charles had paid his long-deferred 
return visit to Sofia, the personal relations between the 
two Sovereigns, as well as the official relations between 


the two Governments, had improved, and recent events 
F 


66 My Mission to Russia 


in Macedonia—where both Koutzo-Vlachs and Bul- 
garians were exposed to the attacks of Greek bands— 
had helped to bring the two countries nearer together. 

Though an understanding with Serbia was beset 
with still greater difficulties, an interview which Prince 
Ferdinand had with King Peter at Nisch in the summer _ 
of 1904, and an official visit paid by the latter to Sofia 
later in that year, paved the way for somewhat better 
relations. During this visit I unwittingly incurred the 
Prince’s serious displeasure, and it manifested itself in 
a very characteristic fashion. His Majesty’s Govern- 
ment had not yet recognized King Peter, so that I was 
debarred from attending the State banquet given in 
his honour; but on the day of His Majesty’s arrival 
curiosity prompted me to watch the royal procession 
from the balcony of a friend’s house. As he drove 
past on his way to the station Prince Ferdinand waved 
his hand in friendly greeting. On returning to the 
palace with the King he again looked up at the balcony, 
and failing to make me out, as I had kept well in the 
background till the procession had passed the house, he 
turned round in his carriage and, catching my eye, 
smiled and winked. I was so taken aback that my face 
probably expressed my blank astonishment, but I 
thought no more of the incident. 

On the following day the Bulgarian agent in 
London happened to be dining with me. As I had 
heard that at the dinner at the palace on the pre- 
ceding evening the Russian representative had been 
treated as if he were on quite a different plane from 
the representatives of the other Powers, I took the 
opportunity of protesting against such a differential 
treatment, and remarked that if Prince Ferdinand 


Prince Ferdinand Invited to London 67 


accorded M. Bakhméteeff the position of a Russian 
viceroy, he need not look to His Majesty’s Government 
for sympathy and support. Two days later M. 
Tsokoff, who had, as I learnt later, repeated these 
remarks to the Prince, was sent to tell me that 
His Royal Highness regarded the look which I had 
given him on the day of King Peter’s arrival as a 
personal insult. Such was Prince Ferdinand’s way of 
marking his displeasure with my outspoken language 
to M. Tsokoff. I had, however, to take his message 
seriously, so I wrote him a private letter expressing my 
painful surprise at this unfounded charge and saying 
that I could only ask pardon for an offence which I 
had not committed. The situation was rendered all the 
more piquant by the fact that I had, a few days 
previously, invited the Prince to dine on the King’s 
birthday, while he was, apparently, contemplating ask- 
ing for my recall. In the end he accepted my invita- 
tion, and nothing was said at the dinner about our little 
misunderstanding. On the contrary, we paid each 
other compliments and exchanged pretty speeches, 
for with a character such as his one could, as Lord 
Beaconsfield put it, lay flattery on with a trowel. 

It was not long, however, before I was once more 
in his black books. Prince Ferdinand had, in the 
summer of 1904, met King Edward at Marienbad, and 
in an audience which I had on going to London in the 
following February I had suggested that His Majesty 
should put the seal on this reconciliation by inviting 
His Royal Highness to pay him a short visit at 
Buckingham Palace. The King agreed, and in 
authorizing me to convey an invitation to the Prince 
added: ‘‘ Tell him only to bring a small suite, as the 


68 My Mission to Russia 


smaller the Prince the larger the suite.’? Knowing 
how touchy Prince Ferdinand was on all matters of 
etiquette, I, with much difficulty, obtained the King’s 
permission to go to meet him on his arrival at Dover, 
and to make other arrangements for his reception. 
At the dinner given in his honour at Buckingham ~ 
Palace the Prince told my wife that this was the first 
time that he had been received with the honours due 
to his rank, and that he would never forget all that I 
had done for him. The next day there was the usual 
exchange of decorations, and His Royal Highness 
showed his gratitude by sending me a Bulgarian 
order of the second class, being piqued at the fact 
that the King had, after consulting me, only given the 
Bulgarian agent the K.C.V.O. On my representing 
to the King that, as most of my colleagues at Sofia had 
Bulgarian orders of the first class, I would prefer not 
to accept this decoration, His Majesty caused a com- 
munication to be made to the Prince that resulted in 


“\. my receiving the Grand _Cross-in-time for me to wear 


it at the dinner given by the Prince of Wales at 
Marlborough House. On leaving the dining-room 
after dinner the King said to me in passing, ‘‘ I am 
so glad that it’s all right’’?; but Prince Ferdinand, 
who had overheard this remark, was not so pleased, 
and, putting his eyeglass in his eye and looking up at 
the ceiling, cut me dead. Though he had to put up 
with my company on his journey to Dover, he did not 
speak to me for six months after my return to Sofia. 
The visit, nevertheless, served a useful purpose in spite 
of his not being altogether satisfied with his conversa- 
tions with Lord Lansdowne, who, he complained, was 
too °° boutonné.”’ 


Better Relations with Austria 69 


Meanwhile Prince Ferdinand had succeeded in 
establishing better relations with both Austria and 
Germany. Austria’s one desire was to dissociate 
Bulgaria from Serbia and to induce her, by motives of 
self-interest, to renounce all idea of a political or 
economic alliance with that kingdom. It was in con- 
sequence of the pressure which she had brought to bear 
at Belgrade that the so-called Serbo-Bulgarian Customs 
Union Treaty, negotiated in 1905, was never ratified 
by the Skuptschina, although it had been voted, by 
acclamation, by the Sobranje and although Prince 
Ferdinand had even undertaken to make common 
cause with Serbia should the latter be drawn into a 
tariff war with the Dual Monarchy. The result was 
that Bulgaria, who had been on the verge of a rupture 
of commercial relations with Austria, arranged a 
modus vivendi with that Empire on the basis of the 
most favoured nation treatment; while Austria aban- 
doned her attitude of cold reserve and adopted one of 
friendly interest in the principality. Germany had also 
become alive to the fact that Bulgaria, as the most 
promising of the Balkan States, was worthy of her 
serious attention. The German Emperor went out of 
his way to be civil to the Prince, and the German 
Government posed as her disinterested friend. A 
German bank was established at Sofia, mountain guns 
and artillery ammunition were supplied to the army, 
and German capital was encouraged to assist in the 
economic exploitation of the country. Prince Ferdi- 
nand, on the other hand, hoped to enlist the services 
of German diplomacy on his side and to use the 
influence of the Sultan’s friend in support of Bulgaria’s 
claims in Macedonia. His leanings towards Berlin 


70 My Mission to Russia 


were, moreover, prompted by the belief that Russia 
was, for the moment, powerless to help him. It had 
been fear rather than love of Russia that had, ever 
since Stambuloff’s fall, been the keynote of his policy, 
as he had always been haunted by the dread of sharing 
the fate of his predecessor or of falling a victim to some 
plot for his assassination. 'The enfeeblement of that 
Empire, owing to the turn which events had taken in 
the Far East, had therefore afforded him a welcome 
relief. Russian imfluence, indeed, had been on the 
wane ever since the fall of the Russophil Daneff 
Government in 1908; and the following incident, 
which, though trivial im itself, gradually assumed an 
international character, shows how low the prestige of 
the Russian agency had fallen in 1905. 

I happened to be president that year of the Union 
Club, and M. Bakhméteeff—who had more than once 
tried to make things unpleasant for me—wrote to me 
one day saying that he had torn up that week’s copy 
of Simplicissimus on account of a caricature which it 
had published of the Emperor Nicholas. He concluded 
by requesting me, as president, to stop its being any 
longer taken in by the club. I replied that other 
Sovereigns had been frequently caricatured in Simpli- 
cissumus, and that if, in an international club like the 
Union, members were at liberty to tear up any paper 
that displeased them, there would not be many left 
intact in the reading room. Had he, I added, sent me 
the caricature in question and requested me to have 
the Simplicissimus suppressed, I would have submitted 
the question to the committee, and I was even now 
prepared to do so if he would admit that he had acted 
incorrectly. He declined, however, to do this, and 


Simplicissimus Makes Trouble 71 


rejected other overtures which I made him with the 
object of providing a golden bridge over which he 
might beat a graceful retreat. He even told me that 
he had but to hold up his little finger and all the 
Bulgarian members of the club would support him. 
Finally, after the incident had lasted some ten days, 
he wrote requesting me to strike his name and the 
names of all his staff from the list of the members of 
the club over which I presided. As I had no wish to 
expose myself to the charge of having purposely forced 
the staff of the Russian agency to leave the club, I at 
once sent in my resignation as president—an example 
that was followed by all the members of the committee. 
A general meeting had consequently to be held to elect 
a new president and a new committee, and after I had 
briefly stated the facts of the case we were all re-elected, 
with but one dissentient voice—that of a secretary of 
the Greek Legation. M. Bakhméteeff was naturally 
furious and cut me ever afterwards. He was, fortun- 
ately, transferred to Tokio in the following year, and 
after the appointment of M. Sementowski as Russian 
diplomatic agent in 1907 my relations with the Russian 
agency, more especially after the Reval meeting, were 
of a most cordial character. 


It is by no means an easy matter to follow the 
course of Prince Ferdinand’s foreign policy, for he 
always made it a rule not to commit himself to any 
definite line of action. An opportunist, inspired solely 
by regard for his own personal interests, he preferred 
to pursue a politique de bascule and to coquette first 
with one and then with another of the Powers as he 
deemed best for the advancement of those interests. 


72 My Mission to Russia 


/ When in 1907 Serbia’s persistent efforts to divide up 
Macedonia into spheres of influence had brought the 
two countries to the verge of war, it was to Austria 
‘that he turned, as he had no wish to see the eventual 
march of the Bulgarian army on Belgrade arrested, as 
it had been in 1885, by the intervention of a second 
Count Khevenhiiller. His advances were met in a 
benevolent spirit ; but as the war scare passed away his 
thoughts were diverted into another channel. 

Prince Ferdinand had long cherished the ambition 
of converting the principality into an independent king- 
dom, and the twentieth anniversary of his accession to 
the throne, which was to be celebrated at Tirnovo by the 
convocation of a grand national assembly composed of 
all deputies who had ever sat in the Sobranje, seemed 
to furnish a grateful nation with a fitting occasion for 
offering their Prince a royal crown. His Royal High- 
ness, as was his wont on occasions of this sort, kept 
carefully in the background and allowed others to do 
the necessary spade-work. The foreign representatives 
were sounded and feelers were put out with a view to 
preparing the public for what was coming. ‘Though 
the idea of thus gratifying the Prince’s vanity appealed 
but to a few interested generals and politicians, it was 
nevertheless generally expected that he would be 
acclaimed King at one of the many banquets by which 
the anniversary would be celebrated, and that he would 
yield to this douce violence. Austria, however, whose 
plans for the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
had not yet matured, considered that the pyschological 
moment had not yet come for such an open violation 
of the Treaty of Berlin. She therefore demanded a 
categorical answer to the question whether or not 


Austria and the Berlin Treaty 73 


independence was about to be proclaimed, and warned 
the Prince that the Emperor would not recognize such 
a change in the status of the principality. His Royal 
Highness, who happened to be abroad, at once pub- 
lished a manifesto, assuring his subjects that their 
Prince “‘ s’est imposé d’autres devoirs envers la nation 
et ne saurait s’occuper de vaines questions de formalités, 
de titres et de satisfaction personelle.’’ He subse- 
quently repeated these assurances both to the Emperor 
at Ischl and to Baron Aehrenthal at Vienna, while the 
Tirnovo fétes were countermanded and his Jubilee 
celebrated on a modest scale at Sofia. In vetoing the 
proclamation of Bulgarian independence the Emperor 
of Austria had been careful to gild the pill by con- 
ferring on the Prince the colonelcy of an Austrian 
regiment; but this compliment did not soothe his 
wounded feelings. He had, he confided to a friend, 
been treated ‘‘ d’une maniére indigne,’’ and he would 
take care, when he found a favourable opportunity for 
declaring Bulgaria’s independence, that nobody should 
have an inkling of his intentions an hour beforehand. 
While Prince Ferdinand had been thus coquetting 
with Austria, he had not neglected Russia. The 
Emperor had, at the orthodox New Year, appealed to 
the weak side of the Prince’s character by conferring on 
him the brilliants of the Order of St. André, and in-the 
following September His Majesty deputed the Grand 
Duke Vladimir to inaugurate the statue erected by the 
Bulgarian nation at Sofia to the memory of the Tsar 
Liberator. The political importance of this visit lay 
chiefly inthe fact that it was the first sign which 
Russia had given since her war with Japan of the 
revival of her active interest in the affairs of the Near 


74 My Mission to Russia 


East and of her desire to reassert her influence in 
Bulgaria. The welcome given the Russian visitors by 
all classes of the population was also symptomatic. For 
it showed that, in spite of the intrigues by which 
Russia had in the past endeavoured to undermine 
the independence of the principality, the salient fact 
alone remained that, as it was to Russia that 
Bulgaria had owed her emancipation, so it was to 
Russia that she must look for the realization of 
her dreams of the Greater Bulgaria projected in 
the Treaty of San Stefano. On the other hand, the 
astonishing progress accomplished by the principality 
and the efficiency of her army were a revelation 
to the Grand Duke and his staff, who realized 
for the first time that Bulgaria, though founding her 
hopes for the future on Russia, was now a factor with 
whom Russia would have to count and was no longer 
necessarily dependent on her. ‘The astute mind of the 
Prince had, moreover, not been slow to grasp the fact 
that both Russia and Austria had need of his co- 
operation, and that it was to his interest to keep them 
apart so as to be free to side with whichever of 
them was prepared to pay the highest price for that 
co-operation. 

Karly in the following year Prince Ferdinand 
decided to part with his Stambulovist advisers, who 
during their five years’ tenure of office had amassed 
small fortunes, and to allow one of the other parties to 
have, as he put it, a bite at the bone. He chose the 
democrats, under Malinoff, as their successors; but 
insisted, as was his wont, on the appointment of two 
outsiders to the Ministries of War and of Foreign 
Affairs, in order to keep the control of those two 


A Bulgarian Election 45 


ministries in his own hands. The result of the elections, 
which followed the dissolution of the Sobranje, was a 
complete victory for the new ministry ; but the methods 
of constitutional government as practised in Bulgaria 
may be gauged by the fact that the Stambulovists, who 
had been in a majority of two to one in the late 
chamber, were unrepresented in the new one, while 
the Democrats, who had previously but two parlia- 
mentary representatives, won 173 out of a total of 
203 seats. 


CHAPTER VII 
1908-1910 


N the spring of 1908 His Majesty’s Government had 
put forward a far-reaching scheme of reforms for 
Macedonia that had caused intense satisfaction in Bul- 
garia; and the somewhat negative attitude which Russia 
adopted towards it did but make her turn more than 
ever towards Great Britain. A new factor, however, 
had suddenly appeared on the scene in the shape of the 
constitutional movement in Turkey which took Europe 
by surprise at the end of July. The first impression 
produced at Sofia was one of scepticism, and the revival 
of the Constitution of 1876 by Imperial Decree was 
regarded in the light of a ruse to gain time for the 
purpose of nullifying the new reform scheme. It was 
for this reason that the overtures, made at the outset 
by the Young Turks to the Macedonian committees, 
were rejected; but as the constitutional movement 
gathered force the question as to how Bulgarian 
interests would be affected by the new order of things 
had to be seriously considered. On the one hand, it was 
felt that a constitutional régime, if honestly applied, 
would enable the Bulgarian element in Macedonia to 
develop both politically and materially ; on the other, 
it was feared that it might seriously compromise the 
realization of Bulgaria’s national aspirations in Mace- 
donia. The Government, at a loss whether to support 
76 


Bulgaria’s International Status "7 


or to oppose it, adopted an attitude of reserve; but, 
while it was thus searching for a policy, an event 
occurred at Constantinople that determined its choice. 
The Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs had omitted 
to invite the Bulgarian agent to a banquet, given the 
heads of missions in honour of the Sultan’s birthday, on 
the ground that the dinner in question was confined to 
representatives of Foreign Powers, and that, if in the 
past M. Gueshoff had ever been treated as a member 
of the diplomatic body, it had been owing to an over- 
sight on the part of a Court official. M. Gueshoff was, 
in consequence, at once ordered to return to Sofia. 
This incident, though trifling in itself, raised the whole 
question of Bulgaria’s international status; and the 
Government felt that, if they now yielded on a point 
of etiquette, they might later on have to surrender 
other rights and privileges, acquired by a series of’ 
precedents, despite the provisions of the Treaty of 
‘Berlin. The nominal rights of suzerainty vested in 
Turkey had, they held, but proved a constant source 
of friction in the past, and they, therefore, decided to 
sever the connecting link. ‘The moment was well 
chosen for such a step. Austria-Hungary, they were 
aware, was also contemplating the annexation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, and, as Prince Ferdinand was about 
to visit the Emperor of Austria at Buda-Pesth, it 
would not be difficult to arrange that the two acts 
should proceed on parallel lines. An opportune strike 
on the Oriental railway, and the consequent stoppage 
of all traffic in South Bulgaria, provided them further 
with a plea that appealed much more to the national 
sentiment than had the Gueshoff incident; and they at 
once proceeded to occupy the Bulgarian section of the 


78 My Mission to Russia 


line. The retention of the railway was so essential to 
the success of the campaign in favour of independence 
that, though the strike had terminated, the Govern- 
ment, in spite of the representations of the Powers, 
decided on September 28 not to restore it to the 
company. Events were now moving fast, and on — 
October 4 a Cabinet Council, held under the presidency 
of the Prince, who had just returned from Hungary, 
finally decided in favour of independence. On the 
_ following day His Royal Highness was solemnly pro- 
\\ claimed Tsar of the Bulgarians at Tirnovo, their ancient 
capital. 

I had, at the end of August, been offered the post 
of Minister at The Hague, but had subsequently, in 
view of the growing gravity of the situation, been asked 
to stay on at Sofia and to see the crisis through, a 
request which I complied with all the more readily as 
it was accompanied by the assurance that I should not 
be a financial loser by this arrangement. I had not 
unnaturally interpreted this assurance to mean that I 
should receive my Hague salary, which was some 
£2,000 more than that of Sofia; but, when after eight 
strenuous months of incessant work, with a chancery 
composed of a single vice-consul, reinforced by the 
voluntary services of my wife and daughter, I claimed 
the fulfilment of this promise, I was met with a polite 
NON PossuMUS. 

The negotiations that ensued after the Declaration 
of Independence centred round the two questions of 
the Oriental railway and the East Roumelia tribute; 
and it was only thanks to the energetic intervention of 
Great Britain, France and Russia—for the Powers of 
the Triple Alliance did but little to prevent a rupture 


The Young Turks 79 


—that peace was preserved. The majority of Bul- 
garians were strongly opposed to the idea of paying for 
independence in hard cash, and, though Prince Fer- 
dinand had, in October, in a telegram to the President 
of the French Republic, acknowledged Turkey’s claim 
to compensation, his Ministers had contested his right 
as a constitutional Sovereign to make such a declaration 
without consulting them. Both Great Britain and 
Russia had strongly disapproved of the Declaration of 
Independence, made, as it was, in collusion with Aus- 
tria; and Russia more especially resented what she 
regarded as an act of treason on Prince Ferdinand’s 
part in allowing Austria to preside over what ought to 
have been a féte de famille Slave. British public 
opinion, on the other hand, was warmly on the side of 
the Young Turks, and the British Press not only mani- 
fested its sympathy with the aggrieved parties, but - 
was loud in its denunciation of Bulgaria. I, personally, 
nevertheless, espoused the cause of the latter and acted 
throughout the whole crisis as their advocate with His 
Majesty’s Government, for the Young Turks, with 
whose delegates I had become acquainted at Sofia, in- 
spired me with neither sympathy nor confidence. My 
Russian colleague, M. Sementowski, took the same 
line; and Russia, through fear of being completely 
supplanted by Austria, eventually adopted a strong 
pro-Bulgarian attitude which was not quite compatible 
with the view taken by His Majesty’s Government of 
the inviolability of treaties. 

From the very outset Bulgaria had declared that 
she would not expend more than 82,000,000 francs 
on account of the railway, and that she would pay 
no tribute for East Roumelia for the period sub- 


80 My Mission to Russia 


sequent to the Declaration of Independence. She 
knew what she wanted, and was determined to get it, 
and, as I told the Foreign Office, she had got her back 
to the wall and would not sign a blank cheque for 
the Powers to fill in. On two occasions—in January 
and in April, 1909—she risked a war with Turkey be- | 
cause the negotiations were proceeding too slowly for 
her, and in the end she got what she wanted. It was, 
however, in great measure due to the pressure brought 
to bear on the Porte by His Majesty’s Government, 
that the Turco-Bulgarian protocol recognizing inde- 
pendence was signed on April 19, 1909. Russia, as 
was but natural, wished to be the first Power to recog- 
nize the new order of things, and on April 21 the 
Emperor Nicholas addressed a telegram to King 
Ferdinand, congratulating him on the independence 
of his country. Two days later the French agent and 
I conveyed to the Bulgarian Government the official 
recognition of our respective Governments, and on 
the 27th the Austrian, German and Italian agents 
followed our example. 

During all these months of crisis I had had to 
refrain from any official intercourse with Prince Fer- 
dinand, and such unofficial communications as passed 
between us had to be made through his Chef de 
Cabinet. As an unrecognized King he was more than 
ever sensitive to anything in the nature of a personal 
slight, and, though he had never reason to complain of 
any want of respect on my part, he on one occasion 
sent his Chef de Cabinet to draw my attention to some 
facetious comments which an English illustrated paper 
had appended to a picture of his triumphal entry into 
Sofia after the Proclamation of Independence. The 


| 


Proclamation of Independence 8x 


Prince, who was never quite happy on horseback, had 
failed to arrive at the time fixed for his entry, and, as 
nearly an hour passed without his putting in an appear- 
ance, some wag remarked : ** Perhaps His Majesty has 
been pleased to part company with his horse.’’ For 
some reason best known to himself, Prince Ferdinand 
suspected my daughter of having written the peccant 
paragraph, and, in spite of my indignant denial, he 
only withdrew the charge on discovering shortly after- 
wards that the real culprit was a well-known journalist. 
After his recognition as King by His Majesty’s 
Government our relations were of a most cordial 
character, and at a dinner which he gave us on the 
eve of our departure for The Hague, he bade us 
farewell in almost affectionate terms. 


I have already called attention to certain sides of © 
Prince Ferdinand’s character and to his very question- 
able conduct at various stages of his career; but, before 
leaving the subject, I must sum up my general im- 
pressions of him. 

His parting with Stambuloff and his subsequent 
treatment of his fallen Minister; his breach of faith 
with his wife’s family on the question of the religion 
of the heir to the throne; and his attitude of almost 
abject prostration before Russia after Prince Boris’s 
conversion, all reveal to us a man dominated by strong 
personal ambitions and not much troubled with scruples 
as to the mode of their attainment. But an impartial 
critic, reviewing the first twenty-two years of his reign 
—for with the period subsequent to my departure from 
Sofia I am not at present concerned—would have to 
make allowances for the exceptional difficulties with 

G 


82 My Mission to Russia 


which he had been confronted and to place certain 
things to his credit. When, as a young lieutenant in 
the Austrian army, he elected to face the risks atten- 
dant on his acceptance of the Bulgarian crown, he was 
generally regarded as an adventurer embarking on a 
forlorn hope that could only end in failure. But Prince - 
Bismarck was right when he said: *‘ Der Coburger wird 
sich doch durchfressen’’ (** The Coburger will worry 
through ’’). Unrecognized by the Powers for the first 
eight years of his reign, he was, as he said of himself, 
‘*the pariah of Europe,’’ and it required no small 
moral courage on his part to brave not only the open 
hostility of Russia, but her still more dangerous secret 
machinations, as well as frequent plots for his assassina- 
tion. During those trying years he developed talents 
and capacities with which no one had credited him, 
and proved himself beyond all expectation a successful 
ruler of a somewhat turbulent Balkan State. It was 
thanks to his restraining influence that the principality 
had not yet embarked on war with Turkey, and it was 
largely due to his initiative and foresight that it had 
advanced so rapidly on the path of progress. ‘‘Je 
remplis ma mission philanthropique,’’ Prince Ferdinand 
once said to me, and if for ‘* philanthropic ’’ he had 
substituted ‘* civilizing ’’ he would not have been far 
from the truth. 

In spite, however, of the services which he had 
rendered his adopted country, the Prince never won the 
affections of his subjects, for he was not endowed 
with those special qualities that arouse popular 
enthusiasm, while the pomp and paraphernalia of 
royalty, with which he loved to surround himself, did 
not appeal to a simple-minded and democratic people 


Character Sketch 83 


like the Bulgarians. He had, none the less, succeeded 
in inspiring a certain respect for his person that bor- 
dered on fear in the case of those whose official positions 
brought them into immediate contact with him, and 
stories are told of members of his household, who had 
incurred his displeasure, hiding in the palace garden in 
the hope of escaping from the wrath to come. His 
intellectual gifts were many and varied. He was 
master of some seven or eight languages, was well read, 
was a distinguished botanist and ornithologist, and, 
when he pleased, the most charming of causeurs. He 
was very journalier, but if he was in a good humour 
he would keep me at an audience for an hour or two 
talking on every possible subject in the most perfect 
French, or lapsing occasionally into English or German 
if he could not find in French an appropriate phrase to 
give expression to his thoughts. Vanity and love of. 
theatrical effect were the weak points of his character ; 
but I should be lacking in gratitude were I to be © 
oblivious of the sympathy and kindness which he 
showed me on more than one occasion. His talents as 
a diplomatist were of no mean order; but his conduct 
of foreign affairs suffered from his love of intrigue and 
from over-confidence in his ability to outwit others. 
Prince Ferdinand was, in a word, an interesting and 
complex personality who, as he himself told me, had 
been happily described by King Edward, when pre- 
senting Lord Haldane to him at Marienbad, as 
‘*ihomme le plus fin en Europe.’ 

Early in 1908 Prince Ferdinand had married, en 
secondes noces, Princess Eleonora of Reuss-K6stritz, 
a lady who, unlike her husband, had succeeded in win- 
ning the affections of the Bulgarians by the kindly 


84 My Mission to Russia 


interest which she showed in everything that concerned 
their welfare, and more especially in the working of 
the hospitals, which were in a very backward state. 
The Princess had served with the Russian Red Cross in 
the Japanese War and had gained much experience as 
a nurse, an experience by which I benefited when, as | 
the result of a riding accident, I was laid up for weeks 
and weeks with a broken leg and ankle. Not only did 
she make all the necessary arrangements for my being 
carried on a stretcher to one of the hospitals, where the 
fractures were photographed with Roéntgen rays, but 
she discussed with the doctors the best means of re- 
lieving the pain which was causing me sleepless nights, 
and she often came and sat with me, bringing me flowers 
and showing me a kindness which I can never forget. 
Her life with the Prince was far from a happy one, 
but she was a real mother to his children, who were all 
devoted to her. Prince Boris—the present King—was 
then a very attractive but a rather shy boy who stood 
in perpetual fear of his father, as the latter’s natural 
affection for his son was tempered by the unpleasant 
misgiving which he did not always conceal, that his heir 
might one day supplant him. He even told me on one 
occasion that, if the Bulgarians imagined that, were they 
to force him to abdicate, they could keep Prince Boris 
as his successor, they were much mistaken, as, in the 
event of his having to leave the principality, he would 
take good care that his son accompanied him into exile. 

Prince Ferdinand’s personality so overshadowed 
that of others that I have not thought it necessary to 
speak of his Ministers, with whom I had to transact 
business, as they were for the most part but puppets 
whose movements were governed by the strings which 


MM. Petkoff and Stancioff 85 


he held in his hand. There were, however, a few ex- 
ceptions to this rule, and among them I would cite M. 
Petkoff and 'M. Stancioff—for both of whom IJ had a 
sincere personal regard. The former was a striking 
figure. ‘The son of a peasant, he had in early life been 
a revolutionary and an intimate friend of Stambuloff. 
During the Russophil reaction that followed the 
latter’s assassination, he conducted a violent Press 
campaign against the Prince, with whom, however, he 
became reconciled in 1899. He eventually became 
Prime Minister and was the most trustworthy and 
patriotic of Bulgarian statesmen, being one of the 
few who ventured to express his views openly to his 
Sovereign. He was, unfortunately for his country, 
assassinated in 1907. M. Stancioff, on the other hand, 
was a highly cultured man who had served successively 
as diplomatic agent at Bucharest, Vienna and St. 
Petersburg, and who took a far broader and more 
cosmopolitan view of things than the majority of his 
compatriots. My relations with him, when he was 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, were always of a most 
cordial kind, and it was in great measure due to his 
conciliatory attitude that the negotiations which I had 
to conduct for the conclusion of a treaty of commerce 
ended satisfactorily. Later on he was Bulgarian 
Minister in Paris and, after the outbreak of the Great 
War, had the courage to warn King Ferdinand, with 
whom he had always been a favourite, against the fatal 
step which he was about to take, in language which lost 
him his Sovereign’s favour and led to his complete 
disgrace. His appointment as Bulgarian Minister in 
London has given me a welcome opportunity of re- 
newing our old friendship. 


86 My Mission to Russia 


When I left Sofia at the end of May, 1909, I 
received from public men of nearly all parties so many 
marks of the sympathy entertained for my country and 
of the gratitude which they felt for the services ren- 
dered Bulgaria by His Majesty’s Government during 
the recent crisis, that, had I then been told that, in 
less than a decade, Bulgaria would be at war with — 
Great Britain, I should not have believed it possible. 
Entente diplomacy during the intervening years cannot, 
however, as I shall endeavour to show later, be held 
entirely blameless in this matter. 

On my arrival in London I was received in audience 
by King Edward, to kiss hands on my appointment to 
The Hague, when His ‘Majesty, after referring in very 
flattering terms to my work at Sofia, handed me the 
insignia of the G.C.V.O. I was further given the 
K.C.M.G. as a mark of the approval of His Majesty’s 
Government, while Sir EK. Grey expressed his appre- 
ciation of my services in the following official dispatch : 


I desire to take this opportunity to convey to you the 
high appreciation entertained by His Majesty’s Government 
of the manner in which you have filled the post of British 
representative at Sofia since the date of your appointment 
in November, 1908, and their entire approval of your action 
during the recent crisis. 

Your interesting and able reports on the situation proved 
invaluable to His Majesty’s Government in their efforts for 
the maintenance of peace, and the moderating influence 
which you successfully exerted on several occasions largely 
contributed to the attainment of their object. 


After such a storm centre as Sofia, The Hague 
was a very haven of rest—whose calm waters were un- 
ruffled by any political convulsion that might be taking 


At The Hague 1909-10 87 


place in the distant Balkans. With the exception of 
an occasional conference on such a stirring topic as 
bills of exchange, or the meeting of an arbitral tribunal, 
there was but little work to do. I had, however, while 
in Bulgaria had such a surfeit of constantly recurring 
crises, with their attendant war scares, that I was glad 
to have leisure to devote to the study of a country so 
interesting as Holland; to visit its picturesque old 
towns, its art treasures, its storied monuments; and to 
revel in that sea of ever-changing glorious colours into 
which its fields are transformed when the tulips are in 
bloom. For myself, too, The Hague, and especially 
the Legation—a beautiful old house that had been the 
residence of the Spanish Ambassadors in the seven- 
teenth century—had a special attraction, associated as 
they were in my memory with bygone years, when my 
father had been accredited as Minister to Queen OUR 
and when I had lived there as a small boy. © 

As the Legation had to be refurnished from top to 
bottom, it was from Clingendaal, under whose hos- 
pitable roof so many an Anglo-Dutch friendship has 
been cemented, and under the auspices of our almost 
lifelong friend Baroness (Daisy) de Brienen, that we 
made our début in Dutch society, a society in which 
we soon found ourselves quite at home, thanks to the 
warm welcome extended to us. Many of its members, 
I am glad to think, still remain our friends, and among 
them none have given us more constant proofs of their 
friendly feelings than the present Netherlands Minister 
in London and his wife. Jonkheer van Swinderen was 
Minister for Foreign Affairs during all the time that 
I was at The Hague, and it was a real pleasure to me 
to have to transact my official business with a man of 


88 My Mission to Russia 


his quick intelligence, mother wit and conciliatory dis- 
position. 

It was at the van Swinderens’ house, where we were 
frequent guests, that I had the good fortune to meet 
ex-President Roosevelt, who was then making a tour 
of the European capitals. Our hostess—to whose 
sympathetic and attractive personality I would pay 
a passing tribute—had told him, in the course of 
luncheon, that I had recently translated the first part 
of Faust into English verse. On hearing this, Mr. 
Roosevelt at once engaged me in conversation across 
the table, and, beginning with the early English ballads, 
passed in rapid review all the great writers of English 
verse down to modern times. On my remarking that 
I considered Swinburne the greatest poet of our 
generation, he exclaimed: ‘‘ There I am with you. 
When I was a young man,”’ he went on, ‘‘I would 
walk in the woods after my day’s work and recite that 
glorious chorus from ‘ Atalanta in Calydon,’’’ some 
half-dozen lines of which he then recited. Not to be 
outdone, I replied: ‘‘ Well, Mr. Roosevelt, when I 
was a young man, crossed in love, I would declaim the 
lines in ‘ Dolores ’: 


Time turns the old days to derision, 
Our loves into corpses or wives.”’ 


‘* And,’’ interrupted Mr. Roosevelt, without giving 
me time to finish : 


** Marriage and death and division 
Make barren our lives.’’ 


‘** What young man,”’ he continued, thumping the 
table with his fist, ‘‘ has not, when suffering the pangs 


My Appointment to St. Petersburg 89 


of despised love, given vent to his feelings in those 
words? ”’ 

As one could dine at the Legation and breakfast 
in London it was easy to pay flying visits to friends 
in England, and I remember more especially one visit 
which we paid the Berkeley Sheffields for the Doncaster 
Meeting in September, 1909—for it was at that 
meeting that I saw King Edward for the last time. 
His ‘Majesty had sent for me after the running of the 
Leger, in which his horse Minoru, though a warm 
favourite, had been beaten, and, with the kindly interest 
which he had always shown in my career, asked me 
about our life at The Hague. After saying how happy 
we were there, I remarked that life in the Dutch capital 
was so calm and peaceful that I was afraid that I should 
end like Rip Van Winkle in Sleepy Hollow, and 
sleep away the remaining years of my diplomatic life. 
** You must not think that,’’ said His Majesty, laugh- 
ing. ‘* Something is sure to turn up.’’ It was but 
a few months after King Edward’s death that the some- 
thing which His Majesty had predicted did turn up and 
that I received the following letter from Sir Edward 
Grey : 

FoREIGN OFFICE. 
July 16, 1910. 

My pEAR BucHANnANn,—Sir Arthur Nicholson’s transfer to 
the Foreign Office will make a vacancy at St. Petersburg. 
The place is one of great importance, as, though our relations 
with the Russian Government are happily cordial, there are 
questions which present difficulties for both Governments, 
which require constant tact and skill on the part of the 
Ambassador at St. Petersburg. 

I am confident, from all I myself have seen and from 


all that I have heard from those who have had still longer 
experience of the Diplomatic Service than I have had, that 


90 My «Mission to Russia 


you would fill the post of Ambassador with success, and, 
if it would be agreeable to you, I should be very glad to 
recommend you for it.—Yours sincerely, K. Grey. 


I had never dared aspire to such an important 
Embassy, and, in thanking Sir Edward for this signal 
proof of his confidence, I could but express the hope 
that I should prove worthy of it and that I should not 
disappoint his expectations. I had, fortunately, four 
months in which to work up the various questions with 
which I should have to deal; and it was only at the 
end of November, 1910, that I kissed hands on my 
appointment. King George, who had such a warm 
affection for the Emperor Nicholas, charged me with 
many messages for His Majesty and continued through- 
out the whole of my mission to honour me with his 
confidence and support. 


CHAPTER VIII 
1911 


HOUGH the relations between the two Govern- 
ments were, as Sir Edward Grey had pointed out 
in his letter to me, cordial, Russia and Great Britain 
were friends over whom still hung the shadow of past 
differences and misunderstandings. They had not yet 
cast aside the mutual suspicions with which they had 
for more than half a century regarded the trend of 
each other’s policy. The Anglo-Russian understanding 
dated from the year 1907. It was founded on a some- 
what loosely-worded document which, while binding 
the two Powers to maintain the integrity and indepen- 
dence of Persia and defining their respective spheres of 
interest in that country, said nothing about their 
relations in Kurope. Framed with the immediate 
object of preventing Persia becoming an apple of 
discord between them, it nevertheless served to bring 
them nearer together and indirectly paved the way for 
their future collaboration in European questions. It 
proved, indeed, in the end more successful in promoting 
an understanding, that was outside the purview of the 
written agreement, than in reconciling their conflicting 
interests in Persia, which up to the very eve of the 
Great War occasioned constant friction. 
On my arrival at St. Petersburg early in December, 
1910, the international outlook, though giving no cause 
QI 


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92 My Miuission to Russia 


for immediate anxiety, was not altogether reassuring. 
The Bosnia and Herzegovina crisis, in which M. 
Isvolsky had been worsted in his duel with Count 
Aehrenthal, had created in Russia a bitter feeling of 
resentment against Austria—a resentment that had 
been intensified by the former’s personal dislike of 
Count Aehrenthal; while the danger of complications 
in the Balkans, that might bring Russia’s interests into 
direct conflict with those of Austria, could not be 
overlooked. M. Sazonoff, who had just succeeded 
M. Isvolsky at the Russian Foreign Office, had, for- 
tunately, no personal grudge against Count Aehrenthal, 
and even held that it might be better that he should 
remain in office for fear of his being succeeded by a 
Minister more amenable to German influence. All 
that he could do under the circumstances was to 
refrain from giving a hostile turn to his policy and to 
work for the gradual re-establishment of more normal 
relations between the two Governments. But what 
struck me most about the then existing situation was 
the fact that, though Russia’s relations with Germany 
had been seriously strained ever since the Emperor 
Wilham had in 1909 donned his shining armour in 
support of his Austrian ally, and though it was thanks 
to Germany that Count Aehrenthal had won the day, 
the Russian public took a more tolerant view of her 
action and did not harbour the same rancorous resent- 
ment against her as against Austria. 

M. Sazonoff, whom I had known when he was 
counsellor of embassy in London, gave me a most 
cordial welcome on my paying him my first official 
visit, and we soon became fast friends. A Russian of 
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M. Sazonoff 93 


country’s interests, he was always a staunch friend of 
Great Britain; and down to the last day of his tenure 
of the post of Foreign Minister—down to the end of 
July, 1916, when the Kmperor, unfortunately for him- 
self and for Russia, was so ill-advised as to replace him 
by M. Stiirmer—I ever found in him a loyal and 
zealous collaborator for the maintenance of the Anglo- 
Russian understanding. We did not, as was but 


natural, always see eye to eye in the many intricate | 


questions which we had to discuss during the next five 
years and a half, but he never resented my frank, 
outspoken language and invariably did all he could to 
smooth over difficulties. He had but recently returned 
from Potsdam, where, in his desire to relax the tension 


existing between the two Governments and to secure - 


Germany’s recognition of Russia’s predominant posi- 
tion in Persia, he had been inveigled into negotiations 
about the Bagdad railway which were not in keeping 
with the understanding on which the other members of 
the Triple Entente had hitherto acted. This so-called 
Potsdam Agreement was the first of the many thorny 
questions which I had to discuss with Sazonoff. It 
also formed the subject of my first conversations 
with the Emperor. On presenting my letters of 
credence I had, after emphasizing the King’s earnest 
wish to see the Anglo-Russian understanding main- 
tained and consolidated, told the Emperor that His 
Majesty’s Government were following the course of 
these Russo-German negotiations with some anxiety. 
His Majesty had assured me, in reply, that his Govern- 
ment would conclude no arrangement with Germany 
without first submitting it to His Majesty’s Govern- 
ment, and that the latter could always count on his 


‘ 
Wen arenas hy POEL EG 


94 My Mission to Russia 


assistance whenever they stood in need of it. He 
repeated these assurances in a further conversation 
which I had with him a few weeks later, and added 
that the pending negotiations with Germany would in 
no way affect his attitude towards Great Britain. 

Though the Emperor was acting in perfect good 
faith, he failed to grasp the fact that the concessions 
which his Government were making to Germany with 
regard to the Bagdad railway were incompatible with 
the support which they were pledged to give their 
partners in the Triple Entente. It was not, as I sub- 
sequently endeavoured to impress on M. Sazonoff, that 
we had the slightest objection to Russia cultivating 
good relations with Germany, but that we were afraid 
that she was about to do so at our expense. Anxious 
as we were ourselves to come to an understanding with 
Germany on the subject of armaments, we should 
never, I assured him, think of taking any step that 
might entail the sacrifice of our friendship with Russia 
and France. We trusted, therefore, that the Russian 
Government would, in its dealings with Germany, show 
a like consideration for our interests. 

In view of the historical interest attaching to them, 
I append a short account of the long-drawn-out 
negotiations which ensued between the Russian and 
German Governments. They entailed constant inter- 
vention on my part, as, had not the former Government 
realized in time that there was a point beyond which 
they could not go, the latter would have succeeded in 
causing a serious split in the ranks of the Entente 
Powers. 

At the beginning of December, 1910, Sazonoff 
had submitted to the German Ambassador a draft 


The Bagdad Railway 95 


agreement embodying the substance of the Potsdam 
conversations. By the first of its articles Russia engaged 
not to oppose the realization of the Bagdad. railway, 
nor to put any obstacle in the way of the participation 
of foreign capital in that enterprise, on the condition 
that she would not be required to make any pecuniary 
or economic sacrifices. By the second, she undertook 
to link up the Bagdad railway with the future North 
Persian railway system. By the third, Germany 
engaged neither to construct nor to give her material 
or diplomatic support to the construction of any rail- 
way in the zone situated between the Bagdad line and 
the Russian and Persian frontier to the north of 
Khanikin; while, by the fourth, she declared that she 
had no political interests in Persia; that she would but 
pursue there objects of a commercial character; that 
she recognized Russia’s special political, strategical and 
economic interests in North Persia, and that she would 
not seek for any concession of a territorial character 
to the north of a line running from Kasri Chirin by 
Ispahan, Yezd and Khakh to the Afghan frontier, in 
the latitude of Ghazrik. 

The engagement taken by Russian in the first 
article was, Sazonoff contended, to apply only to the 
Koniah-Bagdad section of the railway, and left the 
Russian Government free, as far as the Gulf section 
was concerned, to co-operate with Great Britain in the 
future, as in the past. Early in January the Evening 
Times published the text of the draft agreement, and 
in order to prove that this version was unauthentic the 
two Governments agreed to recast the whole text. 
The negotiations now turned mainly on the question 
of the linking up of the two railway systems, as 


96 My Mission to Russia 


Germany was anxious to bind Russia to commence the 
construction of the linking-up line as soon as a branch 
line from Sadijeh had reached Khanikin. This question 
was complicated by the fact that Russian public opinion 
proved to be opposed to the expenditure of money on 
a railway that was to open the Persian markets to— 
German trade, before provision was made for the con- 
struction of a railway from Enzeli to Tehran that 
would render a similar service to Russian goods. In 
order to get over this difficulty M. Sazonoff suggested 
that British and French financiers should finance the 
construction of both the Enzeli-Tehran and the Khani- 
kin-Tehran lines; but, in the absence of any guarantee 
from the Russian Government, this suggestion could 
not be entertained. The only other alternative—that 
of allowing the Germans to build the railway—was 
opposed by us on the ground that the Germans would 
then get the control of the railway into their own 
hands, with the result that they might use it for 
the transport of troops. On February 21 Sazonoff 
handed the German Ambassador a revised draft, under 
which Russia engaged to obtain a concession for the 
linking-up line as soon as the Sadijeh—Khanikin branch 
line had been completed, while the text of the first 
article of the original draft was modified so as to restrict 
Russia’s engagement—not to oppose the realization of 
the Bagdad railway—to the Koniah—Bagdad section. 
Russia also stipulated that, in the event of her ceding 
her rights in the linking-up line to any third party, 
all the other clauses of the agreement should still remain 
in force. 

The negotiations were interrupted, owing to the 
serious illness that incapacitated Sazonoff for over 


The Potsdam Agreement 97 


nine months, but were resumed later on by the acting 
Foreign Minister, M. Neratoff, who in July submitted 
a further amended draft. 

The progress of the negotiations was now somewhat 
accelerated, as both Governments had special reasons 
for bringing them to a speedy conclusion. Germany, 
on the one hand, was engaged in a delicate conversation 
with France on the subject of Morocco, and considered 
the moment well chosen for the publication of an 
agreement which would, she hoped, demonstrate the 
intimate character of her relations with France’s ally. 
Russia, on the other hand, was anxious—in view of 
the internal conflict that had broken out in Persia—to 
secure a declaration of Germany’s désinteressement in 
that country, so that she might have a freer hand to 
deal with the situation should intervention become 
necessary. Germany declined to accept the restricted 
interpretation placed by Russia on the term ‘‘ Bagdad 
Railway ’’ or to consent to the retention in the agree- 
ment of Article m1 of the original draft, under which 
she was to engage not to construct any railway in the 
zone north of Khanikin. The German Ambassador 
did, however, give a categorical verbal assurance, on 
the part of the Emperor William, that Germany would 
only construct in that zone such railways as she was 
entitled to build under the Bagdad railway concession. 
She further claimed the right to obtain for herself the 
concession for the Khanikin-Tehran railway, should 
Russia, or the finance syndicate to whom she might 
cede her rights, fail to commence its construction 
within two years of the completion of the Sadijeh-— 
Khanikin branch line. All her demands were, in the 


end, conceded, and the agreement as finally signed was 
H 


98 My Mission to Russia 


a diplomatic victory for Germany. ‘The initial mistake 
committed by Sazonoff, in allowing himself to be 
entrapped during his conversations with M. Kiderlen- 
Waechter into giving verbal assurances, of which he 
did not at the time realize the full significance, was 
never retrieved. He had pledged Russia, without 
previous consultation with Great Britain and France, 
to withdraw her opposition to the Bagdad railway 
scheme, and, though he subsequently endeavoured to 
restrict this engagement to the Koniah—Bagdad section, 
it was clear from the outset that Germany would hold 
him to the strict letter of his bond. 

Whether, in thus accelerating the final stage of 
these negotiations, the Russian Government were 
prompted or not by the desire to be relieved of all 
apprehensions as to Germany’s attitude in the event 
of their embarking on a policy of active intervention 
in Persia, the signature of the Russo-German agree- 
ment was shortly followed by a change for the worse 
in their relations with that country. This change was 
primarily due to the fact that the Persian Government 
had, in spite of Russia’s repeated remonstrances, taken 
Mr. Shuster and other American advisers into their 
service. One of Mr. Shuster’s first acts was to entrust 
Major Stokes (at one time British military attaché at 
Tehran) with the task of organizing a treasury gen- 
darmerie. The appointment of a British officer to the 
command of a gendarmerie, whose operations were to 
extend over the whole of Persia, including the Russian 
sphere in the north, was resented by the Russian 
Government as a violation of the Anglo-Russian under- 
standing ; and it was only by making strong representa- 
tions at Tehran, which resulted in the appointment 


Mr. Shuster and Russia 99 


being left in abeyance, that we were able to convince 
them of our good faith. 

But hardly had this incident been happily closed 
when Mr. Shuster’s disregard of Russia’s privileged 
position in Persia provoked a still more serious 
crisis. Bent, as he was, on securing for himself 
an absolutely free hand with regard to loans and 
railway concessions, he gave her serious offence by 
appointing an Englishman (Mr. Lecoffre) as treasury 
agent at Tabriz; and in November he brought matters 
to a head by seizing a property belonging to Shoa es 
Sultaneh that had been mortgaged to the Russian 
bank, and by replacing the Persian Cossacks on guard 
there by treasury gendarmes. The Russian Govern- 
ment at once presented an ultimatum demanding an 
apology and the reinstatement of the Persian Cossacks 
within forty-eight hours; and, as the Persian Govern- 
ment, in order to avoid compliance with these demands, 
resigned, orders were given for the despatch to Kaswin 
of a force sufficiently strong to enable a detachment 
being eventually sent to occupy Tehran. 

It was in vain that I endeavoured to impress on the 
acting Minister for Foreign Affairs the serious con- 
sequences which an occupation of Tehran might have 
for the maintenance of the Anglo-Russian understand- 
ing. While assuring me that Russia had no intention of 
violating the principle of Persian integrity, he not only 
refused to cancel the orders already given, but told me 
that, unless the Persian Government complied with the 
terms of the ultimatum before the Russian troops 
landed on Persian territory, further demands would be 
presented. With M. Kokovtsoff, who had recently 
succeeded M. Stolypin as President of the Council, I 


100 My Mission to Russia 


was more successful; and, after Neratoff’s uncom- 
promising language, I was agreeably surprised to 
receive from him the unqualified assurance that, as soon 
as the two original Russian demands had been conceded, 
the Russian troops would be recalled. M. Kokovtsoff, 
however, had counted without his colleagues in the 
Government. The Russian troops having, meanwhile, 
landed at Enzeli, a second ultimatum was despatched, 
demanding a refund of the cost of the military expe- 
dition, the dismissal of Mr. Shuster and Mr. Lecoffre, 
and an engagement that the Persian Government 
would not in future take any foreigners into their 
service without the previous consent of the Russian 
and British Governments. 

The despatch of this second ultimatum, in the teeth 
of the categorical assurances given me by the 
President of the Council, naturally evoked a protest 
from His Majesty’s Government; and in my con- 
versations with M. Neratoff I once more endeavoured 
to dissuade him from an occupation of Tehran, which 
would, as I reminded him, be regarded in England 
as a blow struck at the independence of Persia, and 
- consequently at our understanding with Russia. 
Neratoff, notwithstanding, remained obdurate on this 
point, and at the same time declined to sanction a 
statement being made in the House of Commons to 
the effect that the two Governments had agreed under 
no circumstances to recognize the ex-Shah Mohammed 
Ali, who had recently returned to Persia. It was 
only after Sazonoff had, towards the middle of Decem- 
ber, resumed the direction of foreign affairs that the 
tension between the two Governments relaxed and 
that the Russian demands as the result of further 


Anglo-Russian Relations Strained ror 


negotiations, were toned down. They were accepted 
by the Persian Government before the end of the year, 
though, owing to the outbreak of serious disturbances 
in North Persia, the promised recall of the Russian 
troops from Kaswin had to be postponed. 

I have recorded the above incidents in order to show 
how difficult it sometimes was for the two Governments 
to act in concert owing to the diametrically opposite 
standpoints from which the situation was viewed by 
public opinion in their respective countries. In Russia 
the despatch of troops to Kaswin and the contemplated 
occupation of Tehran were regarded as measures which 
it was incumbent on her to take for the vindication of 
her outraged honour. In England, on the contrary, 
they were condemned as an unjustifiable attempt to 
bring a weak country into subjection and as a violation 
of its integrity and independence. So acute was the © 
divergence of views that, had not the Persian Govern- 
ment yielded before the order was given for an advance 
on Tehran, the Anglo-Russian understanding. would 
with difficulty have borne the strain. Fortunately, 
both Sir Edward Grey and M. Sazonoff were statesmen 
endowed with the gifts of tact, patience and forbear- 
ance, so necessary for the conduct of delicate negotia- 
tions; and, though it is now the custom to depreciate 
the services of the Old Diplomacy, I doubt whether 
the vaunted New Diplomacy would have been equally 
successful in saving the Anglo-Russian understanding 
from the shipwreck with which it was more than once 
threatened. 

My personal efforts were naturally directed to 
reconciling as far as possible the conflicting views and 
interests of the two Governments; but I was hampered 


102 My Mission to Russia 


in this task by the absence of any solidarity or collective 
responsibility between the members of the Russian 
Cabinet. ‘The categorical assurances given me by the 
President of the Council respecting the recall of the 
Russian troops were, as already stated, disregarded by 
his colleagues, and the reason for this very unusual pro- 
cedure was only made clear to me a few months later, 
when a Blue Book on Persia was about to be pre- 
sented to Parliament. In submitting to Sazonoff, in 
accordance with diplomatic usage, the proofs of my 
despatches, I had been careful to tone down the reports 
of my conversations with M. Kokovtsoff so that it 
should not appear that he had failed to give effect to 
his promises. Sazonoff, who was fully acquainted with 
what had passed in the course of those conversations, 
at once took me to task for having appealed to the 
President of the Council in a matter which only con- 
cerned the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 

As the Minister, or, in his absence, the acting 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, was alone responsible to 
the Emperor for the direction of Russia’s foreign 
policy, Sazonoff strongly objected to the publication in 
a Blue Book of despatches reporting conversations 
with another Minister about the affairs of a depart- 
ment with which that Minister was in no way con- 
nected. I had been wrong, he declared, in discussing 
the Persian question with the President of the Council, 
and the latter had exceeded his powers in giving me 
assurances which he was not competent to give. I 
objected that the Russian Ambassador in London 
frequently discussed foreign affairs with the Prime 
Minister, and that, when it was a question which 
vitally affected the relations of our two countries, it 


Russia’s Maritime Jurisdiction 103 


was but natural that I should consult the President 
of the Council, more especially as an acting Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, not being a member of the 
Cabinet, could not speak with the same authority as 
the head of his Government. ‘Though Sazonoff had 
never objected to my taking this course when his 
brother-in-law, Stolypin, was at the head of the 
Government, he merely replied that Russia was not a 
parliamentary country like Great Britain, and that 
the President of the Council had no control over 
Russia’s foreign policy. 

Of the other questions with which I had to deal 
during the course of the year, by far the most important 
was the right claimed by Russia to extend her maritime 
jurisdiction from three to twelve miles. In January 
and March bills had been introduced in the Duma for- 
bidding foreigners to fish within twelve miles of the 
coasts of the Archangel Government and of the Pri 
Amur respectively, and as this claim was contrary to 
recognized practice and to the generally accepted 
principles of international law, I was instructed to 
protest. In their reply to this protest the Russian 
Government contended that the question of the extent 
of the territorial waters of a State was determined 
either by international treaties or by internal legisla- 
tion; that, when it was determined in the latter 
manner, the limit fixed might differ in the case of 
customs, fisheries, criminal or civil jurisdiction, accord- 
ing to the requirements of their several interests; and 
that, as Russia was not bound by any treaty obligations, 
the extent of her territorial waters, from the point of 
view of international law, could only be determined by 
the range of the coastal guns—a range which exceeded 


104 My Mission to Russia 


twelve miles. They suggested, however, that the ques- 
tion might be submitted to the third Peace Conference, 
which was to meet at The Hague in 1915. While 
expressing our willingness to discuss in an international 
conference the limits within which territorial juris- 
diction could be exercised by any State over the waters 
adjacent to its shores, we attached the condition that, ~ 
until such a conference had arrived at a decision, the 
Russian Government should not interfere with British 
vessels outside the existing three miles limit without 
a previous agreement with us. In a conversation which 
I had with him on the subject, Stolypin declared 
that this was a condition which the Russian Govern- 
ment could not accept, as in the opinion of their law 
officers there was no rule in international law that 
precluded Russia from acting as she proposed. He 
could not, therefore, promise to do more than to 
endeavour to adjourn the discusssion of the bills in the 
Duma till the autumn session. 

The arguments advanced by the Russian Govern- 
ment in support of their claim were refuted in a 
succession of notes, in one of which they were reminded 
that they had themselves, in an official note addressed 
to Lord A. Loftus in October, 1874, recognized three 
miles as the hmit of the maritime jurisdiction of a State, 
and had admitted that the question of such jurisdiction 
‘*rentre dans la catégorie de celles, qui dans l’intérét 
des bonnes rélations internationales, il serait désirable 
de voir réglées par un commun accord entre les Etats.”’ 

The Pri Amur bill was passed, both by the Duma 
and the Council of Empire, in June, with the result 
that Japan at once entered an official protest against its 
application ; but the discussion with regard to the Arch- 


The Povage Incident 105 


angel fisheries bill was not pressed to a division. While 
declining to withdraw it, the Government did nothing 
to accelerate its passage, and as a considerable number 
of deputies were unwilling to press a measure that was 
calculated to cause friction with Great Britain, the bill 
eventually died a natural death. 

In one of my conversations with the President of 
the Council in which, after discussing Russia’s claim 
to an extension of her maritime jurisdiction, I had 
taken occasion to press for the settlement of two 
other pending questions, M. Stolypin exclaimed : 
**Vrament, M. l’ Ambassadeur, vous n’étes pas en 
weine! Voila la troisiéme question désagréable que 
vous me posez aujourd’hw.’’ M. Stolypin was right. 
I had fallen on troublous times, for during this, my 
first, year at St. Petersburg there was a constant 
succession of disagreeable questions about which I had 
to make representations to the Russian Government. 
One of them—a typical one—deserves a _ passing 
reference. | 

Karly in April the Russian Press published the 
report of the trial of a former employee in the Ministry 
of Marine accused of having sold a secret signal book 
to Captain Calthorpe, naval attaché to His Majesty’s 
Embassy, in 1908, and of having subsequently, in 
1909, communicated a further signal book, together 
with other secret documents, to his successor, Captain 
Aubrey Smith. In the course of his examination this 
man, Povagé, admitted that he had tried to sell a 
signal book to Captain Calthorpe, who had, however, 
declined to take it. He declared, however, on oath 
that he had never seen Captain Smith in his life. The 
court found him guilty on all counts, but as, owing to 


106 My Mission to Russia 


the lapse of time, he was exempted by statutory rules 
from punishment on the first count, he was condemned 
on the second to twelve years’ hard labour. 

I at once entered a strong protest. I pointed out 
that the judicial authorities had failed to inform the 
Embassy, as they ought to have done, that a trial was 
about to take place in which serious charges were to 
be brought against the British naval attaché; and, after 
giving my word of honour that there was not a particle 
of truth in the whole story, I requested the acting 
Minister for Foreign Affairs to publish an official 
démenti of certain unfounded statements made by some 
of the witnesses for the prosecution. While admitting 
that the judicial authorities ought to have given the 
Embassy notice of the impending trial, and while 
promising to inform the Emperor of all that I had said, 
M. Neratoff, instead of publishing an official démenti 
on behalf of the Russian Government, merely com- 
municated to the Press a statement that the British 
Ambassador had denied in the most categorical manner 
that Captain Aubrey Smith had ever had any dealings 
with Povagé. The Emperor, who happened to be 
receiving Colonel Wyndham, our military attaché, in 
audience the following day, said that he was completely 
satisfied with my assurances and that, so far as he was 
concerned, the incident was closed. In spite of the 
repeated remonstrances which I addressed to the 
Russian Government on behalf of His Majesty’s 
Government, and in spite of the fact that we could 
prove that Captain Smith had been absent from St. 
Petersburg on two occasions when Povagé was said to 
have visited him in his flat, this was the only satisfaction 
which Captain Smith ever received. 


CHAPTER IX 
1912-1914 


N spite of the critical phases through which our 
understanding with Russia had passed in 1911, the 
two countries were nevertheless gradually being drawn 
nearer each other, and the warm welcome accorded to 
an influential and thoroughly representative British 
delegation, which visited St. Petersburg and Moscow 
in February, 1912, marked a fresh milestone on the 
road to Anglo-Russian friendship. Unfortunately the 
Speaker of the House of Commons, Mr. Lowther (now 
Lord Ullswater), who was to have headed the delega- 
tion, was at the last moment prevented coming, owing 
to his father’s death, but his place was ably filled by 
Lord Weardale. 

On the night of their arrival I gave a dinner at the 
Embassy, to which I invited all the members of the 
Government, representatives of the army and navy, 
and the leaders of the constitutional groups in both the 
Duma and the Council of Empire, with the exception 
of the leader of the cadets, M. Miliukoff, whom some 
of the Ministers declined to meet. In my speech 
welcoming them to Russia, I Jaid stress on the fact that 
it was not on diplomatic acts, but on the surer founda- 
tion of mutual sympathy, friendship and confidence, and 
on a community of interests, that we must endeavour to 
build up a real and lasting understanding with Russia. 

107 


108 My Mission to Russia 


This was the keynote of nearly all the speeches delivered 
at the successive banquets given in their honour. On 
one or two occasions, however, and notably at the 
dinner given by the Duma and the Council of Empire, 
the speakers on either side went considerably farther. 
At the last-named dinner I was asked by the President 
of the Duma to return thanks for the toast of the 
Crimean veterans that was to be proposed by a Russian 
general, but excused myself on the ground that there 
was but one reply that I could make to such a toast, 
namely, that we had in the Crimean War learned to 
respect each other as brave and generous foemen, but 
that, should we ever be engaged in another war, we 
would, I trusted, find ourselves fighting shoulder to 
shoulder against the common enemy. It was with much 
difficulty that I induced President Rodzianko to entrust 
the duty of replying to this toast to someone who had 
not to weigh his words with the same care as myself. 
sir E. Bethune’s name was eventually coupled with it, 
and the gallant general, rushing in where I had feared 
to tread, delighted the Russians by replying in almost 
the identical words which I had forecasted, and was, in 
consequence, taken severely to task by the German 
Press. 

It was not, however, so much by its speeches that 
the British delegation promoted a better understand- 
ing between the two countries, as by the_ personal 
contact. which those of its members, who represented 
the Church, the parliament, the army and the navy of 
Great Britain established with the Russian naval, mili- 
tary, parliamentary and ecclesiastical authorities; for 
between nations, as between individuals, personal con- 
tact helps more than anything else to establish good 


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THE KREMLIN, MOSCOW 





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THE LIBRARY 
OF THE 
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The Emperor on Persia 109 


relations. In the same way, the visit which M. Sazonoff 
paid in September to the King at Balmoral, and the 
conversations which he had there with Sir Edward 
Grey, laid the foundation for that close collaboration 
between the two Governments, which alone prevented 
the Balkan conflagration of 1912-13 spreading over 
Europe. Before, however, attempting to follow them 
through the various stages of the Balkan War, it 
will be well first to clear the ground of all the other 
questions which engaged their attention down to the 
outbreak of the Great War. 

Though with the return of M. Sazonoff in restored 
health to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at the close 
of 1911, the Persian question lost much of the acuteness 
which had characterized it during the latter half of that 
year, it continued, nevertheless, to provoke constant 
friction and misunderstandings between the two 
Governments. In speaking to me of the situation 
early in 1912, the Emperor remarked that the Persian 
Government was so weak, and the country in such a 
state of anarchy, that order would never be restored 
without the assistance of Russian troops in the north 
and of British troops in the south. When once they 
had accomplished this task they could be replaced by a 
small Persian army capable of maintaining the order 
which they had established. His Majesty further ex- 
pressed his regret that the sincerity of the assurances 
given by his Government was doubted in certain 
quarters in England, adding that, when he gave his 
word that Russia would not annex any Persian terri- 
tory, His Majesty’s Government might rest assured 
that that word would not be broken. 

But while both the Emperor and M. Sazonoff were 


IIO My Mission to Russia 


really anxious to re-establish normal and correct rela- 
tions with Persia, the Russian consuls in that country 
favoured a forward policy and acted in an entirely 
contrary spirit. The consul-general at Meshed, Prince 
Dabija, was directly responsible for the bombardment 
and desecration of the shrine of that town; while his 
colleagues at other places, such as Tabriz, did not 
hesitate to provoke disorders that might serve as a 
pretext for Russian intervention. In their reports to 
their Government they so successfully misrepresented 
the origin and character of these disturbances that 
Sazonoff even threatened that Russia would have to 
take over the administration of Northern Azerbaijan, 
if the Persian Government failed to maintain order at 
Tabriz. How difficult it was for the two Governments 
to work together in Persia will be seen from the follow- 
ing extract from a private letter, which I wrote to Sir 
Edward Grey after having been instructed to warn the 
Russian Government of the serious consequences which 
might ensue from any such action on their part : 


As Sazonoff could not see me yesterday, I communicated 
to him, in a private letter, what you had instructed me to 
tell him respecting a possible assumption by Russia of the 
administration of Northern Azerbaijan. 

You will have already learned from the telegraphic report 
of the conversation, which I had with him this morning, that 
this is a step which he only contemplated taking in the very 
last resort, and that he trusts that it may be averted 
altogether if the Persians will consent to leave Shuja ed 
Dowleh at Tabriz as deputy-governor. 

After giving me the above explanation, Sazonoff pro- 
ceeded to speak with some heat of what you had said with 
regard to the Anglo-Russian understanding. That under- 
standing, he remarked, was the Alpha and Omega of his 


My Report on Persian Situation 111 


policy, and he only regretted that it had been Isvolsky, 
and not himself, who had put his signature to it. Its main- 
tenance was essential to the vital interests of the two 
countries, and, were it to break down, German hegemony 
would at once be established in Europe. In order to maintain 
it and to meet the wishes of His Majesty’s Government, he 
had, in defiance of Russian public opinion, stopped the 
advance of the Russian troops on Tehran, facilitated an 
amicable arrangement with the Persian Government, con- 
sented to the joint advance of £200,000, sacrificed the ex- 
Shah, and, in fact, done everything which we had asked 
him to do. 

I here interrupted him by remarking that, while fully 
appreciating the loyal manner in which he had co-operated 
with us, I must remind him of the very difficult position 
in which you had been placed by Russia’s action in Persia. 
Public opinion in Russia was a very different thing to what 
it was in a constitutional country like England, where it 
was voiced in Parliament; and I could tell him that there 
was a moment when there was such a strong feeling against 
the military measures undertaken by Russia in Persia that, 
in spite of your earnest desire to maintain the Anglo-Russian 
understanding intact, you had almost despaired of being 
able to defend it. | 

Sazonoff replied that I made a mistake in under- 
estimating the weight of public opinion in this country and 
the difficulties with which he had been confronted. Not 
only had he been attacked in the Press, but he had been 
reproached in other quarters with sacrificing Russia’s 
interests at our dictation. He had had to overcome con- 
siderable opposition in the Council of Ministers, and after 
the attacks made on the Russian troops at Tabriz last 
December he had received three letters telling him that he 
was not fit to direct Russian foreign policy and threatening 
his life. He was determined to maintain the principle on 
which the Anglo-Russian understanding was based, and he 
had not the least desire to assume the administration of 
Northern Azerbaijan; but if the Russian troops were again 
attacked he would be forced to do it. We must have more 


112 My Mission to Russia 


confidence in each other, and His Majesty’s Government 
must believe that, whatever provisional measures Russia 
might be forced to take in self-defence, she had not the 
slightest intention of annexing a single yard of Persian 
territory. Each of the two parties to the agreement of 1907 
must, while adhering to its general lines and principles, be 
allowed a certain latitude as to the measures which either 
might judge it necessary to adopt in its respective sphere 
of influence, for Russian public opinion would be estranged 
did it become known that its Government was being lectured 
like a child at every step which it took to safeguard its 
interests. 

I told Sazonoff that I fully recognized the difficulties of 
his position, but that, in my opinion, the principal cause 
of the misunderstandings which occasionally arose between 
us lay in the fact that, while the two Governments were 
doing their best to act loyally together, the Russian consuls 
in Persia acted in a contrary spirit. When, as had more 
than once been the case, he had told me that disorders had 
broken out at Meshed or at Tabriz that had necessitated 
the intervention of Russian troops, I had never felt quite 
sure, in my own mind, whether those disorders had not been 
wilfully provoked by one or other of the consuls in order 
to provide an excuse for intervention. 

Sazonoff declined to admit this. He declared that Miller, 
his consul at Tabriz, who is now on leave, was an excellent 
man, and contended that the version given by Dabija of 
the Meshed incident was correct. I disputed this, and said 
that Sykes had reported that some eight men had been 
killed in the sacred chamber itself by maxim fire, and that 
he had, by a personal visit to the tomb, corroborated the 
fact of shots having been fired within the shrine itself. 
Sazonoff replied that he could show me the reports which 
he had received that stated the exact contrary. The 
dome of the shrine had alone been injured, and the 
action of the Russian troops in attacking the sanctuary, 
outside the shrine, had been amply justified by the fact 
that the agitators had used it as a base of operations 
against them. The Emperor, he added, had been much 


Action of Russian Consuls 113 


annoyed by the manner in which this incident had been 
distorted. 

Finally, Sazonoff said that he had shown his good inten- 
tions by recalling Pokhitonoff, and that he would have no 
objection to recalling Dabija at the first suitable opportunity. 
He could not, however, do so immediately, as otherwise it 
would appear as if he were acting under pressure. He would 
much prefer, however, that Sykes should be moved at the 
same time. 

We shall never, I fear, be able to work harmoniously 
with Russia till several changes are effected in the Russian 
consular service in Persia; but Sazonoff is not strong enough 
to effect these changes unaided. He is obliged to consider 
his own position, which is none too secure, and I therefore 
think that it would be politic on our part to offer to move 
one or two of our consuls as an act of reciprocity. The 
Persian Minister here has repeatedly told me that he has 
implicit confidence in Sazonoff’s loyalty and good intentions, 
but that he is too heavily handicapped owing to the manner 
in which the consuls, as well as some of the subordinate 
officials in his Ministry, disobey his instructions. 


Persia was naturally one of the questions discussed 
by Sir E. Grey and M. Sazonoff at Balmoral. Though 
they were agreed in principle as to the necessity of 
establishing a strong government at Tehran with a 
properly organized force to maintain order, the sub- 
sequent negotiations came to nothing owing to the 
difficulty of finding the right man to place at the head 
of such a government, as well as of providing the funds 
necessary for the formation of a gendarmerie under 
foreign officers. Meanwhile the Russian consuls con- 
tinued to arrogate to themselves more and more ad- 
ministrative powers, while the representations which I 
had to make on the subject did but serve to accentuate 


the divergence of views held in London and St. Peters- 
I 


II4 My Mission to Russia 


burg with regard to the interpretation to be placed on 
the 1907 agreement. Russia, on the one hand, desired 
more elbow room and freedom of action in North 
Persia, where she had thousands of subjects or pro- 
tected subjects, and where the trade was entirely in 
her hands. She was willing to allow us to do what we 
liked in our own sphere provided that we refrained from 
exercising a sort of inquisitorial control over her actions 
in the Russian sphere. She also thought that the time 
had come for what would virtually have amounted to 
the partition of the neutral zone, and suggested that the 
clause relating to it should be modified by an exchange 
of secret notes. His Majesty’s Government, on the 
other hand, had constantly in view the maintenance of 
Persia’s integrity and independence. While naturally 
concerned with the protection of British economic 
interests in the neutral zone, they had no wish to 
enlarge the sphere of their own responsibilities or to 
see Russian political influence extended over its 
northern portion. They therefore merely expressed 
their readiness to take into consideration any proposals 
which the Russian Government might submit with a 
view to effecting a clearer definition of British and 
Russian interests in that zone. 

The situation created by the action of the Russian 
consuls at last became so serious that I was instructed 
at the end of June, 1914, to ask for an audience in 
order to impress on the Emperor the grave preoccupa- 
tion which it was causing His Majesty’s Government. 

On His Majesty’s inquiring whether their anxiety 
had been caused by anything that had happened re- 
cently, I replied that I had already, a year ago, 
advocated a frank exchange of views between the two 


My Audience with the Emperor 115 


Governments, as I was even then afraid that the trend 
of events in North Persia would end by creating a 
situation that might prove fatal to the Anglo-Russian 
understanding. Events had since been moving fast, 
and North Persia was now to all intents and purposes 
a Russian province. We did not, I proceeded to say, 
for a moment doubt His Majesty’s assurance that he 
would not annex any portion of Persian territory. ‘We 
were but recording actual facts. Unforeseen events 
had led to the occupation of certain districts in North 
Persia by Russian troops, and, little by little, the 
whole machinery of the administration had been placed 
in the hands of the Russian consuls. The Governor- 
General of Azerbaijan was a mere puppet who received 
and carried out the orders of the Russian consul- 
general, and the same might be said of the Governors 
at Resht, Kazwin and Julfa. They were one and all 
agents of the Russian Government and acted in entire 
independence of the central government at Tehran. 
Vast tracts of land in North Persia were being acquired 
by illegal methods, large numbers of Persians were 
being converted into Russian-protected subjects, and 
the taxes were being collected by the Russian consuls 
to the exclusion of the agents of the Persian financial 
administration. The above system was being extended 
to Ispahan and even to the neutral zone. We had not 
the slightest desire to dispute Russia’s predominant 
interests and position in the north, but we did take 
exception to the methods by which that predominance 
was being asserted and the attempts which were being 
made to extend it to the neutral zone. I concluded by 
reminding the Emperor that, without the support of 
Parliament, no British Government could maintain 


116 My Mission to Russia 


the Anglo-Russian understanding, and that, unfortun- 
ately, the sympathies of Liberals and Conservatives alike 
were being alienated by what was happening in North 
Persia. 

The Emperor, after listening attentively to what I 
had said, replied that the present situation in North 
Persia had been brought about by circumstances which 
the Russian Government could not control. It had 
originated with the troubles caused by the Fedais in 
Tabriz and by the necessity which had subsequently 
arisen of safeguarding Russia’s interests in the north. 
No one regretted this necessity more than himself. In 
the first place he could give me his word of honour 
that he sincerely desired to withdraw his troops, and, 
in the second, he felt that he was laying himself open 
to the suspicion of acting contrary to his assurances. 
He quite understood the motives which had prompted 
the representations of His Majesty’s Government, and 
he would welcome a frank exchange of views as cal- 
culated to remove the danger of any possible misunder- 
standing in the future. The first thing, however, to be 
done was to control the action of his consuls, and he 
would cause the whole matter to be inquired into by a 
committee at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 

The Emperor then turned the conversation on to 
the question of the neutral zone, remarking that the 
simplest manner of defining our respective positions 
with regard to it was to partition it. On my replying 
that, though I quite agreed that the two Governments 
ought to come to an understanding as to what they were 
respectively entitled to do in that zone, His Majesty’s 
Government had no desire to extend their responsi- 
bilities, the Emperor said that it might in any case be 


The Neutral Zone 117 


necessary to revise the agreement of 1907. He was 
quite ready to consent to this if His Majesty’s Govern- 
ment desired it. As I took leave of His Majesty at 
the close of my audience, the Emperor said: ‘‘ I can 
only tell you, as I have so often told you before, that 
my one desire is to remain firm friends with England 
and, if I can prevent it, nothing shall stand in the way 
of the closest possible understanding between our two 
countries.”’ 


I, personally, was strongly in favour of a revision 
of the 1907 agreement, as nothing was more calculated 
in my opinion to create tension between the two coun- 
tries than to leave the neutral zone a debatable land. 
To do so would but occasion constant bickerings and 
mutual recriminations in the future. As it was, their 
respective economic interests in it were constantly 
clashing, more especially as regarded the construction 
of railways. While British syndicates were anxious 
to obtain concessions for certain lines, the Russian 
Government objected to the construction of any such 
railways near the Russian zone, for fear that the Persian 
markets would be flooded with seaborne British goods 
to the detriment of Russia’s trade. 

On the other hand, the Russian Government 
strongly favoured the idea of a Trans-Persian railway 
that, when linked up with the Russian and the Indian 
railway systems, would serve as a transit route between 
Europe on the one side and India and Australasia on 
the other. Early in 1912 they submitted a scheme for 
such a railway to His Majesty’s Government, who 
accepted it in principle under certain reserves, with the 
result that a Société des Etudes was eventually formed 


118 My Mission to Russia 


to consider the questions of alignment and finance. 
During the two years which followed there were inter- 
mittent conversations between the two Governments 
on the subject of the alignment. No agreement was, 
however, reached, as, while His Majesty’s Government 
insisted on the line entering the British sphere at 
Bunder Abbas via Ispahan and Shiraz, and on its not 
being prolonged to Karachi without their formal con- 
sent, the Russian Government held out for the more 
direct route via Tehran and Kerman to Chahbar, which 
they maintained was the only point on the South 
Persian coast where a good harbour could be con- 
structed. But leaving the alignment question out of 
account, the chances of raising the necessary capital 
were so remote that, even had the war not inter- 
vened, it is very doubtful if the scheme would have 
materialized. 


CHAPTER X 
1912-19138 


GA VENTS were, meanwhile, moving fast in the 

Balkans, where the Turco-Italian War had engen- 
dered an unrest which proved to be but the precursor 
of a general upheaval. The crisis which ensued not only 
brought the interests of Russia into direct conflict with 
those of Austria, but threatened on more than one 
oceasion to endanger European peace. 

The death of Count Aehrenthal, and the appoint- 
ment of Count Berchtold as his successor, had effected 
a distinct improvement in Austro-Russian relations, 
for the latter had, as Austrian Ambassador at St. 
Petersburg during the Bosnia crisis of 1908-9, acquitted 
himself of his difficult mission with such tact and dis- 
cretion that the sins of his Government were not visited 
on him. Though destined to play so fateful and uncom- 
promising a part in the negotiations which preceded 
the Great War, he was a persona grata at the Russian 
Court, and this fact had helped to relax the existing 
tension. The very question, moreover, which was at 
the root of their mutual jealousies served, curiously 
enough for a time, to bring the two Governments into 
closer contact till, as it became more acute, their 
relations again grew dangerously strained. 

In an audience, which I had with the Emperor early 
in 1912, His Majesty told me that he was seriously pre- 

119 


120 My Mission to Russia 


occupied by the situation in the Balkans, as, though 
anxious to maintain friendly relations with Turkey, he 
could not remain a disinterested spectator of a war 
between that Power and one of the Balkan States. He 
therefore suggested that the Powers of the Triple 
Entente should consult together beforehand so as to 
be prepared with a united plan of action, in the event 
of their being suddenly confronted with a Balkan war 
or with a forward movement on the part of Austria. 
No practical steps were taken to give effect to this 
suggestion; for, as I told the Emperor, we wished to 
avoid taking any step that might split up Europe 
into two hostile camps. We should, I added, prefer 
to see Austria and Russia, as the two Powers most 
directly interested, come to some agreement to which 
all the other Powers could become parties. Russian 
diplomacy, meanwhile, was not idle, and in February, 
1912, as I learned later in the year, Bulgaria and Serbia 
signed a treaty of defensive alliance guaranteeing the 
integrity of their respective territories in the event of 
either of them being attacked by Austria, Roumania 
or any other Power. By a secret military convention 
attached to this treaty provision was made for the 
number of troops to be furnished by each of the two 
contracting parties in such a defensive war, as well as 
for the disposal of their respective armies and for the 
plan of campaign to be adopted in the event of their 
both being engaged in war with Turkey. 

By a further secret ‘‘ annexe’’ they determined 
their respective spheres of influence in Macedonia, 
while they agreed that any difference respecting the 
execution or interpretation of the treaty should be 
referred to Russia for decision. The presence of mem- 


The Balkan Confederation 121 


bers of the Greek and Montenegrin royal families at 
the coming of age festivities of the Crown Prince 
Boris, which were celebrated shortly afterwards at 
Sofia, prepared the ground for the conclusion of 
treaties of a somewhat similar character with Greece 
and Montenegro. With the signature of these treaties 
the Balkan Confederation, for which Russia had so long 
been working, became an accomplished fact. For it 
was at her inspiration that Serbia and Bulgaria had 
concluded a treaty of alliance, that was to bring together 
two Slav races who had for years past been cutting 
each other’s throat in Macedonia, and that the Balkan 
Confederation had been finally constituted. It would, 
she fondly believed, prove a docile instrument in her 
hands and serve the double purpose of maintaining 
peace in the Balkans and of barring an Austrian advance 
to the Atgean. 

It was not long, however, before the hopes which 
she had founded on it as an instrument of peace were 
rudely shaken. Early in July the first note of warning 
was sounded by the Russian Minister in Sofia, who 
reported that the military conspiracy in Turkey and 
the Albanian insurrection had given rise to a dangerous 
movement in Bulgaria in favour of armed intervention. 
Proposals for allaying the threatening storm were suc- 
cessively submitted by M. Sazonoff and Count Berch- 
told; but, though the latter’s programme, in so far 
as it was based on the maintenance of the territorial 
status quo and on the pacific development of the Balkan 
States, did not fail to evoke an official expression of 
satisfaction from St. Petersburg, the Russian Govern- 
ment were anything but pleased with the initiative thus 
taken by Austria. She was suspected of wishing to 


122 My Mission to Russia 


pose as the patron of the Balkan States, a rdle to which 
Russia laid an exclusive claim. By September the 
attitude of the Bulgarian Government had become so 
threatening that they were warned that, if they 
attacked Turkey, Russia would consider her historic 
mission at an end and leave Bulgaria to her fate. 
Sazonoff at the same time made, with the support of 
His Majesty’s Government, strong representations at 
Constantinople urging the Porte to lose no time in 
initiating reforms of a far-reaching character. 

Curiously enough, however, on his proceeding to 
Balmoral at the end of the month, Sazonoff never 
once, despite the growing gravity of the situation, 
suggested our bringing stronger pressure to bear on 
the Porte, while the official communiqué recording 
the purport of his conversations with Sir Edward Grey, 
made but a passing reference to the Balkan crisis. 
The consequence was that the Russian public, who 
had founded all their hopes on the Balmoral meeting, 
most unjustly attributed the subsequent serious turn 
of events to the lack of support which Russia had 
received from Great Britain. Even, however, had 
their hopes been realized and had the Balmoral meet- 
ing led to the adoption of some more drastic action 
at Constantinople, it would have been too late. Be- 
fore Sazonoff had left London the order for the 
mobilization of the Bulgarian army had been issued, 
and before he reached St. Petersburg war had been 
formally declared. 

All the efforts of the Russian Government were now 
directed to localizing the war and to averting an Aus- 
trian occupation of the Sanjak, a breach of neutrality 
that would inevitably have entailed Russia’s interven- 


Russia’s Attitude in Balkan War 123 


tion. They at once announced their determination of 
upholding the principle of the territorial status quo, 
while they gave the most positive assurances at Vienna 
that Russia would not intervene if Austria abstained 
from doing so. Austria, on her part, engaged to 
restrict her action to the concentration of troops near 
the Serbian frontier, so that the two Governments were 
for a time able to act more or less in concert. The 
policy thus enunciated was not, however, long main- 
tained. ‘Towards the end of October the Emperor, who 
was entertaining a shooting party at Spala that included 
the Grand Duke Nicholas and other generals, sent 
for Sazonoff and said that he desired to afford the 
Balkan States all the assistance in his power short of 
involving Russia in any serious entanglements. This 
audience marked a turning point in the attitude of the 
Russian Government. They had at first viewed with 
a certain apprehension the idea of a Bulgarian expan- 
sion eastwards and had insisted that the future Turco- 
Bulgarian frontier should be drawn to the north of 
Adrianople. They had even approached His Majesty’s 
Government with a proposal for mediation and had sub- 
mitted a programme of the reforms to be eventually 
introduced into European Turkey; but before either 
of these proposals could materialize, the battle of Lule- 
Burgas had been fought and won and the Balkan Allies 
had declared that they would not return home empty- 
handed. 

The task of championing the far-reaching claims of 
the Balkan States was now assumed by Russia; and M. 
Sazonoff, early in November, formulated his views 
respecting the prospective changes in the territorial 
status quo as follows: 


124 My Mission to Russia 


Turkey to retain possession of Constantinople, with the 
territory comprised within the Enos-Midia line, and the rest 
of her Kuropean provinces to be divided by right of conquest 
among the Balkan States; Serbia to acquire, in accordance 
with the terms of the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty of 1912, Uskub 
and a slice of territory extending down to Lake Ochrida, 
to secure possession of San Giovanni di Medua, and to obtain 
access to the sea by means of a corridor that would give her 
direct access to that port ; Albania to be made an autonomous 
province; Montenegro to be given the Sanjak; Roumania 
to be compensated for her neutrality by a rectification of 
her frontier on the side of the Dobrudja; Salonica to be 
converted into a free port, and Mount Athos to be neutralized 
as a purely monastic settlement. 


In drawing up this programme Sazonoff had hoped 
that Bulgaria would consent to compensate Roumania 
/ by a slight concession of territory and that Austria’s 
~ opposition to a Serbian port on the Adriatic could 
' be bought off by a guarantee of her economic access 
to the Aigean. SBoth these expectations proved 
fallacious, and the latter question was unfortunately 
allowed to assume proportions which at one moment 
were fraught with danger to the peace of Europe. The 
Russian Government had, moreover, given their un- 
qualified support to Serbia’s claims under the erroneous 
impression that, even were Austria to prove trouble- 
some, Germany was so bent on peace that she would 
not support her ally in any action likely to provoke 
international complications. Germany’s relations with 
Russia were still referred to in all official utterances as 
those of traditional friendship, and in spite of the part 
which she had played in the Bosnia crisis, the Emperor 
Nicholas did not, as he himself told me, regard her 
with mistrust. Confidence in Germany’s pacific inten- 


Germany Intervenes 125 


tions had been further strengthened by the meeting of 
the two Emperors at Port Baltic, where the personality 
of the German Chancellor had so favourably impressed 
both the Emperor and Sazonoff that too large an 
interpretation had been placed on M. Bethmann-Holl- 
weg’s assurances that Germany would not support 
Austria in a forward policy in the Balkans. 

It was, therefore, an unpleasant surprise for the 
Russian Government when the German Ambassador, 
after inquiring whether Russia proposed to treat the 
question of a Serbian post as a Kraftprobe (trial of 
strength), used language that left no doubt as to what 
Germany would do in the event of an Austro-Russian 
war. Sazonoff, in reply, reminded Count Pourtales that 
there had been such trials of strength both in 1909 and 
1911, and that, if Germany contemplated acting towards 
Russia in the spirit of her Agadir policy, the con- 
sequences might be very serious. The Russian Govern- 
ment, however, had no wish to push matters too far, as 
they realized that, were Austria to attempt to expel 
Serbia from any port of which she had taken possession, 
Russia would be compelled to intervene. They there- 
fore gave counsels of moderation at Belgrade and in- 
formed the German Ambassador that, though Serbia 
must be emancipated from her position of dependence 
on other Powers, the question of how this result was to 
be achieved might be left over for discussion by the 
Powers. Thanks to Sir Edward Grey’s intervention 
it was eventually agreed that a conference of Ambas- ? 
sadors should be held in London to discuss the question 
of Serbia’s access to the sea, Albania, the AXgean’ 
Islands and Mount Athos, leaving the question of the 
conditions of peace to stand over till the end of the war. | 


126 My Mission to Russia 


Down to the meeting of this conference, at the end 
of 1912, the aim of Russia’s policy had been the main- 
tenance of European peace, provided always that her 
vital interests could be safeguarded by pacific means. 
On the other hand, it must be admitted that her 
Government more than once jeopardized the cause of 
peace by failing to grasp certain salient features of the © 
situation. Neither they nor the Austrians had antici- - 
pated the victories on which Serbia had founded her | 
claim to access to the sea, and it was only when they 
realized that to insist on this claim would mean war with 
Germany as well as with Austria that they withdrew 
from an untenable position. Their successive changes of 
front reflected the views which for the moment found 
favour with the Emperor. His Majesty was divided 
between his desire to support the claims of the Balkan 
States and his wish to keep clear of international com- 
plications, and Sazonoff had consequently to vary his 
language according as either the one or the other of 
these conflicting purposes held temporary sway over the 
Emperor’s mind. Apt as the Emperor was to be in- 
fluenced by his immediate surroundings, the presence 
of the Grand Duke Nicholas and other generals at the 
Imperial shooting party at Spala at the end of October 
had tended to give a chauvinistic turn to his policy; 
while, on returning to Tsarskoe early in December, he 
once more got into direct touch with Sazonoff and 
Kokovtsoff, neither of whom desired war. It had been 
due to their intervention that the partial mobilization 
desired by the Minister of War had not been carried 
out, though in consequence of the number of troops 
which Austria had massed near the Serbian frontier, 
and of the reinforcements which she had sent to Galicia, 


Prince Hohenlohe’s Mission 127 


Russia had been obliged to retain 350,000 time-expired 
men with the colours. But whether it was owing to 
the advice tendered him by his Ministers or to appre- 
hension of a recrudescence of the revolutionary move- 
ment should the Russian arms meet with a serious 
reverse, the pacific trend of his policy at the end of the 
year came at a most opportune moment. Public 
opinion was incensed against Austria, and in many 
quarters the feeling in favour of war was gaining 
ground. 

Fortunately, too, at this conjuncture, the Emperor 
of Austria made what was regarded in Russian official 
circles as a geste pacifique by sending Prince Godfried 
Hohenlohe, formerly military attaché at St. Peters- 
burg and a persona grata at the Russian Court, with 
an autograph letter to the Emperor Nicholas. The 
object of the Prince’s mission was not so much to 
discuss in detail any of the pending questions as to 
remove the misunderstandings existing between the 
two Governments. In this he was to a certain extent 
successful, and the reply of the Emperor Nicholas to 
the Emperor of Austria’s letter was couched in very 
friendly terms. It laid stress on the concession which 
Russia had made in consenting to the creation of an 
autonomous Albania, and concluded by expressing the 
hope that, by mutual concessions, an arrangement satis- 
factory to both Governments might be arrived at. The 
next step taken by the Austrian Government was to 
suggest that Russia should dismiss her reservists, on 
the understanding that the Austrian troops on the 
Galician frontier should be reduced to a figure some- 
what below the normal peace effectives of Russian 
regiments. 


128 My Mission to Russia 


As owing to the political outlook Austria would not 
reduce the number of her troops on the Serbian frontier, 
the Russian Government urged that the communiqué 
announcing the dismissal of the Russian reservists 
should contain an assurance that Austria harboured no 
aggressive designs against Serbia. After a week of 
fruitless negotiations the Austrian Ambassador even- 
tually took upon himself to authorize the publication 
in the Rossia of a communiqué to the above effect ; but, 
by an unaccountable oversight, he omitted to inform 
his Government of his having done so. The Rossia’s 
communiqué was, in consequence, repudiated by the 
Vienna ‘Telegraphic Agency. Count Thurn sub- 
sequently telegraphed to Vienna explaining how the 
mistake had arisen; and, as M. Sazonoff did not wish 
to do anything to injure his career, the incident was 
passed over in silence by the Russian Press. Count 
Berchtold thanked M. Sazonoff for the considerate 
manner in which he had acted, and at the same time 
published an official communiqué disclaiming all re- 
sponsibility for the various statements made on the 
subject in the Vienna Press. Count Thurn was, never- 
theless, shortly afterwards recalled. 

In the meantime Adrianople had fallen, and on 
April 16 an informal truce was concluded at Chatalja ; 
but so great were the fears entertained by the Russian 
Government of a Bulgarian advance on Constantinople 
that it was only after the Bulgarians had definitely re- 
nounced all idea of forcing the Chatalja line that they 
withdrew their proposal for the despatch of an inter- 
national fleet to the Dardanelles. Negotiations for 
peace were now resumed, and on May 380 the Treaty 
of London was signed. 


The Albanian Deadlock 129 


Two other questions in which Russia was directly | 
interested—the delimitation of the future Albanian 
State and Roumania’s claim to a rectification of her 
frontier on the side of the Dobrudja—had at the same 
time been passing through a succession of acute phases, 
which had more than once threatened to involve her 
in war. In consenting to the creation of an autonomous 
Albania the Russian Government had counted on its 
being composed of the territory comprised within a 
line which, starting from Khimarra on the coast, would 
skirt the shores of Lake Ochrida and follow the course 
of the rivers Drin and Boyana to the Adriatic. When, 
therefore, Austria put forward the unexpected demand 
that Scutari, which Russia desired to see assigned to 
Montenegro, should be incorporated in its territory, 
there ensued a deadlock which was rendered all the more 
perilous owing to the fact that Austria’s attitude had 
been stiffened by the knowledge that she could count 
on Germany’s support. Though warned not to commit 
themselves too far with regard to Scutari, as His 
-Majesty’s Government could not give them more than 
diplomatic support on a question which was, after all, 
but of secondary importance, the Russian Government 
were so afraid that Austria wanted to make Scutari 
the capital of an almost independent Albania and to 
exercise a predominant influence over it through its 
Catholic tribes, that they declined to give way unless 
complete satisfaction were given to Serbia in the matter 
of the five towns of Tarabosch, Luma, Radomir, 
Djakova and Dibra. In the course of the subsequent 
negotiations they allowed the first three of the above- 
named towns to be assigned to Albania, but they made 
a firm stand as regarded Dibra and Djakova, declaring 

J 


130 My Mission to Russia 


that they would never consent to the incorporation in 
a Moslem State of places where there were Slav 
religious institutions. Thanks to Sir E. Grey’s good 
offices, Austria was induced to yield on the question of 
Dibra, but Djakova still barred the way to a complete 
settlement. The situation was, moreover, rendered all 
the more acute by the persistence with which the King 
of Montenegro was pressing the siege of Scutari. King 
Nicholas had recently incurred Russia’s displeasure by 
a letter in which he had informed the Emperor that, 
though he had hitherto always obeyed his commands, 
he would be unable, after the sacrifice of so many 
Montenegrin lives, to withdraw from Scutari when it 
was once taken, even should His Majesty order him to 
do so. Sooner than give it up he would release Russia 
from all her obligations to Montenegro. 

The Emperor, in reply, told the King that he 
had already released Russia from her obligations 
by breaking the agreement under which he was 
bound to undertake no military operations without 
Russia’s permission; that, in the opinion of Russia’s 
friends and allies, Montenegro’s claims to Scutari 
were ill-founded; and that, as Russia would find 
herself isolated were she to promise him her support, 
she must decline to give it. In view of the growing 
gravity of the situation, the Russian Government 
were now invited to join the other Powers in making 
energetic representations at Belgrade and Cettinje 
for the purpose of raising the siege of Scutari and 
securing the evacuation of the territories assigned to 
Albania. As they would only agree to do this on the 
express condition that Djakova was ceded to Serbia, 
Count Berchtold, on March 21, agreed to abandon his 


Crisis Caused by Siege of Scutari 131 


claim to its incorporation in Albania provided that 
steps were taken to enforce the immediate cessation of 
hostilities and the evacuation by Serbia and Monte- 
negro of the territories allotted to that province. Unfor- 
tunately, owing to the dilatory action of the Russian 
Minister, there was some delay in making the necessary 
notification at Belgrade, and the Austrian Government, 
in consequence, presented an ultimatum at Cettinje 
demanding that the civil population should be allowed 
to leave the town within three days. 

Much as this isolated action on the part of Austria 
was resented at St. Petersburg, the orders given by 
King Nicholas for a general assault on the town 
caused such offence that the Russian Government 
informed the Powers that they would raise no objec- 
tion to a collective naval demonstration at Antivari, 
though Russia would not be able to participate in 
it. The Emperor at the same time addressed a 
personal telegram to King Nicholas telling him, 
in terms which amounted to a command, that he 
must bow to the decision of the Powers. In con- 
sequence of the language held by Russia at Belgrade, 
the Serbian troops received orders on April 10 to abstain 
from any further active operations against Scutari, but 
on the 28rd the town surrendered to the Montenegrins. 
The situation was thus rendered extremely critical, as, 
unless some coercive measures were taken by the Powers 
collectively, Austria, it was feared, would have recourse 
to isolated action, and such action on her part might 
easily involve Russia in war. In order to prevent this 
the Russian Government appealed to France and Great 
Britain to put in an appearance, even if they did not fire 
a shot, should coercive action of any kind be decided 


132 My Mission to Russia 


on. There were, however, difficulties in the way of their 
doing so. Fortunately, when the outlook was almost 
desperate—for there was a moment when I thought war 
inevitable—King Nicholas on May 4 announced his in- 
tention of surrendering Scutari to the Powers. Ten 
days later the town was occupied by an international 
naval force. | 

The second question—that of Roumania’s claim to 
territorial compensation—had already been raised at 
the first Peace Conference in London, but owing to 
the tactless manner in which it had been treated by 
the Bulgarian delegate, Dr. Daneff, no settlement had 
been reached. The Roumanians had now put forward 
a claim to all the territory comprised within a line drawn 
from Silistria to Baltchik, and had, in doing so, placed 
Russia in a very difficult position. By a convention 
concluded in 1902 she had guaranteed the integrity of 
Bulgaria’s territory, and she had, therefore, to give 
Roumania a friendly warning not to attempt to occupy 
any portion of it by force of arms. About the middle 
of February the unexpected announcement that Rou- 
mania contemplated occupying Silistria fell like a 
bombshell at St. Petersburg, causing a profound feeling 
of depression in official circles as well as a sharp fall on 
the Bourse. Much, however, as the Emperor resented 
what he regarded as an unjustifiable attempt to deprive 
Bulgaria of territory which Russia had won for her by 
the War of Liberation, he was so bent on maintaining 
peace that, while using all his influence to stay Rou- 
iania’s hand, he caused Bulgaria to be informed that 
she must be prepared to make some concession. Were 
she to refuse to do so she might involve not only Russia 
but Europe in war; and His Majesty therefore gave 


-” 


Roumania Claims Compensation 133 


her clearly to understand that if she desired his support 
she must cede Silistria to Roumania. 

This question formed the subject of a somewhat 
heated conversation between the German Ambassador 
and M. Sazonoff in which Count Pourtales, after 
pointing out the serious consequences that might 
ensue from an active intervention by Russia, sug- 
gested that, were Bulgaria and Roumania to come 
to blows, the Powers should stand aside as they had 
in the Balkan War. The question was, however, 
one in which Russia was too directly interested for 
her to take such an engagement. ‘The Black Sea 
was not the Adriatic, and as M. Sazonoff warned 
Count Pourtales, circumstances might arise which 
would compel her to act as her interests dictated. He 
nevertheless took the opportunity of suggesting that 
Bulgaria and Roumania should leave the whole question 
in the hands of the Powers, and it was eventually 
agreed to refer it to a conference of the Ambassadors 
at St. Petersburg. 

That conference held its first sitting on March 31, 
under the presidency of M. Sazonoff, and its discussions 
were throughout conducted on purely party lines—the 
Ambassadors of the Triple Alliance taking the side of 
Roumania, while the cause of Bulgaria was pleaded by 
M. Sazonoff, M. Delcassé and myself. The former 
based Roumania’s claims to Silistria and to the terri- 
tory comprised within a line drawn from that town to 
Baltchik, on the ground of its strategical importance 
for the defence of the Dobrudja. ‘They dwelt more 
especially on the fact that it was in consequence of the 
assurances given by the Powers that there should be 
no change in the territorial status quo, that Roumania 


134 My Mission to Russia 


had maintained her attitude of reserve during the war, 
and that now that the Balkan States were to acquire a 
large accession of territory, Roumania was entitled to 
some compensation. They also argued that Silistria 
would certainly have been given to Roumania in 1878 
had Bulgaria then acquired the new territories about 

to be assigned to her. 

The representatives of the Triple Entente, on the 
other hand, contended that the Bulgaro-Roumanian 
frontier had been definitely fixed by the Treaty of 
Berlin; that as, owing to her geographical position, 
Roumania could not participate in the redistribution 
of Turkey’s territory, it was only at Bulgaria’s expense 
that she could receive any territorial compensation, and 
that no principle of international law entitled a State 
to demand a cession of territory from one of its neigh- 
bours on the ground of the latter’s aggrandisement in 
another direction; that the only principle which Rou- 
mania could invoke was the right of the strongest; and 
that, while fully appreciating the correctness of her 
attitude, they considered that she could only claim 
the cession of certain strategical points to render her 
frontier more secure on the Bulgarian side. 

After prolonged and heated discussions the confer- 
ence decided that Silistria, together with the territory 
comprised within a radius of three kilométres, should 
be assigned to Roumania; that Roumania should in- 
demnify all Bulgarian subjects who within six months 
expressed their desire to emigrate from the said terri- 
tory; and that Bulgaria should erect no fortifications 
along the frontier between the Danube and the Black 
Sea. The only interest attaching to this award, which 
was so soon to become a dead letter, was the whole- 


Roumania gets Silistria 135 


hearted support given Bulgaria by M. Sazonoff, as it 
was in such marked contrast to the attitude which he 
adopted to her a few months later. It had, however, 
an unpleasant sequel for myself. Owing to my having 
held the rank of Ambassador longer than my French 
colleague, I had been deputed by M. Sazonoff to open 
the case for Bulgaria, and I did so on the lines indicated 
above. My language was reported to Bucharest, with 
the result that when, a few months later, the present 
Queen of Roumania—then only Crown Princess— 
whom I had met frequently at Darmstadt, came to St. 
Petersburg, I was severely taken to task as the supposed 
inspirer of the Triple Entente’s attitude. Her Royal 
Highness began by remarking that she felt inclined not 
to speak to me, and then proceeded to ask how I had 
dared to say that Roumania had no right to any terri- 
torial compensation. I replied that I had merely ex- 
pressed the views which I had formed after a careful 
study of the question, though those views might have 
been biased by the fact that Roumania moved in the 
German orbit. Were Roumania, I added, to enter the 
fold of the Triple Entente, she would always find in 
me a warm defender of her interests. 


CHAPTER XI 
1913-14 


URING the protracted crisis caused by the first 

Balkan War Russia’s réle had been a very difficult 
one, and the course of her policy had naturally fluctuated 
with its successive developments. She had in the spring 
of 1912 succeeded in reconciling the conflicting claims 
of Bulgaria and Serbia in Macedonia and in calling into 
being a Balkan confederation that was to bar Austria’s 
access to the Atgean. She had imagined that this 
confederation would dance to her tune, whereas it dis- 
obeyed her express injunctions and declared war on 
Turkey. As the natural protector of the Balkan Slavs, 
she was expected to take charge of their interests and 
to see that they were not deprived of the fruits of their 
victory by the intervention of other Powers. In under- 
taking to champion their cause she was brought face 
to face with Austria, and in the diplomatic duel which 
ensued she was seconded by Great Britain and France, 
and Austria by Germany and Italy. It was mainly due 
to the untiring efforts of Sir Edward Grey, who acted 
throughout as mediator and peacemaker, that the two 
rivals did not have to settle their differences sword in 
hand and that the Kuropean war, which more than 
once seemed almost within sight, was averted for a 
time. It was thanks to him that Russia was able to 


retire without too much loss of prestige from the 
136 


Treaty of London 137 


position which she had taken up on the questions of a 
Serbian port and of Scutari; and it was again thanks 
to his intervention that Austria yielded on the subject 
of Dibra and Djakova—the two points on which Russia 
was determined to make a firm stand. Though Russia 
more than once suffered a rebuff, she could well afford 
to make concessions on matters of secondary import- 
ance, as she could console herself with the thought of 
all the advantages that would accrue from the final 
settlement of the Balkan question on the lines laid 
down by the Treaty of London. Turkey was to be 
virtually banished from Europe, and her European 
possessions, with the exception of Albania, were to be 
divided between Russia’s clients; while the Balkan con- 
federation was to be converted into a new international 
factor with which both Germany and Austria would 
have to count. The Slav world had, therefore, every 
reason to rejoice, though, as subsequent events proved, 
its joy was destined to be short-lived. 

As Sir Edward Grey’s mouthpiece at St. Peters- 
burg, my rodle throughout the crisis had been to tender 
counsels of moderation; and both the Emperor and 
Sazonoff were, fortunately, so bent on maintaining 
peace so far as was consonant with Russia’s honour and 
interests, that they did not turn a deaf ear to such 
counsels. ‘The situation was, however, complicated by 
the fact that Germany had stiffened Austria’s attitude 
by promising to support her should she find herself 
involved in war with Russia. The Triple Entente 
was, moreover, at a disadvantage owing to the lack of 
solidarity between its members. As Sazonoff more 
than once pointed out in the course of our conversations 
during the Balkan crisis, as well as during the crisis 


138 My Mission to Russia 


which followed the appointment of General Liman von 
Sanders to the command of the Constantinople army 
corps—to which reference will be made later on— 
Germany and Austria were allies, while Great Britain 
and Russia were only friends. Russia, he asserted, 
was not afraid of Austria, but she had to reckon with 
Germany as well. If Germany supported Austria, © 
France would make common cause with Russia; but 
no one knew what Great Britain would do. 

This uncertainty as to our attitude encouraged Ger- 
many to exploit the situation. Great Britain was the 
one Power that could strike a mortal blow at her, and if 
Germany knew that Great Britain would stand by 
France and Russia she would think twice before taking 
any action that would place them in a position from 
which they could not recede with honour. When, in the 
following year, Austria presented her ill-fated ultima- 
tum at Belgrade, Sazonoff held much the same language, 
contending that the situation could only be saved by 
our declaring our complete solidarity with France and 
Russia. It was then too late, as nothing that we might 
have said or done could have averted war; but it is a 
moot question whether an earlier conversion of the 
Triple Entente into a formal alliance would have 
exercised any influence on Germany’s attitude. The 
Emperor took the same view of this question as 
M. Sazonoff, and held that the fact of our not being 
Russia’s ally prevented us giving her the same effective 
support as France. While realizing how difficult it 
would be for His Majesty’s Government to take such 
a step, he could not, he said, understand the apprehen- 
sions with which such an alliance was regarded in 
England. It would be restricted to one of a purely 


Suggested Anglo-Russian Alliance 139 


defensive character, and would not entail on us any 
greater risk of war than we ran at present. Referring 
to the question in a private letter addressed to Sir E. 
Grey in February, 1914, I wrote: 


Impracticable as is, from our point of view, the idea of 
an alliance at the present moment, there is no doubt a good 
deal of truth in Sazonoff’s contention that, if Germany knew 
beforehand that France and Russia could count on England’s 
support, she would never face the risks which such a war 
would entail. The uncertainty which exists with regard to 
our attitude enables us, no doubt, to influence both sides to 
maintain peace, but it places the Triple Entente at a dis- 
advantage in its dealings with the Triple Alliance. Should 
war, unfortunately, ever break out, it will be almost 
impossible for us to stand aside and not take part in it. 


But what really barred the way to an Anglo- 
Russian alliance was the fact that it would not have 
been sanctioned by public opinion in England. 

In another respect, too, the Triple Alliance was in 
a better position than the Triple Entente, as its 
members had, as a general rule, to take their orders 
from Berlin; whereas, whenever some important step 
was about to be taken by the latter, so much time was 
lost in the preliminary exchanges of views that by the 
time the desired formula had been agreed on the 
psychological moment had often passed or the situation 
had so changed that the contemplated action had to be 
modified. Unity of command is often as necessary in 
the field of diplomacy as it is in the conduct of military 
operations; and during the Balkan Wars, as subse- 
quently during the Great War, Entente diplomacy was 
often handicapped by divided counsels, whereas the 
policy of the Triple Alliance was dictated by its pre- 


40 My Mission to Russia 


dominant partner. The course which that policy was 
to take—whether for good or evil—was not, moreover, 
hampered, as was sometimes the case with us, by a 
divergence of views among the members of the Cabinet. 
In this connection the following little story is instruc- 
tive. I had been invited—I think in the summer of 
1912—by Mr. and Mrs. Asquith to meet the newly- 
appointed German Ambassador (Baron Marshal von 
Bieberstein) and his wife at a luncheon given in their 
honour at No. 10 Downing Street. After the depar- 
ture of the other guests our hostess took the Marshals 
and me to see the room where the Cabinet councils are 
held. Looking at the long green table, with a score 
or so of chairs ranged in order around it, the Ambassa- 
dress asked, ‘‘ How many Ministers are there in the 
Cabinet?’’ After answering this question, Mrs. 
Asquith, turning to the Ambassador, said, ‘* And how 
many are you at Berlin?’ ‘‘ One,’’ was the curt 
reply. 

In the spring of 1913 I had the offer of a change 
of post. The Russian climate, coupled with the strain 
of so much responsible work, had seriously affected 
my health, and at the end of April Sir Edward, who 
was always the most considerate of chiefs, wrote me 
the following letter : 


FoREIGN OFFICE. 
April 27, 1918. 

My prEAR Bucuanan,—Increasing physical infirmity will 
make it impossible to renew Cartwright’s term at Vienna, 
which comes to an end in November. 

I know that your health has not been good at St. Peters- 
burg, and if you really think a change necessary I would 
submit your name for Vienna. 


I am Offered the Vienna Embassy 141 


At the same time, I should like to make it very clear 
that, unless your health requires it, I do not think it is at 
all in the public interest that you should leave St. Petersburg. 
You have done the work there so well that I should regret 
any change. Whoever your successor might be, it would be 
some time before he could get the position that I believe you 
have made for yourself at St. Petersburg. 

To put it shortly, I should like you to remain at St. 
Petersburg; but if St. Petersburg is really injuring your 
health, I do not think it right or fair that Vienna should 
be filled up without asking you whether you would like that 
post for yourself. If you think you can stay at St. Peters- 
burg, I shall not only be satisfied but relieved.—Yours, 

(Signed) E. Grey. 


The offer was a very tempting one, and as I was 
on the point of going to England on leave, I asked 
for time to consider it. The day after my arrival in 
London I was received in audience by the King, and 
on His Majesty graciously repeating the offer I 
virtually accepted it. On the following day, however, 
I had to confess to Sir Edward that my doctor, whom 
I had seen in the morning, had told me that I could, 
in his opinion, face St. Petersburg for another two 
years without serious injury to my health. Sir Edward 
therefore proposed that I should remain on there 
subject to the conditions that if my health broke down 
before the two years were over I should exchange with 
Sir Maurice de Bunsen, who would go to Vienna, 
while if I was able to see the two years out I should 
succeed Sir E. Goschen on the termination of his 
appointment as Ambassador at Berlin. I agreed, and 
I actually remained on at St. Petersburg for another 
five years. I should, however, never have been able to 
have done this had it not been for the timely discovery 


42 My Mission to Russia 


that the neuritis and other ailments from which I had 
been suffering were caused by pyorrhocea. Thanks to 
my friend Sir Kenneth Goadby’s skilful treatment of 
that insidious complaint, I recovered my health, and 
was able to bear the strain of four strenuous years of 
war work without once returning home. 

On the conclusion of the first Balkan War Sir 
Edward was also good enough to submit my name for 


the G.C.M.G. 


But to return to more serious matters. The Treaty 
of London had re-established peace with Turkey, but 
had not ended the Balkan crisis, which did but pass 
from one dangerous phase to another. ‘The victors 
were busy quarrelling over the division of the spoils, 
and as under the treaty of 1912 both Serbia and 
Bulgaria had engaged to submit to Russia’s arbitration 
any differences which might arise between them as to 
the interpretation of its terms, Sazonoff now called 
on the two Governments to fulfil this engagement. 
Serbia, he was aware, would not accept an arbitration 
based solely on the strict interpretation of that treaty, 
as in such case the award was bound to be given in 
Bulgaria’s favour. He therefore, while recognizing 
that the latter’s claims in Macedonia were based on 
both ethnographical and historical grounds, endeavoured 
to induce her to make certain concessions. As no 
satisfactory reply had been received from either 
Government, the Emperor (early in June) addressed 
a strongly worded telegram to the Kings of Serbia and 
Bulgaria, expressing surprise that no effect had yet 
been given to his proposal for a conference of the four 
allied Prime Ministers at St. Petersburg, and warning 


Second Balkan War 143 


them that, were they to embark on a fratricidal war, 
Russia would reserve her full liberty of action whatever 
might be the outcome of that conflict. 

King Peter’s reply was more or less satisfactory, 
though it insisted that Serbia’s claims could not be 
restricted to the terms of the treaty of 1912; but 
King Ferdinand merely observed that he had already 
appealed to MRussia’s arbitration, and that Serbia 
was endeavouring to deprive Bulgaria of the fruits 
of her victories. On June 25 the Bulgarian Minister 
informed Sazonoff that his Government could not 
accept arbitration except on the basis of the 1912 
treaty, and that they had, moreover, decided to recall 
their Minister from Belgrade. As this was regarded 
at St. Petersburg as tantamount to a declaration of 
war and as a betrayal of the Slav cause, Russia formally 
denounced the treaty of 1902, under which she had 
guaranteed the integrity of Bulgaria’s territory against 
an attack on the part of Roumania. A few days later 
the Bulgarian Government accepted Russia’s arbitra- 
tion without insisting on their former conditions, but 
at the last moment the departure of their delegates 
for St. Petersburg was countermanded, and on 
June 29 General Savoff ordered an advance along the 
whole line. 

In Russian military circles the impression had at 
first prevailed that the Bulgarians would be strong 
enough to defeat the combined armies of Greece and 
Serbia, and though such a result would have had 
the advantage of precluding any danger of Austria’s 
intervention, the prospect of a too powerful Bulgaria 
was regarded with a certain apprehension that 
was, not unnaturally, strengthened by Bulgaria’s 


144 My Mission to Russia 


utter disregard of Russia’s wishes and advice. Both 
the Emperor and Sazonoff, moreover, had listened 
sympathetically to Prince Nicholas of Greece, who had 
come to St. Petersburg for the express purpose of 
inducing Russia to use her influence at Bucharest in 
favour of Roumania’s intervention in the coming war. 
The appeal for assistance which Bulgaria now addressed 
to Russia fell, therefore, on deaf ears, and, so far 
from exercising a restraining influence on Roumania, 
Russia indirectly encouraged her to take the field. 
There was an exchange of friendly messages between 
the Emperor and King Charles in which the 
identity of Russia’s and Roumania’s interests was 
emphasized. 

Though Russia may at the outset have been 
prompted to adopt this line by the hope of maintaining 
peace, the idea of checkmating Austria by detaching 
Roumania from the Triple Alliance and of preventing 
Bulgaria establishing her hegemony in the Balkans was 
not altogether absent from her mind. No attempt was 
even made to restrict Roumania’s action to the occupa- 
tion of the Turtukoi—Baltchik line, and her advance on 
Sofia deprived Bulgaria of all possibility of retrieving 
her initial reverses. Under the terms of the Treaty of 
Bucharest, which was signed on August 10, 1918, she 
had to submit to seeing Macedonia divided between 
Serbia and Greece and to ceding to Roumania some 
eight thousand square kilométres of territory. The 
original idea of the Russian Government had been that, 
while the belligerents should be allowed to draw up 
their own treaty of peace, that treaty should be subject 
to revision by the Powers; but all idea of revising the 
Treaty of Bucharest was dropped after the publication 


The Treaty of Bucharest 45 


of the telegram in which the Emperor William con- 
gratulated King Charles on the results of his wise and 
statesmanlike policy. 

Meanwhile Turkey, following the example set by 
Roumania, had moved her troops across the Enos- 
Midia line and had occupied Adrianople. Russia at 
once protested, and informed the Porte that she could 
not allow an emancipated Christian population to be 
replaced under Ottoman rule. She was not, however, 
prepared to back up this protest by any military action, 
more especially as, so far as her material interests were 
concerned, she had no objection to Adrianople remain- 
ing in Turkey’s hands. It was different when Turkey 
went a step farther and ordered her troops to cross 
the Maritza. Sazonoff was then at once authorized by 
the Emperor to recall the Russian Ambassador from 
Constantinople and to concert with his colleagues as to 
the further measures which Russia should take. This 
time Russia was really in earnest, and had not the 
Turkish Government yielded and recalled their troops 
across the Maritza effect would have been given to the 
Kmperor’s orders. As a result of the subsequent 
negotiations between Turkey and Bulgaria, the former 
recovered the greater part of Thrace, of which Bulgaria 
had been in occupation for some six months. 

The outbreak of the second Balkan War had created 
an entirely new situation and had revealed, not for the 
first time, the little respect with which orders emanating 
from St. Petersburg were treated at Sofia and Belgrade. 
Intoxicated with the wine of their victories and suffer- 
ing from an acute form of megalomania, the Balkan 
allies were one and all intent on retaining possession of 


whatever territories their respective armies had wrested 
K 


146 My Mission to Russia 


from Turkey. Bulgaria had borne the brunt of the 
war; she had had to face, on the eastern front, the bulk 
of the Turkish army, while her losses in killed and 
wounded far exceeded those of her allies. As a result 
of her victories she was to annex the large and fertile 
province of Thrace. Such an extension of her territory 
towards the east had never been contemplated when, in 
1912, she and Serbia had determined their respective 
spheres of influence in Macedonia. Greece and Serbia, 
therefore, contended that she ought to renounce her 
rights under that treaty in favour of her allies. It was 
their armies that had liberated Macedonia from the 
Turkish yoke, and Serbia, moreover, would, by the 
proposed creation of an autonomous Albania, be 
deprived of certain districts that had been allotted to 
her. 

They failed, however, to take into account the 
fact that Bulgaria had, ever since the short-lived Treaty 
of San Stefano, had her eyes constantly fixed on 
Macedonia as her lawful inheritance, and had during 
all the intervening years been gradually consolidating 
her position in that province. Bulgaria, on the other 
hand, was ill-advised enough to insist on the strict 
execution of the treaty of 1912, and refused to make 
concessions which were but reasonable under the altered 
circumstances, more especially as it was in order to 
satisfy her territorial ambitions in Thrace that the first 
Balkan War had been unduly prolonged contrary to 
the wishes of her allies. She, moreover, regarded the 
military convention that had been concluded between 
Greece and Serbia as a direct provocation, framed with 
the express purpose of forcing her to renounce her long- 
coveted prize. Finally, she committed the colossal 


Roumania’s Intervention in the War 147 


blunder of placing herself in the wrong and her rivals 
in the right, in the eyes of the civilized world, by 
attacking Serbia. 

After the manner in which Bulgaria had flouted her 
advice it was but natural that Russia’s sympathies 
should be on the side of Serbia, but in encouraging 
Roumania to intervene in the conflict she, in my 
opinion, steered a course which, as I told Sazonoff at 
the time, was fraught with danger for the future. If, 
as I readily admitted, Bulgaria was responsible for the 
opening of hostilities, Greece and Serbia could hardly 
be acquitted of what almost amounted to deliberate 
provocation. Prince Nicholas of Greece had, during 
his visit to St. Petersburg, urged me to persuade my 
Government to use all their influence to bring not only 
Roumania, but even Turkey, into the war which he 
regarded as imminent. The fact that Greece, who 
without the victories won by Bulgaria over the Turks 
would have played but a sorry part in the first Balkan 
War, was prepared to call in the old enemy of the 
Balkan Christians to crush her former ally, revealed the 
general spirit of unscrupulous aggrandizement that 
produced the second Balkan War. But it was not on 
such ethical grounds, but on considerations of what 
the Germans call Real Politik, that I tried to dissuade 
M. Sazonoff from listening to Prince Nicholas. 
Bulgaria, despite her heavy losses in the first Balkan 
War, was still a very important factor in the Balkans, 
while neither Roumania nor Greece could be counted 
on to fly to Serbia’s assistance should she be attacked 
by Austria. For us to take a step that would alienate 
Bulgaria for all time and drive her into the arms of 
the Triple Alliance would, I urged, break down the 


148 My Mission to Russia 


barrier which Russia had been at such pains to erect 
against an Austro-German Drang nach Osten. _ 

The Treaty of Bucharest was hailed with satisfaction 
by the Emperor William, and with good cause. For 
that treaty undid all that had been accomplished by 
the first Balkan War and created a situation which 
Germany turned to good account when the Great War 
broke out. After its signature King Ferdinand is 
reported to have said, ‘‘ Ma vengeance sera ternble,”’ 
and he kept his word. 


I was absent from Russia on sick leave during the 
greater part of the autumn of 1913, and on returning 
to St. Petersburg at the end of the year I found the 
Russian Government greatly exercised by the question 
of the appointment of General Liman von Sanders to 
the command of the Turkish army corps at Constanti- 
nople, as well as by the engagement of a large number 
of German officers to hold executive posts in the 
Turkish army. Such an appointment would, in their 
opinion, place Constantinople and the key of the Straits 
in the hands of a German general. We had promised 
the Russian Government our diplomatic support on this 
question, but at their request the representations which 
were to have been made by the Ambassadors of the 
Triple Entente had been temporarily postponed. It was 
only, indeed, after the publication of an Imperial zrade 
appointing General von Sanders to the command in 
question that they asked us to take action. 

From information which we had received in the 
meanwhile we had reason to believe that the importance 
of this command had been exaggerated, and we were, 
moreover, seriously hampered by the fact—on which the 


General Liman von Sanders 149 


German Government had laid great stress—that the 
executive command of the Turkish Fleet was held by 
a British admiral. We were not, therefore, prepared 
to go quite as far as M. Sazonoff wished. The 
instructions originally sent to Sir Louis Mallet had 
consequently to be toned down. On hearing of this, 
M. Sazonoff expressed the keenest disappointment. 
His contention was that, as this was almost the first 
question seriously affecting her interests on which 
Russia had appealed to Great Britain for support, it 
was in the nature of a test case in which the Triple 
Entente was on its trial. The Entente, he urged, 
constituted a stronger combination of Powers than the 
Triple Alliance, and if only Great Britain, France and 
Russia would let Turkey see that they were in earnest 
the latter would give way and Germany would do 
nothing. Instead, however, of acting firmly together, 
they were always proclaiming their nervous dread of 
war, and by so doing would one day find that they had 
brought war upon themselves. | 
There was a grain of truth in the above conten- 
tion. During the Balkan Wars Russia had had on 
more than one occasion to recede from positions 
which she had somewhat rashly taken up, and the 
impression that she would never fight had gained such 
ground at Constantinople that the Turks had even 
told the German Ambassador that he need have no 
apprehensions of any action by Russia. M. Sazonoff 
had, however, been mistaken when he hinted that 
the Triple Entente had on this occasion proved a 
failure. For Sir EK. Grey had again successfully inter- 
vened as mediator, adding one more to the many 
services which he had already rendered Russia and 


150 My Mission to Russia 


Europe in the cause of peace. It was, indeed, as 
M. Sazonoff himself gratefully acknowledged after- 
wards, thanks to the firm language which he used to 
Prince Lichnowsky, that a settlement was eventually 
reached under which General Liman von Sanders, 
while being accorded the rank of a Turkish field- 
marshal and remaining at the head of the German 
military mission, relinquished the command of the 
Constantinople army corps. 


CHAPTER XII 
1910-1914 


HAVE in the preceding chapters dealt exclusively 

with questions affecting Russia’s international posi- 
tion and her relations with foreign Powers; but, before 
proceeding further and before entering on a review of 
the fateful year that was to witness the outbreak of a 
world war, I must devote a few pages to the considera- 
tion of her internal situation. 

When I arrived in Russia at the end of the year 
1910 it was among the students of the universities and 
of the high schools that the prevailing political unrest 
was most marked. In many of them strikes had been 
declared and lectures suspended, while recourse was had 
to noxious gases and other terroristic measures to pre- 
vent students who desired to continue their studies 
putting in an appearance. On the other hand, vigorous 
measures were taken by the Government to restore 
order; but the professors, as a rule, delivered their 
lectures to almost empty benches under the protection 
of the police. In a conversation which I had with 
him early in March M. Stolypin told me that the 
Government had not suspended the autonomy of the 
universities, but had left it intact as far as regarded 
ordinary matters of administration. 

They could not, however, accord to a number of 
hot-headed youths the right, which no other class 


I5I 


152 My Mission to Russia 


of Russian subjects possessed, of holding political 
meetings without the sanction of the competent 
authorities. Nor could they permit a return to the 
state of things that had existed in 1905, when a 
professor delivered a lecture on the subject of the 
manufacture of bombs. As neither the peasants nor 
the army were any longer disposed to listen to 
revolutionary propaganda, the universities, according 
to M. Stolypin, were almost the only field left 
open to the machinations of the committees that, 
in Paris and other capitals, were endeavouring to 
organize a fresh rising through the agency of the 
students. The strike, having accomplished its object 
—that of calling public attention to the state of 
Russian educational institutions—was shortly after- 
wards countermanded. In the Duma, however, the 
disciplinary measures which the Government had 
adopted, as well as the expulsion of a number of 
students and of several leading professors, had but in- 
creased the hostility with which their general policy 
was regarded by a large section of that Chamber. 
During the debate on the Budget violent speeches were 
made in condemnation of their habitual recourse to 
exceptional laws and of their system of administrative 
exile. 

But it was from an unexpected quarter, during the 
debate in the Council of Empire on a Local Govern- 
‘ment bill for the six western provinces, that an attack 
. was delivered which placed the Government in a 
minority. The object of this bill was to limit the 
influence of the large Polish landowners. In order to 
accomplish this it was proposed that the election of 
representatives of the proprietary class to district and 


Stolypin’s Mistaken Tactics 153 


provincial councils should take place in two curiz, the 
one Russian and the other Polish, while the number 
of Polish members to be elected was to be fixed by 
law. The bill represented, in fact, the idea of 
nationalism which had of late years been one of the 
fundamental principles of the Government’s policy. 
It might, therefore, have been expected to appeal to 
those parties on the right, who were never weary of 
propounding the doctrine of ‘‘ Russia for the Rus- 
sians.’’ They had, however, long been seeking a 
favourable opportunity for encompassing the fall of 
M. Stolypin; and a cabal, under the leadership of M. 
Trepoff and M. Durnovo, succeeded in getting the 
measure defeated by a majority of 24 votes. 

On the following day—March 18—M. Stolypin 
tendered his resignation, and at one moment it was 
believed that the Emperor had accepted it. Thanks, 
however, to the intervention of the Dowager Empress, 
a Ministerial crisis was averted and M. Stolypin with- 
drew his resignation. ‘Two days later the Official 
Messenger published an Imperial ukase suspending, by 
virtue of Article xcrx of the Fundamental Laws, the 
sittings of the Duma and of the Council of Empire for 
three days. It was at the same time announced that M. 
Trepoff and M. Durnovo, the leaders of the attack on 
M. Stolypin’s bill, had been granted leave of absence 
from their duties from January 1-14. The personal 
satisfaction thus given M. Stolypin met with but little 
criticism save on the part of the friends of these two 
gentlemen; but it was different with regard to the 
ukase suspending the sittings of the two Chambers. 

The object of that ukase had been to enable the 
Government to promulgate the Western Governments 


154 My Mission to Russia 


bill by administrative decree under Article Lxxxvi of 
the Fundamental Laws, according to which the Govern- 
ment was at liberty to publish such decrees in cases of 
urgency when the Duma was not in session. As had 
been generally expected, the Western Governments 
bill was immediately promulgated by an Imperial ukase 
in the form in which it had left the Duma, and, as — 
had equally been expected, the head of the Octobrist 
party, M. Guchkoff, at once resigned the presidency 
of that Chamber. He was succeeded by M. Rodzianko. 
The Government’s organs in the Press defended M. 
Stolypin’s action on the ground that the right to 
determine whether circumstances were abnormal or 
not rested solely with the supreme authority, and that 
that authority could alone decide whether circum- 
stances justified the application of Article Lxxxvi of 
the Fundamental Laws. It cannot, however, be con- 
tested that M. Stolypin had not only made an unwar- 
ranted and unconstitutional use of that article, but that 
he had also committed a grave tactical blunder. Had 
he been contented with the satisfaction afforded him 
by the suspension of his two principal opponents, and 
had he had the patience to wait a few months till the 
bill had become law, as it most certainly would have, 
in the normal constitutional course of its re-introduc- 
tion in the Duma, he would have won over the great 
majority of that assembly to the side of the Govern- 
ment. As it was, he alienated the sympathies of his 
principal supporters in that chamber at the very 
moment when he had thrown down the gauntlet to the 
reactionary party in the Council of Empire. He tried, 
but utterly failed, to persuade M. Guchkoff and the 
Octobrists that, in acting as he had done, he was but 


Stolypin Assassinated 155 


defending the rights of the Duma, whose bill had been 
rejected by the Upper Chamber. Resolutions con- 
demning his action were subsequently passed in both 
chambers. 

The term of two months, within which the Govern- 
ment was obliged by law to submit to the Duma any 
bill that had been promulgated by Imperial ukase, 
expired on May 26. On that day, and only on that 
day, was the Western Government bill laid before that 
chamber; but in order that there might be no risk of 
its being rejected, the Duma was at the same time 
prorogued till the autumn. It would undoubtedly have 
constituted the one great contentious measure of the 
autumn session had it not been for the deplorable 
tragedy that had in the meanwhile removed M. Stoly- 
pin from the scene. 

On September 9 the Emperor with the Imperial 
family had left Peterhof for Kieff, where His Majesty 
was to unveil a statue of Alexander II. On the even- 
ing of the 14th the Emperor with the young grand 
duchesses attended a gala representation at the Opera 
House. The President of the Council and some of his 
colleagues who were in attendance occupied seats in the 
first row of the stalls. During the second entr’acte M. 
Stolypin was standing, with his back to the orchestra, 
facing the audience, and was talking to a colleague 
when a young man dressed in evening clothes ap- 
proached him, coming down the gangway between the 
stalls from the rear of the house. M. Stolypin seems 
to have looked at him interrogatively as if to ask him 
what he wanted, when the young man drew a revolver 
and fired two shots point blank at His Excellency. 
A scene of indescribable confusion ensued, during 


156 My Mission to Russia 


which the assassin almost succeeded in escaping. The 
Emperor, who at once advanced to the front of his 
box, was enthusiastically acclaimed, and the National 
Anthem was, on the demand of the audience, sung 
by the whole opera company kneeling on the stage. 
M. Stolypin was removed in an ambulance to a | 
neighbouring hospital, where he expired four days 
later. 

The assassin, a Christianized Jew, Mordko Bogrov 
by name, had in 1906-7 been a member of the Revolu- 
tionary Committee of Student Delegates, and had, as 
such, undergone on more than one occasion short terms 
of imprisonment. Like the famous Azef, he had at 
the same time acted as an agent of the secret police, 
whose confidence he secured by the betrayal of some 
of his associates. Bogrov, it appears, had recently 
been living with a married brother in St. Petersburg, 
and only arrived in Kieff on the day preceding his 
crime. He at once called on Lieutenant-Colonel 
Kuliabko, the chief of the secret police in that town, 
and informed him that the St. Petersburg Social 
Revolutionary Committee had decided to kill the 
President of the Council and the Minister of Educa- 
tion, and that they were employing as their instru- 
ments a woman called Nina Alexandrovna and a man 
known by the name of Nicholas. Colonel Kuliabko 
placed implicit confidence in all that Bogrov told him 
and even entrusted him with the mission of watching 
over M. Stolypin’s safety and of securing the arrest of 
the intending murderers. He at the same time warned 
M. Stolypin’s secretary of the plot, adding that all 
the necessary precautions had been taken. The 
Governor of Kieff, which was known as a hotbed of 


His Five Years’ Tenure of Office 157 


the revolutionary movement, in which Jews had always 
played a prominent part, was said to have issued an 
order to the effect that no Jews were to be admitted 
to the theatre. In spite of this, however, Bogrov was 
given a pass and was not even subjected to a personal 
examination to see if he carried any weapon on him. 
Considering that the most minute precautions had been 
taken to prevent the entrance of any suspicious persons, 
it seems incredible that Colonel Kuliabko should have 
taken no steps to have Bogrov watched and that he 
should have placed implicit reliance on the word of a 
man who, he knew, had at one time been in close rela- 
tions with the revolutionary party. 

M. Stolypin had been appointed President of the 
Council in July, 1906, at a moment when Russia was 
still in the throes of revolution and when government 
on constitutional lines had been rendered almost im- 
possible by the irreconcilable attitude of the cadets 
and of the parties of the extreme left. Though it 
was he who gave effect to the Imperial ukase dissolv- 
ing the first Duma, it was not on his advice that the 
Emperor had signed it. In his ‘‘ Souvenirs de Mon 
Ministére,’’ published in the Révue des Deux Mondes, 
the late M. Isvolsky tells us how M. Stolypin, who was 
at that time Minister of the Interior, had been in 
favour of a Coalition Government in which the Duma 
and the Council of the Empire were to be largely 
represented; how the President of the Council, M. 
Goremykin, who had apparently heard of the pour- 
parlers already initiated with certain prominent mem- 
bers of the Duma, had suddenly told his colleagues that 
it was his intention to submit for the Emperor’s signa- 
ture an Imperial ukase dissolving that assembly ; how 


158 My Mission to Russia 


he had asked them to meet him the next evening on 
his return from his audience, and how he had then 
electrified them by announcing that he had brought 
back the Imperial ukase duly signed, but that the 
Emperor had at the same time deigned to relieve him 
of his functions as President of the Council and to — 
replace him by M. Stolypin. 

The step thus taken by the Emperor, in the hope 
of mitigating the bad impression which the dissolution 
of the Duma was bound to create, did but exasperate 
all parties alike. The reactionaries were indignant 
at M. Goremykin’s summary dismissal, while Liberals 
of all shades of opinion saw in the dissolution of 
the Duma the first step towards the eventual 
abrogation of the 1905 charter. In a crisis like that 
through which Russia was then passing, M. Stoly- 
pin had no choice but to accept the mandate with 
which the Emperor had charged him, involving though 
it did the dissolution of the Duma. ‘The dissolution 
was immediately followed by renewed efforts on the. 
part of the cadets and their allies to foment disorders. — 
The Viborg proclamation calling on the people to refuse 
to serve in the army or to pay taxes was issued; the 
peasantry were incited to agrarian outrages; the houses 
of landed proprietors were pillaged or burnt; terrorist 
crimes followed each other in quick succession; and 
finally M. Stolypin’s summer residence was blown up, 
his daughter maimed for life, and some fifty persons 
killed or wounded. 

The second Duma, which met in the spring of 1907, 
was more moderate than the first, but the revolutionary 
doctrines preached by the Social Democrats forced 
Stolypin to ask the Chamber to consent to judicial 


ne 


Stolypin and the Duma 159 


proceedings being taken against fifty-five members of 
that party. On an attempt being made to avoid a 
direct answer to this request by referring it to a Com- 
mission, he obtained from the Emperor a ukase dis- 
solving the Duma. 

Stolypin then decided that the only course open 
to him was to restrict the franchise. His object was 
to secure the representation of the best classes and to 
give to the landed proprietors and to those who had 
material interests at stake a preponderating voice in 
the representative Chamber. A new electoral law was 
accordingly promulgated under which sweeping changes 
were effected with a view to introducing as many Con- 
servative or moderate Liberal elements as possible and 
of eliminating or reducing the representation of all 
non-Russian nationalities. 

This new departure exposed Stolypin to the re- 
proach of having deprived the Duma of its character 
of a representative assembly ; but his accusers were too 
apt to forget the difficulties with which he was con- 
fronted. On the one hand, the party of reaction was 
clamouring for the abolition of all forms of parliamen- 
tary institutions on the ground that they had been tried 
and found wanting. On the other hand, he could not 
hope to draw from an ignorant peasantry, hungering 
for land which did not belong to them, who had not 
a thought for anything beyond their own personal 
interests, the material wherewith to build up a Chamber 
that would help him to stamp out anarchy and to 
elaborate reforms of a moderate but beneficial character. 
In his desire to promote the nationalist policy, of which 
he had made himself the champion, he inclined too 
much towards the right, and, as has already been 


160 My Mission to Russia 


shown, he committed the grave mistake of making an 
unconstitutional use of Article Lxxxvm of the Funda- 
mental Laws. 

Stolypin had such confidence in himself—such an 
iron determination to do what he considered best 
for his country without any regard for his own safety 
or interests, that he was too prone to govern with 
a strong hand. He relied too much on the police 
and suppressed any manifestation of discontent with- 
out attempting to remove the causes which had given 
rise to it. His faults and mistakes were, however, 
largely outweighed by the services which he had ren- 
dered. Though he failed to destroy the seeds of unrest 
that continued to germinate underground, he rescued 
Russia from anarchy and chaos; and, though forced to 
place her newly granted representative institutions on 
a narrower foundation, he saved them from the destruc- 
tion which at one moment threatened them. He was 
a true patriot and, despite his faults, a great Minister. 
He combined with rare strength of character a simple, 
gentle nature that charmed and attracted me. From 
the moment of my arrival he held out the hand of 
friendship, which I was not slow to grasp, and up to the 
day of his death I was in constant touch with him. He 
was an ideal ‘Minister to transact business with. Frank 
and outspoken, he always went straight to the point 
and, what is unusual in a man who, like himself, pos- 
sessed to an extraordinary degree the gift of oratory, 
he never wasted time in words. When he once pro- 
mised a thing it was always done. His death was an 
irreparable loss not only to his own country but to 
ours; for, had his life been spared, and had he been 
at the head of the Government when war broke out, 


Stolypin’s Agrarian Policy 161 


many of the disasters which have since befallen Russia 
would have been avoided. | 

He had achieved one signal success by initiating a 
scheme of agrarian reform which had conferred inestim- 
able benefits on the peasantry. With the abolition of 
serfage by Alexander II, the Russian peasantry had not 
only secured their own personal liberty, but had at the 
same time been endowed with grants of land. ‘The 
Government, however, in its desire to prevent the 
formation of an agrarian proletariat, had not allotted 
these lands to the peasants individually, but had divided 
them among the different communes to be held under 
a system of collective communal ownership. Each 
commune, or mir, then apportioned out the lands 
assigned to it in separate lots among its members for 
a fixed term of years, at the end of which these lots 
were redistributed afresh. Such a system was incom- 
patible with the requirements of modern agriculture, 
as it deprived the peasants of all incentive to develop 
the land of which they were but temporary tenants. In 
order to give the peasants a personal interest in their 
lands, and with a view to creating a conservative class 
of peasant proprietors, Stolypin introduced a series 
of agrarian reforms which had for their object the 
gradual conversion of the communal lands into in- 
dividual holdings. He further facilitated the purchase 
by the peasants of lands belonging to the State and 
to the Imperial apanages by the institution of peasant 
banks. The success of Stolypin’s agrarian policy 
surpassed all expectations, and at the time of his 
death nearly 19,000,000 acres of land had been 
allotted to individual peasant proprietors by the land 
committees. 

L 


162 My Mission to Russia 


M. Kokovtsoff, who succeeded Stolypin as President 
of the Council, was a man of a very different stamp, 
representing as he did the best type of the-old Russian 
bureaucracy. Honest, hardworking and remarkably 
intelligent, he had, as Minister of Finance, effected 
an extraordinary improvement in Russia’s financial 
position; and it was in great measure thanks to his 
able administration, as well as to the progressive 
development of Russia’s industries and agriculture, 
that in 1914 her ordinary revenue, which during the 
preceding years had been rapidly expanding, was esti- 
mated at over £370,000,000, and that the gold reserve 
amounted to £150,000,000. ‘The only serious blot in 
the Russian Budget was the fact that £95,000,000 of 
the ordinary revenue were derived from the Govern- 
ment’s alcohol monopoly. M. Kokovtsoff was on 
better terms with the Duma than either his predecessor 
or the majority of his colleagues. He had on more 
than one occasion evinced a desire to work in harmony 
with it; but in an official statement, published shortly 
after his appointment as President of the Council, he 
made it quite clear that, while there could be no ques- 
tion of the abrogation of any of the existing institutions 
of Government, Stolypin’s policy must be carried out 
in its entirety and would not be changed owing to 
the acts of terrorists. 

In foreign policy M. Kokovtsoff was a firm sup- 
porter of the Anglo-Russian understanding. I had a 
great personal regard for him, and our official relations 
were always of the best. Unfortunately, while possess- 
ing, like M. Stolypin, great natural eloquence, he had 
not the latter’s gift of being able to compress what he 
had to say into a few words, and, after my conversations 


The Okhrana 163 


with him, I had often to ask myself: ‘‘ Was ist der 
langen Rede kiirzer Sinn? ’’ (** What, briefly, is the 
long oration’s gist? ’’). He had not, moreover, Stoly- 
pin’s commanding personality, and, as he was not 
always able to impose his own views on his colleagues, 
his assurances did not carry the same weight. 

Stolypin’s assassination had naturally drawn public 
attention to the extraordinary and anomalous methods 
of the Okhrana, or secret police—that darkest of all 
dark blots in the history of the old régime. Though 
it seems almost incredible, it is a fact that the 
Government was in the habit of employing creatures 
like Azeff, who, acting as their agents provocateurs, 
incited to crime and murder and then delivered over 
into the hands of the police their unsuspecting victims. 
They kept these men in their employ even when they 
knew them to be active revolutionaries who had them- © 
selves played a prominent part in the assassination of 
high-placed State officials. During the autumn session 
of the Duma the drastic reform of the Okhrana was 
urgently but vainly demanded. 

During the year 1912 there was, with the exception 
of a number of strikes of a distinctly political character, 
no open manifestation of the prevailing discontent on 
the part of the proletariat, while the peasants were 
engrossed by the task of securing for themselves the 
benefits accruing from Stolypin’s agrarian reforms. 
The revolutionary organizations were, nevertheless, 
quietly but actively carrying on their subterranean 
work, with the result that mutinies broke out in the 
Baltic and Black Sea fleets as well as among the troops 
at Tashkent, which had to be suppressed by force. In 
September the third Duma was dissolved after a life 


164 My Mission to Russia 


of four and a half years. The new elections, however, 
effected but little change in the composition of that 
chamber. 

The Octobrists, though somewhat diminished in 
numbers, still held the balance between the parties 
on their right and on their left; but they were so 
dissatisfied with the continual postponement of all 
constitutional reforms that they were gradually adopt- 
ing an attitude of greater independence towards the 
Government. ‘The increasing gravity of the internal 
situation was, indeed, one of the causes that con- 
tributed to the determination of the Government not 
to depart from a pacific attitude during the acute stages 
of the Balkan crisis. 

In June of the following year—1913—the Duma 
by a large majority passed a resolution censuring the 
Government for prolonging the state of exceptional law 
and for delaying the introduction of measures of con- 
stitutional reform. The continual postponement of 
these reforms, together with the severity of the ad- 
ministrative régime that had been accentuated by M. 
Maklakoff, the newly appointed Minister of the 
Interior, had so incensed all the law-abiding classes 
that, as M. Guchkoff remarked, there had never been 
a time when Russian society and the Russian people 
had been so deeply permeated with the revolutionary 
spirit. The legislative work of the Duma continued 
to be hampered by the constant rejection or radical 
amendment of its bills by the Council of the Empire 
and by the failure of the Government to submit for 
its consideration measures of importance. 

T'o quote but one instance of these. A bill for 
the reform of the municipalities in Poland that had 


Growth of Revolutionary Spirit 165 


been voted by the Duma was amended by the 
Council of the Empire so as to prohibit the use of 
the Polish language in the debates of the municipal 
councils. Though the President of the Council had 
himself supported the proposal to allow the use of 
Polish, he was successfully opposed by the reactionary 
Ministers of Justice and of the Interior and by the 
Procurator of the Holy Synod. The reactionary 
party in the Government was rapidly gaining the 
upper hand, and during all the ensuing months till 
the outbreak of war the situation grew steadily worse. 
M. Kokovtsoff was summarily dismissed and M. 
Goremykin, who had been responsible for the dissolu- 
tion of the first Duma, was once more appointed 
President of the Council. An amiable old gentleman 
with pleasant manners, of an indolent temperament and 
quite past his work, he had not moved with the times, 
and still looked upon the Duma as an unimportant 
factor that could be safely ignored. With the con- 
summate skill of the born courtier he had ingratiated 
himself with the Empress, though, except for his ultra 
monarchical views, he had nothing whatever to recom- 
mend him. The record of his tenure of office in 1906, 
on the other hand, extinguished all hope of constitu- 
tional reforms so long as he enjoyed the confidence of 
the Emperor. Discontent became so general and so 
acute, strikes succeeded each other in such rapid suc- 
cession and assumed such dangerous proportions, that 
it was hardly surprising that the German Ambassador 
should have predicted that the declaration of war would 
start the revolution. 


CHAPTER XIII 
1896-1914 


HAVE in previous chapters reported some of my 

conversations with the Emperor Nicholas, and it is 
time that I should give a brief account of my personal 
relations with His Majesty and with the Imperial 
family in general. ‘Though I am only dealing at 
present with the pre-war period, I shall occasionally 
have to anticipate and to refer to events of a later 
date. 

My relations with the Imperial family date back to 
the days, some sixteen years before my appointment as 
Ambassador at St. Petersburg, when I was accredited 
as chargé d’affaires to the Empress’s brother, the Grand 
Duke of Hesse. Princess ‘‘ Alix’’—the name by 
which the Empress was best known before her marriage 
—was then a beautiful girl, though shy and reserved; 
but when once this barrier of reserve was broken down, 
one realized how charming she could be. Her natural 
kindness of heart manifested itself in many ways, and 
in our case more especially by the ready sympathy 
which she more than once showed us when we were 
in trouble. Her face was a very striking one, with, 
at times, a sad and pathetic expression—an expression 
which Koppay has reproduced to the life in the portrait 
which he painted soon after her marriage. I remember 


remarking, when I first saw an engraving of this 
166 





CAA iY: 








THE EMPRESS, WITH THE TSAREVITCH 


(From a photograph in the possession of Sir Ian Matcolnz) 











The Emperor at Darmstadt 167 


picture, that there was something in it that suggested 
the idea of impending tragedy. 

It was during a visit which Their Majesties paid to 
Darmstadt in 1896 that I first had the honour of being 
presented to the Emperor. It was in one of the 
entr’actes of a gala performance given at the Court 
theatre, and under ordinary circumstances such a pre- 
sentation would not have alarmed me. But I had been 
charged by Lord Salisbury with a somewhat delicate 
mission, and I was afraid that I should not get in what 
I wanted to say in the course of a few minutes’ con- 
versation. Lord Salisbury had, during the Emperor’s 
recent visit to Balmoral, spoken to him about the 
Armenian question, which was then passing through 
one of its acute phases, and the Emperor Nicholas, who 
was about to visit Paris, had promised to communicate 
to him, through our Ambassador, the result of the con- 
versations which he was to have on the subject with 
members of the French Government. 

As the Emperor in his conversation with Lord 
Dufferin had said nothing about Armenia, I had 
been instructed to endeavour to ascertain whether any 
decision had been arrived at in Paris. I had hoped, 
by an indirect reference to the Balmoral meeting, 
to remind the Emperor of his promise without having 
to violate the rules of Court etiquette by myself 
introducing the subject; but this hope was doomed 
to disappointment. The Emperor, after saying how 
much he had enjoyed his visit to the Queen, of 
whom he spoke in the warmest terms, proceeded to 
speak of matters of local interest, and disconcerted me 
by saying that he had heard that I had a charming 
daughter. I confess that for the moment I wished 


168 My Mission to Russia 


my daughter anywhere, as the mention of her name 
had deprived me of my last chance of giving the 
conversation the turn which I desired. I had, there- 
fore, no choice but to tell the Emperor straight out, 
as he was on the point of dismissing me, that Lord 
Salisbury would be glad to know what, if any, decisions — 
had been taken at Paris. Much to my relief, he at 
once reassured me by requesting me to inform Lord 
Salisbury that during his short stay at Paris his time 
had been so taken up with other matters that he had 
had no opportunity of discussing the Armenian question 
with the French Ministers. 

In the autumn of the following year the Kmperor 
and Kmpress spent several weeks with the Grand Duke 
and Grand Duchess at Wolfsgarten, and we were 
occasionally invited to meet them there or at the 
Darmstadt tennis club, where the Emperor sometimes 
played while the Empress sat and looked on. The 
Kmperor also received me in private audience, when 
he talked to me on a variety of subjects. He began 
with tennis and then went on to shooting, telling me 
all about the elk, stag, buffaloes and wild boar which 
he had recently shot in Poland, and saying that his 
best day’s pheasant shooting was 1,400 head, which he 
considered quite enough. As the conversation became 
more political in character I remarked that, according 
to the German Press, His Majesty’s Government were 
pursuing a long-sighted Machiavellian policy with the 
intent of provoking a European war; whereas, if the 
truth were known, they had no definite policy at all 
and were not in the habit of looking far ahead. The 
Emperor laughed and said that one of the disadvantages 
of parliamentary government was that the policy of the 


My First Audience 169 


Government of the day might be reversed by the 
Government of the morrow. There could thus be no 
continuity in its foreign policy. Foreign Governments 
could not, therefore, place implicit reliance on our 
friendship, though in view of our insular position it 
was no doubt to our interest to preserve our liberty of 
action and to keep aloof from all hard-and-fast alliances. 

With regard to what I had said about the German 
Press, His Majesty observed that nothing interested 
him more than to read what people thought of him and 
his Government. He then asked me how things were 
going on the Indian frontier, and on my saying that 
order was gradually being restored there, he proceeded 
to speak of our relations in Asia. He did not, he said, 
believe in buffer States, unless they were strong and 
independent; and Persia, with its effete and corrupt 
Government, was too weak to play the réle of such a 
State with advantage. Russia had already quite as 
much territory as she could manage, and he did not 
desire to acquire more; but he personally thought that 
our relations would be far more friendly and satisfac- 
tory were there no Persia between us. He feared, 
however, that British public opinion was hardly yet 
prepared to see England and Russia neighbours, though 
our old distrust of his country was, he rejoiced to say, 
gradually waning. During the rest of the audience the 
Emperor talked about the Klondike and Siberian mines, 
about his own journey through Siberia and about its 
climate and vegetation. 

I little foresaw when I took leave of His Majesty 
how many audiences I was to have with him in years 
to come, and how eventually I should have to hold 
language such as no Ambassador before me has, I 


170 My Mission to Russia 


imagine, ever held to an autocratic Sovereign. ‘The 
fact, however, that my wife and I were personally 
known to the Emperor and Empress was a considerable 
asset in our favour when we went to St. Petersburg. 

I had, as already stated in Chapter vill, assumed 
charge of the Embassy at a moment when the Anglo- 
Russian understanding had been somewhat strained in 
consequence of the Potsdam Agreement, and I made it 
a rule from the first to be perfectly frank and outspoken 
in my conversations with the Emperor. His Majesty, 
who was most anxious to maintain that understanding 
intact, appreciated this frankness and honoured me with 
his confidence. During the years which followed my 
relations with him gradually assumed a more intimate 
character, and I personally became devotedly attached 
to him. His Majesty had such a wonderful charm of 
manner that when he received me in audience he almost 
made me feel that it was a friend, and not the Emperor, 
with whom I was talking. There was, if I may say so 
without presumption, what amounted to a feeling of 
mutual sympathy between us. Knowing, as he did, 
that my language with regard to international questions 
was inspired by my desire to promote Anglo-Russian 
friendship, while that as regarded the internal situation 
I had what I conceived to be his true interests at heart, 
he never once resented my outspoken language. 

At official ceremonies, with the exception of the 
New Year’s diplomatic reception, the Emperor seldom 
spoke to any of the Ambassadors. He would shake 
hands with them without engaging them in conversa- 
tion, and would then go from one group of Russians to 
another, talking with whom he would. On one occasion 
—it was at a dinner given at Peterhof in 1911 in honour 


Incident at a Court Dinner 17) 


of the King of Serbia—he placed me in rather an 
embarrassing position. I was the only Ambassador 
present, having been invited to meet Prince Arthur of 
Connaught, who happened to be on a visit to the 
Emperor and Empress. His Royal Highness, how- 
ever, had at the last moment been told by the Emperor 
that the dinner would not amuse him, and that he had 
better go out stalking. There was thus no raison d’étre 
for my presence at the dinner, and I remember poor 
Stolypin—who was assassinated a few weeks later— 
asking me what I was doing ‘‘ en cette galére.’’ After 
dinner one of the Court chamberlains came up to me 
and begged me to stand on one side of the room where 
the Emperor was about to pass, as His Majesty would 
doubtless wish to speak to me. I accordingly did so; 
but as His Majesty passed without apparently seeing 
me, my friend once more placed me in another favour- 
able position for catching His Majesty’s eye—with the 
same unfortunate result. As he was about to repeat 
the experiment a third time I remarked that if His 
Majesty wished to speak to me he could always send 
for me, but that I was not going to run after him. It 
was only as he was about to retire that the Emperor, 
as he passed, shook hands with me and bade me good 
night. The fact was that he had forgotten, when he 
sent Prince Arthur out shooting, that I had been 
invited to the dinner, and consequently felt somewhat 
embarrassed by my presence. 

Only once had I the courage to approach the 
Kmperor at a public ceremony and to speak to him 
without being sent for. It was during the war, at the 
launching of a battle cruiser. His Majesty was stand- 
ing alone, watching the preliminary proceedings, and 


172 My Mission to Russia 


as I had something which I particularly wished to say 
to him I went up and spoke to him. He received me 
very graciously and kept me in conversation till the 
ceremony was about to commence. 

It is a curious fact that, in spite of the long- 
established ceremonial and the traditional etiquette of © 
the Imperial Court, Ambassadors were sometimes 
treated rather cavalierly. So much was this the case 
that at a meeting of Ambassadors convoked shortly 
after my arrival the doyen was charged to make certain 
representations on the subject. According to the 
unwritten law governing such questions, an Ambassa- 
dor who is invited to lunch or to dine at the palace 
lunches or dines at the Sovereign’s table. When, 
therefore, on the eve of my first audience I received 
a telephone message from Tsarskoe saying that I was 
to remain to luncheon, I naturally imagined that I was 
to lunch with the Imperial family. I was, however, 
mistaken, as at the conclusion of my audience I was 
taken off to lunch with the household. I said nothing 
at the time, as I felt that it hardly became a new- 
fledged Ambassador to be too punctilious. 

In the following year, on being invited to Tsarskoe 
to present to Their Majesties the members of the 
recently arrived’ British delegation, I was once more 
constrained to lunch with the household in spite of my 
having tried to excuse myself. As my colleagues and I 
had agreed not to accept such invitations in future, I 
thought it time to protest. As soon, therefore, as the 
luncheon was over I spoke to the grand master of the 
ceremonies. He had, I said, placed me in a very 
embarrassing position. I had come to the palace in my 
official capacity as His Majesty’s Ambassador, and he 


The Court in Retirement at Tsarskoe 173 


must know as well as I did that under such circum- 
stances it was contrary to all etiquette to invite me to 
lunch with the household. I therefore trusted that he 
would not repeat such invitations in future, and that 
he would arrange for me to return to St. Petersburg as 
soon as my audiences were over. Count Hendrikoff 
had to admit that I was right, and on all subsequent 
occasions I was given a special train, which waited for 
me at the Tsarskoe station till I was ready to return 
to town. 

Ever since the revolutionary outbreak that had 
followed the Japanese War the Emperor and Empress 
had lived in comparative retirement at Tsarskoe Selo, 
and only came to St. Petersburg when some State 
function or religious ceremony necessitated their 
presence there. The Court no longer played a part in 
the social life of the capital, and the splendid balls, of 
which the Winter Palace had so often been the scene, 
were a tradition of the past. From time to time, on 
such occasions as that of the Romanoff Tercentenary, 
there were gala performances at the opera, when the 
house presented a wonderful sight with the parterre 
one mass of gorgeous uniforms and the boxes filled 
with smartly dressed ladies resplendent with jewels. 

But only once during the whole period of my mission 
were the doors of the Winter Palace opened for any- 
thing beyond the formal New Year’s reception and 
the ceremony of the Blessing of the Waters at the 
Epiphany. It was during the winter of 1913-14 that 
the heads of missions and the leading members of 
Russian society were invited to witness a performance 
of Parsifal in the private theatre in the Hermitage that 
had been built by the Empress Catherine. It was in 


174 My Mission to Russia 


every respect a beautiful performance, and one of 
which the great Catherine might herself have been 
proud. I, personally, am not musical, and I was after- 
wards reproached by the Empress Marie and the young 
Grand Duchesses with having slept peacefully through 
the performance; but, as I assured them, I had but | 
closed my eyes the better to listen to the music. The 
dinner, however, that was served in the Winter Palace 
during one of the entr’actes hardly came up to one’s 
expectations after all that one heard of the splendours 
of such entertainments in the past. Neither from a 
spectacular nor from a gastronomic standpoint could it 
compare with a State banquet at Buckingham Palace. 

In their retreat at Tsarskoe the Emperor and 
Kmpress led a simple domestic life, and the latter dis- 
couraged the idea of allowing outsiders to intrude into 
their happy family circle. ‘They entertained but little, 
and it was only on very rare occasions—such as the 
arrival of General Sir Arthur Paget on a special 
mission ; the visit of Admiral Sir David Beatty (as he 
then was) with the First Battle-cruiser Squadron; the 
meeting of the Allied Conference at Petrograd on the 
eve of the revolution—that I had the honour of lunch- 
ing or dining with the Imperial Family. Once—in 
1916—I was invited to witness a private representation 
at T'sarskoe of the films showing the part which the 
British army and navy had played in the war; but 
though I sat between the Emperor and Empress during 
the representation, which lasted till past eight o’clock, 
I was not invited to remain to dinner. Nor was the 
French Ambassador, who was invited a few days later 
to witness a representation of French war films. As 
Ambassador, therefore, I had but few opportunities 





THE EMPRESS MARIE 
(From a photograph kindly given nie by Her Imperial Majesty) 





The Empress Marie 175 


of any serious conversation with the Emperor unless 
I could find some excuse for asking for a special 
audience. 

With the Empress Marie it was very different. Her 
Majesty liked to see people, and, though since the death 
of the Emperor Alexander III she had not entertained 
on a large scale, she gave small, informal luncheons to 
which I often had the privilege of being invited. Her 
whole personality was so attractive and sympathetic 
that she was loved by all who approached her, and she 
had the great gift of putting everybody at their ease. 
Her sense of humour also did away with all constraint 
on the part of the guests, so that the conversation at 
these luncheons never flagged and was as a rule very 
amusing. I had, more than once, occasion to discuss 
with Her Majesty the internal situation, which, as the 
war progressed, caused her ever-increasing preoccupa- 
tion. Realizing as she did the danger of the course 
which the Emperor was steering, she repeatedly ten- 
dered counsels of moderation, and, had her advice been 
followed, Russia might have been spared much suffer- 
ing. But Fate had willed it otherwise. 

Among the other members of the Imperial family 
the Grand Duchess ‘Marie Pawlowna, the widow of the 
Grand Duke Wladimir, took the first place. In her 
palaces at St. Petersburg and Tsarskoe Her Imperial 
Highness held a little Court of her own. It had, 
indeed, socially speaking, become a substitute in minia- 
ture for what the Imperial Court had been before it 
underwent all but total eclipse owing to the retired 
life led by the Emperor and Empress. A grande dame 
in the best sense of that term, but without any pre- 
tensions as regards the strict observance of Court 


176 My Mission to Russia 


etiquette, the Grand Duchess was admirably fitted to 
play the part of hostess and to do the honours of the 
Court. With great conversational gifts, she was not 
only herself full of verve and entrain, but possessed the 
art of inspiring them in others. Her entertainments, 
no matter what form they took, were never dull, and. 
no one was ever bored. At her dinners and receptions 
one met many of the younger members of the Imperial 
family and the élite of Russian society, more especially 
the ‘‘ smart set,’’ as well as a sprinkling of the official 
and artistic worlds. For the Grand Duchess, though 
very fond of society, had other and more serious tastes, 
and was President—and a very active one—of the 
Russian Academy of Arts. During the war she de- 
voted herself entirely to Red Cross work, while she 
was exceptionally well-informed on all political and 
military questions, in which she took active interest. 
The Grand Duchess Victoria—the wife of the Grand 
Duke Cyril—who, when she was Grand Duchess of 
Hesse, had befriended us at Darmstadt, and the Grand 
Duchess Xenia, the Emperor’s sister, whose kindness 
to us I shall never forget, also entertained a good deal ; 
and many were the pleasant evenings. which we spent 
at their informal dinners and dances. One of the most 
_attractive traits in the Russian character was—for I 
cannot speak of the present—its extreme simplicity ; 
and all the members of the Imperial family were as 
simple and natural as could be. They never stood on 
their dignity and disliked being treated with too much 
ceremony. When they came to the Embassy it was 
always by preference to some informal entertainment, 
and what they liked the best of all was a diner dansant 
at round tables, where they could talk unreservedly to 


Grand Duke Nicholas Michaelowich 177 


their friends. No one could have been more simple 
and natural than the Emperor himself. I remember 
how, at the diplomatic reception on New Year’s Day, 
1912, after speaking to me about some political ques- 
tion, he said: ‘* My sisters tell me that they are going 
to your house to-night. Are you giving a ball?’’ On 
my replying that it was not a regular ball, but that we 
were giving a dinner of about a hundred and fifty 
persons at round tables and were going to dance after- 
wards, His ‘Majesty exclaimed: ‘* What fun that will 
be.’’ I longed to ask him to come too, but knew that 
it would be useless, as neither he nor the Empress ever 
went into society. 

Of the Grand Dukes whom I met in society or at the 
Yacht Club, where I occasionally dined, the Grand 
Duke Nicholas Michaelowich was the one whom I knew 
the best. A liberal-minded and cultured man, he was 
distinguished alike as an author—he had written an 
admirable history of the reign of Alexander I—and as 
a collector of pictures and miniatures, of which he was 
an expert judge. He honoured me with his friendship, 
and I shall have later on the opportunity of paying a 
tribute of my affectionate regard to his memory. He 
always drove about in an ordinary “‘ isvostchik ’’ (cab), 
and his advanced political views, as well as his demo- 
cratic ways, had earned him the sobriquet of ‘*‘ Philippe 
EKgalité.”’ | 


CHAPTER XIV 
1914 


N his book on the war the late Herr von Bethmann- 
Hollweg asserts that by joining the Entente Great 
Britain encouraged France and Russia in their warlike 
designs. Such a contention is absolutely unfounded. 
In the first place Russia, with whom I am alone con- 
cerned, did not desire war, and throughout the pro- 
tracted Balkan crisis of 1912-18 the preservation of 
peace had been the keynote of her policy. In spite of 
occasional errors of judgment on the part of his Govern- 
ment, the Emperor, when faced with a situation in- 
volving the question of war or peace, never hesitated 
to throw the whole weight of his influence on the side 
of peace. So far did he carry his pacific policy, so 
ready was he to make concessions, if only by so doing 
he could avert the horrors of war, that at the end of 
1918, as I have shown in Chapter x1, the impression 
had gained ground that Russia would never fight, an 
impression that unfortunately encouraged Germany 
to exploit the situation. In the second place, the idea 
that His Majesty’s Government ever incited Russia to 
embark on a policy of adventure is refuted by facts. 
The exact contrary was the case. No one ever worked 
harder than did Sir Edward Grey to preserve the peace 
of Europe during those two critical years; and it was 
thanks mainly to his untiring efforts, to his restraining 
178 


My Audiences between 1912—1914 179 


influence and to the counsels of moderation, which he 
gave both at St. Petersburg and Vienna, that war was 
averted. If anyone was to blame it was Germany 
herself; for it was her policy of piling up armaments 
wherewith to impose her will on Europe that forced 
Great Britain, France and Russia to concert together 
for the protection of their respective interests. Nor is 
it true that the aim of the Entente Powers was to en- 
circle Germany with an iron ring. In concluding an 
agreement that was to remove as far as possible any 
cause of further misunderstanding between them, 
Russia and Great Britain had not been inspired by any 
feeling of hostility to Germany. They, on the contrary, 
gave repeated proof of their desire to cultivate friendly 
relations with her—Russia, by concluding the Potsdam 
Agreement, and Great Britain, by entering into 
negotiations with her—with the object of placing 
Anglo-German relations on a better footing. I would 
supplement what I have already said on this subject 
by recording the conversations which I had with the 
Emperor on the international situation between the 
years 1912 and 1914. 

On February 23, 1912, I had an audience in which, 
after informing the Emperor that the main object of 
Lord Haldane’s recent visit to Germany was to create 
a better feeling between London and Berlin, I received 
the emphatic assurance of the satisfaction which the 
news of this visit had caused His Majesty. Russia, he 
said, had concluded an arrangement with Germany that 
had greatly improved her relations with that empire; 
and it was not only natural, but necessary, in the 
interest of the world’s peace, that relations of a 
similar friendly character should be established between 


180 My Mission to Russia 


Germany and Great Britain. A nation might be 
attracted to one nation more than to another, but this 
was no reason why it should not live on good terms 
with the latter. His Majesty then proceeded to say 
that he had no reason to mistrust Germany except with 
regard to her Turkish policy. If the Ottoman army 
were ever to take the field it would be either against 
Russia or against one of the Balkan States; it was 
not, therefore, a friendly act on Germany’s part to 
supply it with military instructors. It was thanks to 
those instructors that that army was acquiring a high 
degree of efficiency ; but though he had more than once 
questioned the Emperor William on the subject, he 
had never received a satisfactory answer. | 
In another audience—April 14, 1918—during the 
discussions which were taking place on the subject of 
Scutari, the Emperor said that he fully realized that 
Germany would make common cause with Austria, and 
that he had no intention of embarking on a war with 
those two empires about a wretched Albanian town. 
In supporting the claims of the Balkan States with an 
insistence which, he feared, had sometimes caused His 
Majesty’s Government considerable embarrassment, 
Russia had but fulfilled her historic mission as the pro- 
tector of those States. The crisis had, he was glad to 
say, brought the two Governments nearer together, 
and he was more especially grateful for the services 
which Sir Edward Grey had rendered the cause of 
peace. On my observing that, while desirous of giving 
Russia all the support in their power, His Majesty’s 
Government were at the same time anxious to main- 
tain good and friendly relations with Germany, His 
Majesty said that he quite understood this and that he 


The Emperor on German Armaments 181 


desired to do the same. He was leaving shortly for 
Berlin to attend the Royal wedding, and was looking 
forward with the greatest pleasure to meeting the King 
there. During this visit he would, no doubt, as on 
former occasions, be plied with questions and proposals 
by the Emperor William. He would in that case listen 
patiently to what the Emperor had to say and be care- 
ful not to commit himself, as he always found that this 
was the safest course to pursue. 

Returning once more to the subject of the Balkan 
War, the Emperor told me that as regarded the con- 
templated occupation of Constantinople by the Bul- 
garians, the latter had originally intended to offer it 
to Russia as a token of gratitude for their liberation 
from the Turkish yoke. He had given them clearly 
to understand that Russia could not possibly accept 
such a gift, and he had urged them to renounce all idea 
of attempting to occupy it. 

As the conversation then turned on the German 
Army Bill and the counter-measures being taken by 
France to meet the new military situation, I asked the 
Kmperor whether he thought that the financial strain 
thus imposed on the two countries would be so severe 
that one or other of them might lose patience and pre- 
cipitate a war, and whether, if this danger really 
existed, it would be possible for the Powers to do any- 
thing to avert it. The Emperor replied that in 1899 
he had taken the initiative in convoking the Peace 
Conference at The Hague, but his action had been mis- 
represented as aiming at a general disarmament. He 
was not, therefore, tempted to repeat the experiment, 
and would abstain from putting forward any proposals 
on the present occasion. He quite understood the 


182 My Mission to Russia 


reasons which had prompted the proposed increase of 
the German army, but the German Government must 
be aware that they were but setting an example which 
other States would be bound to follow. They would 
probably have no difficulty in finding the men, but 
whether the country would for long be able to bear the 
increased taxation was another question. Russia, on 
the other hand, had unlimited resources to draw on 
with regard both to men and money; and just as His 
Majesty’s Government had fixed the relative strength 
of the British and German fleets at sixteen to ten, so 
he was determined to maintain the same ratio between 
the Russian and German armies. It was impossible to 
foresee what would happen, but it was very necessary 
to prepare beforehand to meet the danger should it 
arise. 

The Emperor spoke of Austria without any bitter- 
ness, but as a source of weakness to Germany and as a 
danger to peace, owing to the fact that Germany was 
bound to support her in her Balkan policy. He further 
expressed the opinion that the disintegration of the 
Austrian Empire was merely a question of time, and 
that the day was not far distant when we should see a 
kingdom of Hungary and a kingdom of Bohemia. The 
Southern Slavs would probably be absorbed by Serbia, 
the Roumanians of Transylvania by Roumania, and the 
German provinces of Austria incorporated in Germany. 
The fact that Germany would then have no Austria to 
inveigle her into a war about the Balkans would, His 
Majesty opined, make for peace. I ventured to observe 
that such a recasting of the map of Europe could hardly 
be effected without a general war. 

In March, 1914, public attention was drawn to 


His Majesty Discusses an Alliance 183 


Russia’s international position by the publication in 
the Novoye Vremja of a series of conversations with 
a Russian statesman in whom it was easy to recognize 
Count Witte. The gist of these conversations was to 
the effect that the only hope of permanent peace lay 
in a regrouping of the Powers. Count Witte had 
always regarded a close understanding with Germany 
as the mainspring of Russia’s foreign policy, and had 
consequently denounced the Anglo-Russian agreement 
as a mistaken sacrifice of her freedom of action. Very 
similar views were held by the German party at Court, 
who contrasted the material advantages to be derived 
from an alliance with Germany with the somewhat 
problematic benefits which an understanding with Great 
Britain had to offer. Even persons who were well dis- 
posed towards us were beginning to ask themselves of 
what practical value was an understanding with a 
country whose support could not be counted on in the 
event of war. 

I was not, therefore, surprised when, in an audience 
which I had on April 8, the Emperor himself broached 
the subject of Anglo-Russian relations. We had been 
talking of the views expressed by Count Witte in the 
Novoye Vremja, and His Majesty had ridiculed the 
idea of a regrouping of the Powers. Much as he 
desired to live on good terms with Germany, an alliance 
with her was, he declared, out of the question, as, apart 
from other reasons, Germany was endeavouring to 
acquire a position at Constantinople that would enable 
her to keep Russia shut in altogether in the Black Sea. 
After remarking that with Europe divided into two 
camps the international situation was disquieting, the 
Emperor said: ‘* What I should like to see is a closer 


184 My Mission to Russia 


bond of union between England and Russia, such as 
an alliance of a purely defensive character.’’ On my 
remarking that this was, I feared, impracticable at 
present, the Emperor then suggested that we might at 
any rate conclude some arrangement similar to that 
which existed between France and England. Though 
he was not acquainted with the terms of that arrange- ~ 
ment, he believed that if we had not actually a military 
convention with France we had discussed and agreed on 
what each country was to do in certain eventualities. 
I said that I knew nothing about our arrangement with 
France, but that it would, for material reasons, be im- 
possible for us to send troops to co-operate with the 
Russian army. ‘‘I have men enough and to spare,”’ 
replied the Emperor, ‘‘ and such an expeditionary force 
would serve no useful purpose; but it might be advan- 
tageous to arrange beforehand for the co-operation of 
the British and Russian fleets. ‘*‘ Our understanding,”’ 
His Majesty continued, ‘‘is at present confined to 
Persia, and I am strongly of opinion that it ought to 
be extended, either by some sort of arrangement such 
as I have just suggested, or by some written formula 
which would record the fact of Anglo-Russian co-opera- 
tion in Europe.’’ 
I told the Emperor in reply that much as I should 
personally welcome any arrangement that would tend 
to consolidate the Anglo-Russian understanding, I 
could but ask myself whether, supposing that England 
had in 1918 been the ally of Russia, she could have 
rendered her any more effective service than she had 
done as her friend. On several occasions during the. 
prolonged Balkan crisis she had been able to play the 
role of mediator at Berlin and Vienna. It was thanks, 


Tirpitz’s unfounded Statement 185 


moreover, to her friendly intervention that a more or 
less satisfactory settlement of the Serbian port question 
had been arrived at, and that Austria had yielded about 
Dibra and Djakova, which were blocking the way to a 
settlement of the all-important question of Scutari. 
It was, I thought, doubtful whether we should have 
been so successful either at Berlin or Vienna had we 
approached those two Governments as the ally of 
Russia instead of as a friend who might be turned into 
an ally should Germany and Austria force war on 
Russia. While admitting that there might be some 
force in the above argument, the Emperor said that he 
would nevertheless prefer to see the Anglo-Russian 
understanding assume a more precise and definite 
character. 

I recently came across the following passage in 
Admiral Tirpitz’s ‘* Memoirs ”’ (English edition, Vol. 1, 
p. 256): ** During the visit of the English Fleet to Kiel 
at the end of June, 1914, the British Ambassador at 
St. Petersburg, Buchanan, announced the conclusion 
of an Anglo-Russian naval convention.’’ It would 
appear from the context that I had intended this 
announcement to act as a sort of counterblast to the 
friendly gesture implied in the despatch by His 
Majesty’s Government of a British squadron to Kiel. 
If Admiral Tirpitz has ever read Sheridan’s play The 
Critic, he will remember how the Governor of Tilbury 
Fort interrupted his daughter, who was descanting on 
all that she saw on the approaching Armada, by 
remarking : 


The Spanish fleet thou canst not see—because 
It is not yet in sight. 


186 My Mission to Russia 


In the same way I may reply that I did not an- 
nounce the conclusion of an Anglo-Russian convention 
—because no such convention ever existed. I may 
further inform the gallant admiral that I never even 
entered into negotiations with the Russian Govern- 
ment for the conclusion of a naval convention, and that, 
if Great Britain eventually became Russia’s ally both 
by land and sea, that alliance owed its being to 
Germany’s violation of Belgium’s neutrality. 

I have recorded the above conversations in order to 
show how utterly unfounded are the charges of chau- 
vinism brought by so many highly placed Germans 
against both Russia and Great Britain. Not one word 
did the Emperor ever utter that betrayed a desire on 
his part to adopt an aggressive attitude towards Ger- 
many. On the contrary, he never missed an occasion 
of expressing his earnest wish to live on good terms with 
her. It was only when he realized the trend of her 
policy and the meaning of her ever-growing armaments 
that he took steps to guard against possible future 
eventualities. He increased the number of his peace 
effectives, and he suggested the conversion of the 
Anglo-Russian understanding into an alliance of a 
purely defensive character. On the other hand, the 
language which I used when the Emperor made this 
tentative suggestion is, I think, a sufficient answer 
to those who accuse His Majesty’s Government of 
having encouraged Russia to steer a warlike course. 
Germany, it must not be forgotten, had in 1918 raised 
£50,000,000 by a levy on capital for military purposes, 
and Russia had to take counter-measures in self- 
defence. I remember how M. Delcassé, who was then 
Ambassador at St. Petersburg, warned me at the time 


it : 
Delcasse’s Warning of War 187 


that Germany would never have had recourse to such 
a drastic measure of finance were she not determined 
on war in the near future. I passed on the warning 
to London, but it fell on deaf ears, for no one believed 
Germany capable of such criminal folly. The general 
impression seems to have been that, as a friend wrote 
to me, the ‘‘ financiers,’? who were opposed to war, 
would put the brake on. The German Emperor was 
at the same time credited with the wish of going down 
to posterity as the keeper of European peace. The 
view taken by German writers of Russia’s military pre- 
parations reminds me of what a witty Frenchman wrote 
many years ago: ‘‘Cet animal est bien méchant. 
Quand on l’attaque, il se défend.’’ 

The last audience which I had with the Emperor 
before the outbreak of war has already been recorded 
in Chapter 1x. The questions discussed in it had refer- 
ence exclusively to such countries as Persia, Thibet and 
Afghanistan, where British and Russian interests were 
likely to clash. The Emperor said nothing about Ger- 
many, but urged that the conversations proceeding be- 
tween our two Governments with reference to the 
aforesaid countries should be brought to as speedy a 
conclusion as possible, ‘*‘ in order that,’’ as His Majesty 
remarked, ‘‘ we might be able to sleep comfortably in 
our beds without fear of any breach being made in the 
Anglo-Russian understanding.”’ 

This last audience took place on June 15, after the 
luncheon given by the Emperor at Tsarskoe to Admiral 
Beatty and the officers of the First Battle-cruiser 
Squadron, which had just arrived at Cronstadt on a 
complimentary visit to Russia. The welcome accorded 
them by the Emperor, as well as by the general public, 


188 My Mission to Russia 


was of the warmest, while the naval and municipal 
authorities entertained them with true Russian hos- 
pitality. The Emperor paid a visit of inspection to the 
squadron, which was composed of the Lion, Queen 
Mary, Princess Royal and New Zealand, and, together 
with the Empress and his four daughters, honoured 
Admiral Beatty with his presence at luncheon on 
board his flagship. Never have I seen happier faces 
than those of the young Grand Duchesses as they 
were escorted over the Lion by a little band of 
middies specially told off for their amusement; and 
when I think of them as I saw them that day, the 
tragic story of their deaths seems like some hideous 
nightmare. 

On July 20 the President of the French Republic, 
M. Poincaré, arrived on an official visit to the Russian 
Court. There were the usual reviews, banquets and 
toasts. The international outlook, which was not 
reassuring, naturally formed the subject of their private 
conversations, but the Emperor, though preoccupied, 
still believed in the pacific intentions of the Emperor 
Wilham. On the 21st the President held a reception 
of the heads of foreign missions. While I was awaiting 
my turn to be conducted to the room where he was 
receiving the Ambassadors, the Serbian Minister en- 
gaged me in conversation. Speaking with considerable 
emotion, he called my attention to the threatening 
attitude of Austria, and said that Serbia was faced 
with the gravest crisis in her history. M. Poincaré, to 
whom I repeated what M. Spalaikovitch had told me, 
afterwards broached the subject in his conversation with 
the Austrian Ambassador, but failed to elicit any satis- 
factory assurance as to Austria’s attitude. On the 


The Austrian Ultimatum 189 


evening of the 28rd the President started on his home- 
ward journey. 

As several weeks had elapsed since the assassination 
of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand without any move 
on Austria’s part, there seemed reason to hope that 
she had renounced the idea of any punitive action. I 
had myself been granted leave of absence and had 
already taken tickets for our journey to England. As 
I was sitting in my study the next morning (the 24th) 
musing on all that I was going to do during my ap- 
proaching holiday, I was roused by the ringing of the 
telephone. ‘*‘ Who’s there? ’’ I asked. ‘‘ I, Sazonoff,”’ 
was the reply. ‘* Austria has presented an ultimatum 
at Belgrade couched in terms which mean war. Please 
meet me at the French Embassy in an hour’s time as 
I must discuss matters with you and Paléologue.’’ 


CHAPTER XV 
1914 


USTRIA had carefully timed the presentation of 
her ultimatum so that it should coincide with 
the departure from St. Petersburg of the President of 
the French Republic and the President of the French 
Council of ‘Ministers on their return journey to France, 
a journey that would take at least four days. I knew 
that Austria’s action would be regarded at St. Peters- 
burg as a direct challenge to Russia, and I was not 
sorry, therefore, to have an hour wherein to reflect on 
its possible consequences, more especially as I foresaw 
that the conversation of the French Embassy would 
turn on the crucial question of British solidarity with 
France and Russia. 

Nor was I mistaken. After pointing out how 
utterly unacceptable were some of her demands, M. 
Sazonoff remarked that Austria would never have pre- 
sented such an ultimatum unless she had assured herself 
beforehand of Germany’s approval and support. Could 
Russia, he proceeded to inquire, equally count on the 
support of her partners in the Triple Entente? The 
French Ambassador, to whom he first addressed this 
question, assured him that France would give Russia 
her diplomatic support and would also, if necessity 
arose, fulfil all the obligations entailed by her alliance. 
** And your Government? ’’ next inquired M. Sazonoff, 

190 


My Talk with Sazonoff IgI 


turning to me. I replied that though I could not speak 
in the name of His Majesty’s Government, I had no 
doubt that they would give them all the diplomatic 
support in their power. I could not, however, hold out 
any hope of their making a declaration of solidarity that 
would entail an unconditional engagement to support 
France and Russia by force of arms on behalf of a 
country like Serbia, where no direct British interests 
were involved. Such an engagement would not be 
sanctioned by British public opinion; and, unless 
backed by public opinion, no British Government 
could take upon themselves the responsibility of pledg- 
ing their country to war. To this M. Sazonoff objected 
that we must not forget that the Serbian was but a part 
of the general Kuropean question and that, in view of 
the vital interests at stake, we could not afford to efface 
ourselves altogether. I replied that I gathered that he 
wished us to join Russia in making a communication to 
Austria to the effect that we would not tolerate any 
active intervention by her in the internal affairs of 
Serbia; but, supposing that Austria nevertheless took 
military measures against Serbia, was it, I asked, the 
intention of the Russian Government forthwith to 
declare war on her? While expressing the personal 
opinion that Russia would have to mobilize, M. Sazonoff 
said that the whole question would be considered by a 
Council of Ministers over which the Emperor would 
preside. I therefore urged that the first and most im- 
portant thing to do was to endeavour to induce Austria 
to extend the time limit of forty-eight hours and, at 
the same time, to find out how far Serbia was prepared 
to go to meet the demands formulated by Austria in 
her note. M. Sazonoff agreed, saying that some of 


192 My Mission to Russia 


the Austrian demands could doubtless be accepted by 
Serbia. 

The conversation, which had begun at noon, was 
continued after luncheon, when M. Sazonoff and M. 
Paléologue once more pressed me to declare British 
solidarity with Russia and France. Apart from the fact 
that it was quite outside my province to make any de- 
claration that would bind His Majesty’s Government, 
I was determined not to say one word that could be 
interpreted as an encouragement to Russia to declare 
war on Austria. To do so might not only have dimin- 
ished any chance of a pacific solution of the question, 
but would, I knew, be seized on by Germany as an 
argument to prove—as she is still endeavouring to 
prove—that we had egged on Russia into war. I there- 
fore confined myself to saying that His Majesty’s 
Government might, I thought, be prepared to make 
strong representations at Berlin and Vienna, pointing 
out that, as an Austrian attack on Serbia would bring 
Russia into the field, it would be difficult for Great 
Britain to stand aside were the war to become general. 
This did not satisfy M. Sazonoff, who contended that 
we should render war more likely if we did not at once 
make common cause with Russia and France. 

On receiving my telegraphic report of this conversa- 
tion, Sir Edward Grey replied: ‘‘ You spoke quite 
rightly in very difficult circumstances as to the attitude 
of His Majesty’s Government. I entirely approve what 
you said and I cannot promise more on behalf of the 
Government.”’ 

To give an account of all the conversations held at 
the different capitals and of all the telegrams exchanged 
during the critical days which followed the presentation 


Refutes German Misstatements 193 


of the Austrian ultimatum would require a book in 
itself. I shall, therefore, content myself with recording 
those which have a special bearing on Russia’s attitude, 
and on the advice which we tendered at St. Petersburg, 
in order to show how unfounded are the statements of 
certain German writers who have endeavoured to throw 
on Great Britain and Russia the responsibility for the 
war. 

To take but two of them—Herr von Bethmann- 
Hollweg and Baron von Schoen, who was Ambassador 
at Paris at the time. The former, in his ‘‘ Betracht- 
ungen zum Weltkriege,’’ asserts that while Germany 
was doing all she could to restrain Austria, we refrained 
from giving counsels of moderation at St. Petersburg. 
The latter, in his ‘*‘ Memoirs of an Ambassador,’’ goes 
a good deal farther. He accuses Russia of having 
brought about the war in order to stave off the danger 
of internal complications, and he accuses us of having 
never shown the slightest inclination to work for the 
maintenance of peace at St. Petersburg. He repre- 
sents us as having, on the contrary, frustrated Ger- 
many’s efforts to bring about a direct conversation 
between St. Petersburg and Vienna by encourag- 
ing Russia in her attitude of ‘‘ intransigeance.’’ He 
further states that it was the knowledge that she 
could rely on our support that determined Russia to 
mobilize. 

On the other hand, his vindication of the course 
pursued by his own Government is so enlightening that 
I am tempted to reproduce it. Austria, he states, was 
competing with Russia for supremacy in the Balkans, 
while Germany stood behind her ally and protected her 


out of regard for her own interests. The Austrian 
N 


194 My Mission to Russia 


Government were determined to exact ample atone- 
ment for the Serajevo murder, which had demonstrated 
the necessity of crushing once for all at their centre 
(Belgrade) the subversive activities at work in the south- 
eastern portions of the Hapsburg monarchy. In order 
to secure really effective guarantees for the future the 
terms of the ultimatum had been made as harsh as 
possible, so that Serbia had either to make complete 
submission to Austria, to sacrifice some of her sovereign 
rights and to renounce her connexion with Russia— 
or to face the consequences. Germany, on being con- 
sulted, recognized that it was but a question of striking 
at the root of dangers which directly threatened the 
existence of her ally and indirectly her own. She could 
not reasonably refuse her consent and support, for were 
Austria, as a result of the undermining work being 
carried on by the Serbs, to fall to pieces, she would be 
of no further use to Germany as an ally. Germany, 
therefore, announced her intention of loyally adhering 
to her alliance and of preventing any disastrous inter- 
vention from outside. She proposed localizing the con- 
flict, but her proposal was checkmated by Russia acting 
as Serbia’s protector and declaring that the conflict 
could not leave her indifferent. Finally Baron von 
Schoen blames Sir Edward Grey for having proposed 
a conference of -the four Powers not immediately 
interested, as, in doing so, he had contravened the 
principle of non-intervention on which Germany laid 
such stress. In a word, Germany, according to Baron 
von Schoen, undertook to keep the ring while Austria 
made Serbia her vassal, although she knew, from what 
had passed during the Balkan crisis, that Russia would 
never tolerate an Austrian attack on Serbia. 


Reviews Course of the Negotiations 195 


The following summary of my successive conversa- 
tions with 'M. Sazonoff will show how different from 
this was the attitude of the Russian and the British 
Governments. 


On July 25 we resumed our conversation of the pre- 
ceding day. Austria, Sazonoff contended, aimed at 
establishing her hegemony in the Balkans, and the 
action which she had taken at Belgrade was directed 
against Russia. Germany’s attitude, on the other 
hand, would be determined by ours. So long as she 
believed that she could count on our neutrality she 
would go all lengths; but if only we took our stand 
firmly by France and Russia there would be no war. 
If we failed them, rivers of blood would flow and we 
would in the end be dragged into the war. Though I 
feared that his prediction was likely to come true, I 
could but repeat what I had said to the Emperor in 
one of the audiences recorded in the preceding chapter, 


that we could play the rdle of mediator to better pur- _- 


pose as a friend who, if her counsels of moderation were 
disregarded, might be converted into an ally, than if 
we were at once to declare our complete solidarity with 
Russia. I, at the same time, expressed the earnest hope 
that Russia would give His Majesty’s Government time 
to use their influence as peacemaker and that she would 
not precipitate matters by mobilizing. Were she to do 
so Germany would, I warned him, not be content with 
a counter-mobilization, but would at once declare war 
on her. Russia, M. Sazonoff replied, could not allow 
Austria to crush Serbia, but I might rest assured that 
she would take no military action unless absolutely 
forced to do so. 


196 My Mission to Russia 


On the following day—July 26—he informed me 
that he had, in conversation with the Austrian Am- 
bassador, suggested a direct conversation between 
Vienna and St. Petersburg for the purpose of finding 
a formula that, while giving satisfaction to Austria as 
regarded her principal demands, might prove more 
acceptable to Serbia. He had, he said, told Count 
Szapary that he quite understood the motives which had 
prompted Austria to present her ultimatum, and that 
if only she would consent to revise certain of its articles 
it would not be difficult to arrive at a satisfactory 
settlement. 

In reply to a question which he addressed to me in 
the course of our conversation I told him that the 
language which I had held to him on the 24th had been 
approved by Sir E. Grey as correctly defining the atti- 
tude of His Majesty’s Government. They would, I 
added, use all their influence to avert war; but if their 
efforts were to be successful it was essential that Russia 
should not mobilize save in the very last resort. 

On my communicating to him on July 27 Sir E. 
Grey’s proposal for a conference of the four Ambassa- 
dors in London, M. Sazonoff replied: ‘‘ I have begun 
a conversation with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador 
under conditions which I think may be favourable for 
_a revision of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia. Should 
direct explanations with Vienna prove impossible I am 
ready to accept Sir E. Grey’s proposal or any other 
proposal of a nature to bring about a favourable solution 
of the conflict.’’ 

In consequence of the threatening international out- 
look orders had been given to the British fleet, concen- 
trated at Portland, not to disperse for manceuvre leave. 


A Turn for the Worse 197 


In informing the Russian Ambassador of the above fact 
Sir Edward Grey was careful to explain that this must 
not be taken to mean anything more than a promise 
of diplomatic action. 

On July 28 things took a decided turn for the 
worse. Not only did Count Berchtold decline M. 
Sazonofif’s proposal for a direct conversation between 
the two Governments, but Austria declared war on 
Serbia. No assurance which Austria might give as to 
the integrity and independence of Serbia would, M. 
Sazonoff told me, satisfy Russia, and the order for 
mobilization against Austria would be given on the day 
that the Austrian army crossed the Serbian frontier. I, 
nevertheless, once more urged him to refrain from any 
military measures which might be construed as a chal- 
lenge by Germany. 

I repeated the gist of this conversation to my French 
colleague, whom I found in the ante-room awaiting 
his turn to be received, and begged him to speak in 
the same sense. The situation, I said, was becoming 
critical. Russia was in earnest and would never allow 
Austria to crush Serbia. But if war was forced on 
Russia it was important that she should not give Ger- 
many any pretext for representing her as the aggressor. 
For, unless convinced that the whole responsibility for 
the war rested with Germany, British public opinion 
would never sanction our participation in it. 

Baron von Schoen, in his ‘‘ Memoirs,’’ translates a 
passage from ‘‘ La Russie des Tsars dans la Grande 
Guerre,’’ in which M. Paléologue records my above- 
mentioned remarks, and reads into them a meaning 
which they do not possess. He makes me say: ** Russia 
is determined to go to war. We must, therefore, 


198 My Mission to Russia 


saddle Germany with the whole responsibility and 
initiative of the attack, as this will be the only way of 
winning over public opinion in England to the war.”’ 
He goes on to represent me as egging on Russia to 
fight, while endeavouring to throw all the blame on 
Germany. This is a wanton misrepresentation of my 
attitude, as I had—as I have already shown—said all 
that I possibly could to discourage mobilization, know- 
ing that it would furnish Germany with the pretext 
which she wanted for declaring war on Russia. 

The German Ambassador at St. Petersburg had all 
along been under the impression that the Russian 
public had not been greatly stirred by the Austro- 
Serbian conflict and that only a small clique of chau- 
vinists was endeavouring to give it an acute character. 
As he happened to be lunching with me at the Embassy 
on the 28th I took the opportunity of opening his eyes 
to the growing danger of the situation. He had asked 
me to impress prudence on Sazonoff, and I told him 
that I had done so from the outset. It was, I added, 
time for the German Ambassador at Vienna to speak 
seriously to Count Berchtold, for, if Germany allowed 
Austria to attack Serbia, a general war would be the 
inevitable result. Count Pourtales, who was greatly 
upset by this remark, protested that Russia and not 
Germany was responsible for the existing tension. He 
was, I believe, personally anxious to avert war, and had 
probably been kept in the dark as to the real intentions 
of his Government. But his attitude was not calculated 
to smooth over matters. He held that Austria had to 
administer a severe chastisement to Serbia, while Russia 
had to look on quietly and maintain the passive réle of 
a disinterested spectator. Were she, on the contrary, 


Question of Partial Mobilization 199 


to carry out her projected mobilization, she would, he 
contended, be endangering the peace of Europe. It 
was in vain that I argued that Russia had shown her 
pacific intentions by accepting the proposal for a con- 
ference a quatre, and by declaring her readiness to abide 
by any decision which that conference might take, that 
had the approval of France and Great Britain. Nor 
would he listen to me when I reminded him that 
Austria had not only partially mobilized but had 
actually declared war on Serbia. ‘‘I cannot,’’ he 
replied, ‘‘ discuss anything that Austria has done.’’ 

Though Austria had already begun mobilizing 
against Serbia on the 26th, it was only on the 28th that 
Russia took any preliminary steps for a mobilization 
in the military districts of Kieff, Odessa, Kazan and 
Moscow. Between one and two o’clock on the after- 
noon of July 29 Count Pourtales had an interview with 
M. Sazonoff, in which he reminded the latter that, in 
the event of such a partial mobilization, Germany’s 
treaty of alliance with Austria would automatically 
cause German mobilization. About seven o’clock the 
same evening Count Pourtales again called at the 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs and communicated to 
M. Sazonoff a telegram from the German Chancellor 
stating that any further development of Russia’s 
military preparations would compel Germany to take 
counter-measures and that this would mean war. 

As such language was almost tantamount to an 
ultimatum, and as the Russian War Office had, mean- 
while, received information of the extensive military 
preparations that Germany was secretly making, as well 
as of the Austrian general mobilization, the whole situa- 
tion had to be reconsidered. In the course of the even- 


200 My Mission to Russia 


ing the Emperor, yielding to the pressure brought to 
bear on him by his military advisers, unwillingly con- 
sented to order a general mobilization. A few hours 
after doing so he received the following telegram from 
the German Emperor : | 

‘*T believe that a direct understanding between 
your Government and Vienna is possible—an under- 
standing which my Government is endeavouring to 
promote. Naturally military measures by Russia, 
which might be construed as a menace by Austria- 
Hungary, would accelerate a calamity which both of 
us desire to avoid.’’ 

To this the Emperor Nicholas replied : 

‘* Thanks for your telegram, which is conciliatory, 
while the official message, presented by your Ambassa- 
dor to my Foreign Minister, was conveyed in a very 
different tone. I beg you to explain the difference. It 
would be right to submit the Austro-Serbian question 
to the Hague Conference. I trust in your wisdom and 
friendship.’”’ 

After despatching this telegram the Emperor 
Nicholas successively rang up on the telephone the 
Minister of War and the Chief of the General Staff 
and countermanded the general mobilization. That 
mobilization had already commenced, and to stop it 
would, as both the generals protested, throw the whole 
military machine out of gear. The Emperor, neverthe- 
less, insisted; but in spite of his categorical orders the 
military authorities allowed the general mobilization to 
proceed without his knowledge. 

Meanwhile the German Ambassador had learned 
what was going on, and at two o’clock on the morning 
of July 30 called at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 


The Emperors Exchange Telegrams 2o1 


Seeing that war was now inevitable, he broke down and 
appealed to Sazonoff to make some suggestion for him 
to telegraph to his Government. Sazonoff thereupon 
drew up the following formula : 

‘Tf Austria, recognizing that the conflict with 
Serbia has assumed the character of a question of 
Kuropean interest, declares herself ready to eliminate 
from her ultimatum the points which violate the prin- 
ciples of Serbia’s sovereignty, Russia engages to stop 
all military preparations.”’ 

Sazonoff, who had been informed by the Chief of 
the General Staff of the telephonic conversation which 
he had had during the night with the Emperor, had an 
audience with His Majesty early in the afternoon of 
the 30th. Before proceeding to Peterhof he had 
received the news of the Austrian bombardment of 
Belgrade and of the refusal of the German Government 
to consider the formula which he had given to Count 
Pourtales. He found the Emperor greatly perturbed 
by a telegram which he had just received from the 
German Emperor. ‘‘ My Ambassador,’’ the latter 
stated, ‘‘ has instructions to direct the attention of 
your Government to the dangers and serious con- 
sequences of mobilization. I have told you the same 
in my last telegram. Austria-Hungary has mobilized 
only against Serbia and only a part of the army. If 
Russia mobilizes against Austria-Hungary, the part of 
mediator, with which you have entrusted me in such 
a friendly manner and which I have accepted at your 
express desire, is threatened, if not rendered impossible. 
The entire weight of the decision now rests on your 
shoulders. You have to bear the responsibility of war 
or peace.’’ The Emperor Nicholas felt so keenly the 


202 My Mission to Russia 


gravity of the decision which he had to take that he 
still shrank from sanctioning a general mobilization. 
Only after that Sazonoff had assured him that he could 
do so with a clear conscience, as his Government had 
not left a stone unturned in their efforts to avert war, 
did the Emperor finally decide not to leave his country 
defenceless against the offensive which Germany was 
already preparing. At four o’clock the same afternoon 
His Majesty caused the necessary orders to be tele- 
phoned to the Ministry of War. 

He had already, earlier in the afternoon of the 30th, 
telegraphed as follows to the Emperor William: ‘* I 
am sending Tattischeff with instructions to-night. The 
military measures now taking form were decided on five 
days ago for reasons of defence against Austria. I hope 
with all my heart that these measures will not in any 
way influence your position as mediator, which I prize 
very highly. We need your strong pressure on Austria 
in order that an understanding may be arrived at.’’ 

On the following day—the 3lst—he telegraphed 
again: ‘‘ It is impossible for me, for technical reasons, 
to suspend my military preparations. But so long as 
the pourparlers with Austria are not broken off my 
troops will abstain from any offensive. I give you my 
word of honour.’’ 

The Emperor William replied : ‘‘ I have gone as far 
as it is possible for me to go in my efforts to maintain 
peace. It is not I who will have to bear the responsi- 
bility for the horrible disaster that now threatens the 
whole civilized world. It still rests with you to dispel 
it. My friendship for you and your Empire, which my 
grandfather bequeathed me on his deathbed, is always 
sacred for me. I have been true to Russia when mis- 


General Mobilization Ordered 203 


fortune befell her, especially during the last war. At 
the present moment you can still save the peace of 
Europe by stopping your military preparations.”’ 

On the same day—the 31st—Sazonoff made a final 
effort to safeguard peace by modifying, at Sir E. Grey’s 
request, the formula which he had given Count Pour- 
tales so that it should read as follows : 

‘*If Austria consents to stay the march of her 
troops on Serbian territory, and if, recognizing that 
the Austro-Serbian conflict has assumed the character 
of a question of European interest, she admits that the 
Great Powers may examine the satisfaction which 
Serbia can accord to the Austro-Hungarian Govern- 
ment, without prejudice to her sovereign rights and to 
her independence as a State, Russia undertakes to pre- 
serve her waiting attitude.”’ 

The Emperor, who received the German Am- 
bassador in audience the same afternoon, endeavoured 
to impress on him the conciliatory spirit in which this 
formula had been drafted and the prospect which it 
offered of an honourable settlement of the conflict, 
but without success. 

At eleven o’clock that night Count Pourtales went 
to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and informed M. 
Sazonoft that unless Russia stopped her mobilization 
before noon the next day, the whole German army 
would be mobilized. In reply to his passionate appeal 
for immediate demobilization Sazonoff could but repeat 
the assurance that so long as the Austro-Russian pour- 
parlers continued, Russia would not take the offensive. 
There were at that moment signs of a relaxation of the 
tension between Vienna and St. Petersburg ; there had 
been friendly conversations between their respective 


204 My Mission to Russia 


Foreign Ministers and Ambassadors, and the Austrian 
Government seemed even disposed to admit a discussion 
on the interpretation to be placed on the text of their 
note to the Serbian Government. But Germany willed 
it otherwise. 

On the morning of August 1 the Emperor Nicholas 
once more telegraphed to the Emperor William: ‘**I ~ 
understand that you are forced to mobilize, but I should 
like to receive from you the same guarantee which I 
have given you, namely, that these measures do not 
mean war and that we shall continue to negotiate for 
the welfare of our two countries and for the universal 
peace which is so dear to us. With the aid of God it 
must be possible for our long-tried friendship to prevent 
the shedding of blood. I expect with full confidence 
your urgent reply.”’ 

To this the Emperor William, after stating that the 
time limit had expired and that he had been forced to 
mobilize his army, replied: ‘* An immediate, clear and 
unmistakable reply of your Government is the sole way 
to avoid endless misery. Until I receive this reply I am 
unable, to my great grief, to enter upon the subject of 
your telegram. I must ask most earnestly that you, 
without delay, order your troops to commit under no 
circumstances the slightest violation of our frontiers.”’ 

About five o’clock that afternoon I received a tele- 
gram from the Foreign Office instructing me to ask 
for an immediate audience in order to deliver to the 
Emperor a personal message from King George, in 
which His Majesty, after referring to the representa- 
tions which Germany had made on the subject of the 
Russian mobilization, proceeded to say: ‘‘I cannot 
help thinking that some misunderstanding has produced 


Audience to Deliver King’s Message 205 


this deadlock. I am most anxious not to miss any possi- 
bility of avoiding the terrible calamity which at present 
threatens the whole world. I therefore make a personal 
appeal to you to remove the misapprehension which I 
feel must have occurred, and to leave still open grounds 
for negotiation and possible peace. If you think I can 
in any way contribute to that all-important purpose I 
will do everything in my power to assist in reopening 
the interrupted conversations between the Powers con- 
cerned. I feel confident that you are as anxious as I 
am that all that is possible should be done to secure the 
peace of the world.”’ 

About a quarter past seven M. Sazonoff, who had 
arranged that I should be received by the Emperor at 
Peterhof at ten o’clock, rang me up on the telephone 
to tell me that Count Pourtales had just informed him 
that Germany considered herself in a state of war with 
Russia. He came to dine with me at eight o’clock, 
bringing with him a draft reply to the King’s telegram 
for me to submit to the Emperor. I left the Embassy 
at nine o’clock, but owing to something having gone 
wrong with the electric lights on my motor, the chauf- 
feur took a wrong turn and I only reached Peterhof at 
a quarter to eleven. After apologizing to the Kmperor 
for being so late I handed him the King’s telegram as 
well as the draft reply which Sazonoff had drawn up.. 
When His Majesty had finished reading them I ven- 
tured to suggest that it would be better were he to 
answer the King in his own words rather than in the 
official style of the reply which had been drafted at the 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs. ‘‘ I will do so if you will 
help me,”’ replied the Emperor, ‘‘ for talking English 
is a very different thing to writing it correctly.’’ His 


206 My Mission to Russia 


Majesty then asked me to sit down, and we discussed 

for more than an hour the situation that had been 

created by the Austrian ultimatum, the ineffectual 
efforts that had been made by both the Russian and the 

British Governments to preserve peace, and the reasons 
which had forced ‘Russia to mobilize. Mobilization, His 
Majesty insisted, did not necessarily entail war, and he 
had given the Emperor William the most categorical 
assurances in this sense. Then, getting up and going to 

his writing table, he took some telegraph forms and a 

pencil and proceeded to write his answer, consulting 

me from time to time as to how he should turn a phrase 

if he were at a loss for a word. When he had finished he 

gave me the autograph telegram to have ciphered on 
my return to the Embassy. The text was as follows : 


‘*T would gladly have accepted your proposals had 
not the German Ambassador this afternoon presented 
a note to my Government declaring war. Ever since 
presentation of the ultimatum at Belgrade, Russia has 
devoted all her efforts to finding some pacific solution 
of the question raised by Austria’s action. Object of 
that action was to crush Serbia and make her a vassal 
of Austria. Effect of this would have been to upset 
balance of power in Balkans, which is of such vital 
interest to my Empire. Every proposal, including that — 
of your Government, was rejected by Germany and 
Austria, and it was only when favourable moment for 
bringing pressure to bear on Austria had passed that 
Germany showed any disposition to mediate. Even 
then she did not put forward any precise proposal. 
Austria’s declaration of war on Serbia forced me to 
order a partial mobilization, though in view of threaten- 


The Emperor’s Reply 207 


ing situation my military advisers strongly advised a 
general mobilization owing to quickness with which 
Germany can mobilize in comparison with Russia. I 
was eventually compelled to take this course in con- 
sequence of complete Austrian mobilization, of the 
bombardment of Belgrade, of concentration of Austrian 
troops in Galicia, and of secret military preparations 
being made in Germany. That I was justified in doing 
so is proved by Germany’s sudden declaration of war, 
which was quite unexpected by me, as I had given most 
categorical assurances te the Emperor William that my 
troops would not move so long as mediation negotia- 
tions continued. 

‘*In this solemn hour I wish to assure you once 
more that I have done all in my power to avert war. 
Now that it has been forced on me, I trust your country 
will not fail to support France and Russia. God bless 
and protect you.”’ 


It was past one o’clock when I reached the Embassy 
to find the door blocked by an enthusiastic crowd eager 
to know whether Russia could count on England’s 
support. 


CHAPTER XVI 
1914 


N the previous chapter I have given what, from per- 
sonal knowledge, I believe to be a straightforward 
and accurate account of Russia’s attitude during the 
nine critical days which preceded the war. Nothing that 
she did, or that she left undone, can possibly be cited 
against her as evidence of what Baron von Schoen terms 
her ‘‘ will for war.’’ In his endeavours to preserve 
peace, Sazonoff did not reject a single suggestion that 
was made him. He successively accepted proposals for 
a conference of four, for mediation by Great Britain 
and Italy, and for a direct conversation between Austria 
and Russia. Germany and Austria, on the other hand, 
either declined these proposals altogether or prevented 
their materializing by replying in evasive terms. There 
was one thing that Sazonoff could not do. He could 
not allow Austria to crush Serbia. Germany and 
Austria knew this quite well, for they had during the 
Balkan crisis been given clearly to understand that an 
Austrian attack on Serbia would bring Russia into the 
field. Russia, it is true, mobilized, but not until 
mobilization had been forced upon her by the discovery 
of Germany’s secret military preparations as well as by 
Austria’s threatening attitude. Germany was perfectly 


aware that the military programme adopted by Russia 
208 


War forced on Russia 209 


after the passing of the new German Army Bill in 19138 
would not be completed till 1918, and she also knew 
that the Russian army was inadequately equipped for 
war on modern scientific lines. It was the psychological 
moment to strike, and Germany seized it. On the day 
on which she despatched her final ultimatum to St. 
Petersburg a high official of the German Foreign Office 
told the representative of a then neutral Power that 
the only thing which his Government feared was that 
Russia would, at the eleventh hour, climb down and 
accept it. I know this as a fact, as it was told me at 
the time by the representative of the said neutral Power 
at St. Petersburg. 

As regards our own attitude, I have explained the 
reasons which prompted the language that I con- 
sistently held to Sazonoff. Russia never received from 
us any promise of armed support or any assurance of 
a nature to encourage her to push matters to extremes. 
Up to the very last His Majesty’s Government reserved 
their full freedom of action, though they did, as was 
but right, warn the German Government not to be 
misled by our friendly language into thinking that we 
should stand aside were British interests to become 
involved. 

I am reluctantly compelled to make a personal 
statement in order to rebut certain charges which have 
been brought against me. In its issue of April 8, 1922, 
the Graphic published two paragraphs which, after 
suggesting as an appropriate title for a future book the 
words, ‘‘ Someone has blundered,’’ went on to say: 
**'The men of little faith would come badly off. A 
typical example is afforded in M. Paléologue’s new book 


on Russia in 1914. Sir George Buchanan is said to 
O 


210 My Mission to Russia 


have said to M. Sazonoff, ‘I am afraid our public 
opinion is far from understanding that our national 
interest so evidently commands us to’ [remain neutral 
in the Great War].’’ The words in brackets are the 
Graphic’s. 

I should not have taken any notice of this silly 
paragraph had not a friend shortly afterwards told me 
that people were asking when I was going to answer 
the charges brought against me by Paléologue. I 
replied that Paléologue was an old friend, who had 
been my colleague both at Petrograd and Sofia, and 
that I was not aware that he had said anything but 
good of me. I would, however, read his book. On 
doing so, I found that he makes me say, on July 24, 
1914: ** Mais je crains que notre opinion publique ne 
soit encore trés éloignée de comprendre ce que l’intérét 
national nous commande avec tant d’évidence.’’ Sup- 
posing that I did actually use these words, I would ask 
whether, on the day following the presentation of the 
Austrian ultimatum, public opinion in England would 
have been behind the Government had they, then and 
there, pledged the country to war on account of what 
was at that moment regarded as a quarrel between 
Austria and Serbia. But, quite apart from this 
question, the Graphic has not only mistranslated the 
passage above quoted, but has, by adding the words 
‘* remain neutral in the Great War,’’ read into it, for 
the benefit of its readers, a meaning which it cannot 
possibly have. This is quite clear from the context. 
Sazonoff had, according to Paléologue, said, ‘* La 
neutralité de V Angleterre équivaut a& son suicide.” 
““C’est ma conviction,’ I am reported to have 
answered, while the rest of my reply, if correctly 


My Views as to Our Participation 211 


translated, would read as follows: ‘* But I am afraid 
that our public opinion is still far from understanding 
what our national interest so clearly commands us to 
do.”’ 

Why, I should like to know, did the Graphic 
have recourse to such deliberate misrepresentation? 
My personal views with regard to our participation in 
the war were expressed at the time in my official 
correspondence with the Foreign Office. In handing 
me, on the night of August 1-2, his reply to the King’s 
telegram the Emperor begged me to second his appeal 
for British support, and I did not hesitate to do so. I 
ventured to tell His Majesty’s Government that, were 
we to stand aside, we should be left without a friend 
in Europe; that we could not, out of regard for our 
own safety, allow Germany to crush France; that we 
should be forced to intervene sooner or later in the 
war, and that the longer that we postponed inter- 
vention the heavier would be the price which we should 
have to pay. 

Owing to the fact that this telegram reached the 
Foreign Office in a mutilated form, breaking off in the 
middle of a sentence, it could not be published in the 
White Book, that, with this one exception, recorded 
all the communications which passed between me and 
that department during those critical days. 

On the day following Germany’s declaration of war 
a solemn service was held in the Winter Palace, the 
French Ambassador, as the representative of Russia’s 
ally, being the only foreigner invited. At its close one 
of the officiating priests read the Imperial war mani- 
festo, in which the Emperor told his people: ‘‘ We 
have not only to succour a kindred land that has been 


212 My Mission to Russia 


unjustly attacked, but to safeguard the honour and 
dignity of Russia as a great Power... . 

‘‘In this dread hour of trial may all internal differ- 
ences be forgotten! May the union of the Tsar and his 
people become closer and stronger! ”’ 

Then, approaching the altar and taking the Gospel 
in his right hand, the Emperor addressed the officers 
present as follows: ‘‘ I salute in you my whole army. 
I solemnly swear not to make peace so long as there is 
a single enemy on Russia’s soil.’’ 

When, a few minutes later, the Sovereigns appeared 
on the balcony, the huge crowd that filled the square 
in front of the Winter Palace fell on their knees, 
singing the National Anthem. 

The oath thus taken by the Emperor Nicholas was 
modelled textually on that sworn by the Emperor 
Alexander I when the Emperor Napoleon invaded 
Russia. For the moment, too, the Russian people 
were animated by the same spirit that had inspired 
their forefathers in 1812, though this time the sacrifices 
demanded of them were to prove greater than they 
could bear. 

During the first three days of the war my position 
was not a pleasant one. Impatient crowds kept demon- 
strating before the Embassy clamouring for news from 
London and demanding in no friendly tones whether 
Russia could count on our support. I pacified them as 
best I could with vague assurances, but great was my 
relief when, at five o’clock in the morning of the 5th, 
one of my secretaries brought me the laconic message 
from the Foreign Office: ‘‘ War—Germany—<Act,”’ 
which told me that England had proved true to herself 
and to her partners in the Triple Entente. I telephoned 


All Russia rallies round the Throne 213 


the good news to the French Embassy, to the Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs, and to the Emperor at Tsarskoe, 
and later in the morning attended a solemn Mass in 
the French Catholic church as the representative of the 
ally of France and Russia. On my return to the 
Embassy I found many floral offerings awaiting me 
which had been sent by Russians of all sorts and con- 
ditions as a tribute of gratitude to their new ally. 
During those wonderful early August days Russia 
seemed to have been completely transformed. ‘The 
German Ambassador had predicted that the declaration 
of war would provoke a revolution. He had even 
declined to listen to a friend who had advised him, on 
the eve of his departure, to send his collection of art 
treasures to the Hermitage for safe keeping, as the 
Hermitage would, he foretold, be one of the first build- 
ings to be sacked. Unfortunately for him, the only act 
of mob violence throughout the whole Russian Empire 
was the wholesale looting of the German Embassy on 
August 4. Instead of provoking a revolution, the war 
forged a new bond between Sovereign and people. 
The workmen proclaimed a truce to strikes, and the 
various political parties laid aside their grievances. 
In the Duma, which the Emperor had convoked for 
an extraordinary session, the leaders of the different 
parties vied with each other in supporting the Govern- 
ment whom they had but a few weeks earlier been 
denouncing. The military credits were voted unani- 
mously, and even the Socialists—who abstained from 
voting—exhorted the workmen to defend their country 
against the invader. In thus rallying round the Throne 
Liberals and progressives were animated by the hope 
that the war, whicly had brought the Emperor into such 


2I4 My Mission to Russia 


close touch with his people, would inaugurate a new 
era of constitutional reforms. 

But it was at Moscow, where, in accordance with 
the traditions of his house, the Emperor went to 
worship at the holy shrines of the Kremlin, that the 
heart of Russia voiced the feelings of the whole nation. 
The French Ambassador and I, together with my wife 
and daughter, had been invited to assist at the coming 
ceremonies. On the morning of August 6 we pro- 
ceeded to the Kremlin, and were conducted to the 
great gallery of the palace, where a crowd of high 
officials and notables of every kind, as well as repre- 
sentatives of municipal and other institutions, were 
awaiting the arrival of the Sovereigns. Soon after- 
wards the Emperor and Empress, followed by the 
Grand Duchess Elisabeth, the four young Grand 
Duchesses and the little Tsarevitch (who, having hurt 
his leg, was carried in the arms of a huge Cossack), 
made their entrance. Stopping in the middle of the 
gallery, the Emperor made a short speech in which, 
after saying that he had come to Moscow to find 
strength in prayer, he spoke of the splendid spirit with 
which all classes of his subjects had responded to his 
call to arms, and concluded by invoking God’s blessing 
on the allied armies. 

Then joining the procession that was formed, 
we followed the Imperial family through a number 
of rooms and down the famous ‘‘ Red Stair- 
case’’ to the Ouspensky Sabor—or Cathedral of the 
Assumption—where the Emperors were crowned. The 
appearance of Their Majesties was greeted with a 
storm of applause, while the bells of all the churches 
of Moscow rang out a peal of welcome. The service 


Patriotic Scenes at Moscow 215 


which followed was beautiful and impressive beyond 
description. ‘The long line of archbishops and bishops, 
in their vestments of gold brocade, their mitres spark- 
ling with precious stones; the frescoes on the walls, 
with their golden background; the jewelled icons—all 
lent colour and brilliancy to the picture presented by 
the glorious old cathedral. 

As soon as we had taken our places behind the 
Imperial family the deep bass voice of a priest was 
heard chanting the opening passages of the liturgy, 
and then the choir, joining in, flooded the church 
with harmony as it intoned the psalms and hymns 
of the Orthodox ritual. As the service was nearing 
its close the Emperor and Empress, followed by the 
Grand Duchesses, went the round of the church, 
kneeling in deep devotion before each of its shrines 
or kissing some specially sacred icon presented them 
by the Metropolitan. Nor, when the doors were 
opened, was the scene outside less impressive. Walk- 
ing along a slightly raised narrow platform to the 
other wing of the palace, with nothing but a low 
railing to separate him from the kneelimg multitude 
of his subjects—some of whom even kissed the ground 
as he passed—the Emperor was acclaimed with one 
never-ending cheer. Stopping for a moment and 
inviting the French Ambassador and me to keep near 
him, His Majesty said, ‘* These acclamations are 
addressed to you as well as to me.’’ 

As I drove away with my French colleague to our 
hotel I could not help wondering how long this national 
enthusiasm would last, and what would be the feeling 
of the people for their ‘‘ Little Father ’’ were the war 
to be unduly prolonged. 


216 My Mission to Russia 


I do not propose to follow the Russian armies 
through all the successive phases of the war, as this has 
already been admirably done by my friend and former 
military attaché, Major-General Sir Alfred Knox, in 
his book, ‘‘ With the Russian Armies, 1914-1917.”’ I 
shall therefore content myself with a brief sketch of the 
principal events in the Eastern theatre of war, with 
reference more especially to their bearing on the general 
Russian situation. 

Yielding to the pressure brought to bear on him by 
his Ministers, the Emperor had renounced his intention 
of assuming the command of the armies, and had 
appointed the Grand Duke Nicolas Nicolaievich com- 
mander-in-chief. ‘Though Germany had declared war 
on Russia on August 1, it was only on the 6th that 
Austria, who had brought the war about, followed her 
example and recalled her Ambassador. According to 
the plan of campaign drawn up by the General Staff, 
Russia was at once to take the offensive in the south 
against Austria and to act on the defensive in the north 
till everything was im order for the far more serious 
business of an advance against Germany. Had Russia 
only consulted her own interests this would undoubtedly 
have been the wisest course for her to follow, but she 
had also to think of her allies. The advance of the 
German armies in the west rendered it imperative for 
her to make a diversion in the east. The original 
plan of campaign was accordingly changed, and on 
August 17—the day following the completion of the 
mobilization—General Rennenkampf took the offensive 
and made a raid into East Prussia. 

For the first ten days his operations were attended 
with such complete success that it was even hoped that 


Tannenberg 217 


the whole province would soon be at his mercy. He had, 
however, advanced farther than was prudent under the 
circumstances. The German General Staff, alarmed at 
the number of fugitives who kept streaming into Berlin, 
caused troops to be transferred from the west, and sent 
General von Hindenburg to take over the command in 
the east. At the same time, owing to the forced retire- 
ment of the allied armies in the west, the French 
Ambassador was instructed to urge the Russian Govern- 
ment to press home the offensive in East Prussia. In 
the opinion of the best Russian generals such an offen- 
sive was premature and doomed to failure. The army 
was not yet thoroughly organized in all its branches. 
The difficulties of transport were tremendous: the 
troops were not properly concentrated, and the 
country, with its forests, lakes and marshes, was not 
inaptly likened to a sponge that would suck up all who 
entered it. But Russia could not turn a deaf ear to 
the appeal of an ally whose capital was threatened by 
the enemy, and Samsonoff’s army was ordered to 
advance. 

The battle of Tannenberg was the result. Owing 
to tactical errors on the part of the corps commanders 
on the flanks and to the lack of the necessary means 
of communication between them and Samsonoff, the 
two central corps were left without support and had 
to lay down their arms. The Russians lost all their 
artillery as well as vast quantities of shells and other war 
material which they could ill spare. In the course of 
a few more weeks the Germans, following up their 
victory, cleared the whole province of the enemy, 
inflicting on them a total loss of a quarter of a million 
of men besides striking a serious blow at the morale 


218 My Mission to Russia 


of their army and the prestige of its commanders. 
Though later in the year the Russians re-entered Kast 
Prussia and overran the frontier districts, they had in 
the following February to evacuate it for good. 

This disaster in the north was counterbalanced to 
some extent by the brilliant victories gained in the 
south, where General Ivanoff was in command, with 
General Alexeieff as Chief of the Staff. The Austrians 
were driven back by the armies under Generals Ruzsky, 
Brussiloff and Radko Dimitrieff; Lemberg was taken 
early in September, and in November the great fortress 
of Przemysl was invested. ‘The Austrians lost in all 
1,000 guns and 200,000 prisoners. This rapid advance 
raised in many quarters exaggerated hopes for the 
future, and my French colleague was at one moment so 
optimistic that he even bet me £5 that the war would 
be over by Christmas. But the Russian ‘* steam 
roller,’’ in its endeavours to relieve the pressure in the 
west, had been pushing on at a pace that ill suited its 
cumbrous mechanism. Russia was heavily handicapped. 
She had to move troops and supplies enormous distances 
on bad roads, and in Poland, which the Germans had 
entered at the beginning of the war, she had to fight 
in a country flanked on either side by hostile territory. 
In October the Germans were almost at the gates of 
Warsaw. The opportune arrival of the Siberian con- 
tingent effected a welcome change in the situation. 
The Russian offensive was resumed, the Germans were 
driven back and narrowly escaped a crushing defeat at 
Lodz. They were only saved by the reinforcements 
which, thanks to their network of strategic railways, 
they were able to bring up in time. The tables were 
once more turned in their favour, the Russians had to 


Russia Lacks Rifles and Munitions 219 


retire, and by the middle of December their offensive 
was totally arrested. ‘The curtain had risen on the 
opening act of the great Russian tragedy. 

On September 25 General Joffre had inquired 
whether Russia’s supply of ammunition was sufficient 
to meet the prevailing high rate of consumption, and 
had received the comforting assurance that there was 
no cause for anxiety on that score. Then suddenly, on 
December 18, the French Ambassador and I were 
informed by the Chief of the Staff at the Ministry for 
War that, though Russia had in her depots men enough 
and to spare to make good her colossal losses in the 
war, she had no rifles wherewith to arm them and that 
her reserves of artillery ammunition were exhausted. 
General Bielaieff added that orders were being placed 
abroad and that steps were being taken to increase the 
output of the national factories, but that for the next 
two or three months the military situation would be not 
only difficult but dangerous. This announcement came 
as a bolt from the blue. In that early stage of the war 
there was little, if any, co-ordination in the plans of 
the Allied Commanders-in-Chief in their respective 
theatres of war and they were too much inclined to 
adhere to the system of watertight compartments. An 
offensive would be taken in the west when the Russians 
in the east were obliged to remain on the defensive, 
and vice versa, with the result that the Germans kept 
special army corps, which they sent backwards and 
forwards from the one front to the other, wherever 
their presence was the most needed. 

In protesting at the time against the secrecy that 
had been observed with regard to Russia’s shortage of 
ammunition, I urged the necessity of closer contact 


220 My Mission to Russia 


being established between the Allied General Staffs. 
The Russians had apparently based their calculations 
on their experiences in the Japanese War, and had 
not made provision for a war of longer duration. I 
remember once asking a distinguished member of the 
Duma who was, during the Balkan crisis, advocating 
the adoption by the Entente of a firmer policy, 
whether Russia was ready to face a European war. 
‘*No,’’ was his reply; ‘‘ but she never will be 
ready.’’ He was right. Her industries were still in 
a backward state; she had not sufficient factories, 
and those which she had often lacked the requisite 
machinery and the necessary number of skilled work- 
men. The rearmament of Russia was, indeed, soon 
to become one of the most difficult problems which 
the Allies had to face. Though I personally did not 
share the pessimism that had already struck root 
in Petrograd, as the Russian capital had been re- 
christened, I felt that there was but little chance of 
her opening the road to Berlin through Silesia, and 
that her future rdle would have to be restricted to 
wearing out and gradually destroying the enemy forces 
in a war of attrition. 

In addition to the feeling of discouragement occa- 
sioned by the military situation, the peace campaign 
being conducted by Count Witte and his band of 
Germanophils could not but be regarded as a disquiet- 
ing sign. Count Witte, as I have already stated in 
Chapter xiv, had always held that Russia’s interests 
dictated a close understanding with Germany, and he 
was now openly declaring that Russia had nothing to 
gain by continuing the war and ought to make peace. 
In one of our conversations with Sazonoff early in 


Count Witte’s Attacks 221 


November, my French colleague urged that it was time 
that the Emperor should take some action with regard 
to a campaign that was assuming dangerous propor- 
tions. Sazonoff thereupon suggested that the French 
Ambassador should himself bring the matter to the 
Emperor’s notice and promised to arrange an audience 
for the purpose. In this audience, which took place a 
week later, the Emperor did not mention Count 
Witte’s name, and Paléologue did not therefore 
venture to broach the subject himself. 

As Count Witte’s attacks were mainly directed 
against Great Britain, I determined to take up his 
challenge, and I did so in a speech which I made at 
the English Club on New Year’s Eve. ‘‘ We were,’’ I 
said, ** being accused by certain well-known Germano- 
phils of having pushed Russia into the war for our 
own selfish ends and of now leaving her to bear the 
brunt of it. We were constantly being asked by 
these gentlemen, ‘'Where is your navy?’ ‘ What is 
your army doing?’ I will tell them,’’ I proceeded to 
say, ‘‘ what the British army and navy have done’”’; 
and after enumerating all the services which they 
had rendered the Allied cause, I cited Germany—the 
special friend of our critics—as a witness to prove the 
truth of my statement. For it was to England that 
Germany’s poets addressed their hymns of hate, and 
it was on England that Germany’s professors poured 
the vials of their wrath; and they did so because they 
knew that the British Empire barred the way to 
the world dominion of which the Fatherland had 
dreamed. This speech had an enormous success. Not 
only was it published in ewtenso in all the leading 
Russian papers, but it was made the subject of long 


222 My Mission to Russia 


leading articles, in which I was congratulated on having 
had the courage to open the sore from which Russia was 
suffering. The Emperor, whom I saw shortly after- 
wards, told me that he was very glad that I had been 
so outspoken. 

It also had a sequel. A few days later I received 
the visit of a well-known journalist, who informed me 
that he had been sent by Count Witte, who was ill, to 
inquire whether what I had said in my speech was aimed 
at him. I replied that this was a question which I 
must decline to answer as there were so many Germano- 
phils in Petrograd. They might all ask me the same 
question, and I could not really reply to each one 
individually. My journalistic friend was not satisfied, 
saying that Count Witte insisted on receiving an 
answer. I then said: ‘* You can tell Count Witte 
from me that when I made my speech I had in my 
mind all those who had held the language of which I 


had complained, and that if the cap fits him he can 
wear it.”’ 


CHAPTER XVII 
1914-15 


: LMOST immediately after the opening of hostilities 
Sazonoff had made tentative efforts to secure the 
co-operation of benevolent neutrality of those States 
which, on account of their geographical position or 
territorial aspirations, were likely to be drawn into 
the conflict. Bulgaria was offered certain districts of 
Serbian Macedonia in the event of a victorious war 
resulting in Serbia obtaining access to the Adriatic; 
Roumania was tempted with the promise of the greater 
part of Transylvania and the northern half of the 
Bukowina; overtures were made to Italy with regard 
to Italia Irredenta, while His Majesty’s Government 
were invited to open negotiations with Japan. Japan 
entered the war on August 22, but Roumania pleaded 
the close friendship that had so long existed between 
King Carol and the Emperor Franz Joseph as a reason 
for not entering the lists. It was only after King 
Carol’s death in the following October that the inter- 
minable negotiations, which ended in Roumania taking 
the field when it was too late, were opened at Bucharest. 
But the one question of paramount importance for 
Russia, more especially after the passage through the 
Straits of the Goeben and Breslau, was the attitude 
that Turkey would adopt. Negotiations were at once 
opened at Constantinople with a view to purchasing her 
223 


224 My Mission to Russia 


neutrality ; but Germany’s influence, enhanced by the 
prestige of her victories and by the presence of two of 
her warships off Constantinople, outweighed that of the 
Entente Powers and in the end carried the day. Early 
in October the Straits were closed, and a few weeks 
later two Turkish torpedo boats entered Odessa harbour 
and sank a Russian gunboat. ‘The closing of the Straits 
was a paralysing blow for Russia. With only two ports 
—Vladivostock in the far east and Archangel in the 
north, that was ice-bound in winter—she was now 
virtually shut off from all communication with her 
allies in the West. The need of free access to the sea 
was thus brought home to the Russian public, whose 
eyes turned to Constantinople as the one great prize 
to be won by the war. Moscow led the movement, and 
the Emperor, in the manifesto issued after the recall 
of the allied Ambassadors from Constantinople, told 
his people that ‘‘ Turkey’s unwarranted intervention 
would but prepare the way for the solution of the his- 
toric problem bequeathed to us by our fathers on the 
shores of the Black Sea.’’ 

We were at the time engaged in a conversation with 
Russia on the subject of Persia. While raising no 
objection to the continued presence of Russian troops 
in Azerbaijan for the purpose of maintaining order, or 
to their passage through Persia in the event of a Turkish 
attack on that country, we did not wish her to act as 
Germany had acted in the case of Belgium and to 
violate Persia’s neutrality. His Majesty’s Government 
had, however, to take into account the new situation 
created by Turkey’s entrance into the war and to give 
some satisfaction to the wishes and aspirations of the 
Russian people. They accordingly instructed me in 


Russia Asks for Constantinople 225 


November to inform the Russian Government that in 
the event of our defeating Germany the fate of Con- 
stantinople and the Straits would have to be decided 
in conformity with Russia’s needs. ‘Though received 
by Sazonoff with a warm expression of his grateful 
appreciation, this communication was not quite precise 
enough to satisfy the Russian Government for long. 
During the winter months the movement had grown 
in intensity and, in the Duma, the veiled references of 
Ministers to the brilliant future opening for Russia on 
the shores of the Black Sea had been received with 
acclamation. Early in March Sazonoff spoke to the 
French Ambassador and me of the emotion which the 
question of Constantinople was evoking throughout the 
country and of the necessity of its radical solution. 
The Emperor, he said, felt that after all the sacrifices 
which he had imposed on his people he could no longer 
delay asking his allies for a definite assurance of their 
consent to the incorporation of Constantinople in the 
Russian Empire when once the war had been won. 
On March 18 I was instructed to inform the 
Emperor personally that His Majesty’s Government 
were prepared to give this assurance on certain condi- 
tions. Though not yet in a position to define all their 
own desiderata, the revision of the Anglo-Russian 
Agreement of 1907 and the recognition of the neutral 
zone as a British sphere would have to be conceded by 
Russia. With regard to Constantinople they would 
attach the condition that an arrangement should be 
made for the commercial freedom of the Straits for 
merchant vessels as well as for a free port for goods in 
transit from and to non-Russian territory on the Black 


Sea. They would further expect Russia, among other 
P 


226 My Mission to Russia 


things, to do everything in her power to facilitate the 
participation of Roumania and Bulgaria in the war 
against Turkey and the Central Powers. 

As the Emperor was leaving the next morning for 
the front, Sazonoff kindly arranged that I should 
accompany him to Tsarskoe and be received at the same 
time as himself in an audience which he was to have 
that evening. 

The Emperor received us in his study, and after a 
few words of friendly greeting said to me: ‘** You have 
a communication to make?’’ I replied that I was 
charged with a message which would, I trusted, give 
him as much pleasure to receive as it gave me to deliver, 
namely, that His Majesty’s Government consented to 
the realization of Russia’s secular aspirations with 
regard to Constantinople and the Straits on conditions 
which he would have no difficulty in accepting. I then 
enumerated those conditions. After desirmg me to 
convey his warmest thanks to His Majesty’s Govern- 
ment the Emperor inquired what was the existing 
arrangement with regard to the neutral zone. I ex- 
plained the nature of that arrangement in general 
terms, adding that its incorporation in the British 
sphere would put an end to a constant cause of friction 
between our two Governments and would mark a great 
step in advance towards a final and friendly settlement 
of the Persian question. As the Emperor still hesi- 
tated, I ventured to say that had I a year ago brought 
him the offer of Constantinople in exchange for a 
declaration of Russia’s désinteressement in the neutral 
zone, I had no doubt as to what His Majesty’s answer 
would have been. 

The Emperor laughed and said I was quite right. 


I Convey England’s Consent 227 


On my asking whether I might inform my Govern- 
ment that His Majesty accepted their conditions in 
principle, Sazonoff intervened with the remark that 
Russia must in return be allowed complete liberty of 
action in her own sphere; not, he proceeded to explain, 
that she had any desire to annex North Persia, but 
because she wanted an end put to the representations 
which we were so constantly making about her action 
there. I replied that we also had not the slightest 
intention of annexing the neutral zone, and that our 
object, on the contrary, was to secure the mainten- 
ance of Persian integrity. This object was more 
likely to be attained were ambitious Russian consuls 
to be precluded, as they would be under the new 
arrangement, from pursuing a forward policy con- 
trary to the wishes of their Government. At the same 
time the Russian and British representatives at Tehran 
might work out an agreement under which Russia could 
obtain sufficient liberty of action in her own sphere 
without violating the principle of Persian indepen- 
dence. ‘Then, turning to the Emperor, I said that after 
the war Russia and Great Britain would be the two 
most powerful empires in the world. ‘With the settle- 
ment of the Persian question the last cause of friction 
between them would disappear and the world’s peace 
would then be assured. The Emperor cordially agreed. 
His ‘Majesty then authorized me to say that he accepted 
our conditions in principle. 

The rest of the audience was occupied with a dis- 
cussion of Italy’s claims to territorial compensation in 
Dalmatia and on the Adriatic. Taking an atlas, the 
Emperor followed Sazonoff’s report, pointing out the 
exact position of every town and district mentioned 


228 My Mission to Russia 


with a promptitude that surprised me. ‘The negotia- 
tions with Italy had been complicated by the fact that 
many of her claims clashed with those of Serbia. It 
was the old question of Slav interests; and there was 
a strong party in Russia, including such influential 
personages as the Grand Duke Nicholas, that was 
opposed to the acceptance of some of her demands. 
They contended that Russia could not allow Italy to 
acquire a position on the Adriatic that would virtually 
make Serbia her vassal there, and that if Serbia’s 
aspirations were left unsatisfied, we should in no distant 
future be confronted with fresh troubles if not with 
another war. In view of the vital importance of 
securing Italy’s co-operation, I had to endeavour to 
overcome these objections and to induce the Russian 
Government to make the necessary concessions. 
Sazonoff, fortunately, was too broadminded to press 
these views unduly, and subordinating Russia’s special 
interests to the general interests of the Allies, he 
finally accepted the arrangement under which Italy 
entered the war on May 28. 

Negotiations had at the same time been proceeding 
with Roumania, Greece and Bulgaria, and from the 
language originally held by M. Bratiano we had reason 
to hope that Roumania would at once follow Italy’s 
example. Though aware that Italy was on the point 
of declaring war on Austria, she let slip the favourable 
moment in the spring of 1915, when the Russians held 
the more important of the Carpathian heights, and 
when her co-operation with the Russian army might 
have saved the situation. The tide of war had now 
turned in Germany’s favour, and the farther the 
Russians retired the less disposed was she to throw 


Roumania’s Attitude 229 


down the gauntlet to the Central Powers. But, apart 
from the military question, the negotiations respecting 
the political agreement that was to record the price to 
be paid for her intervention dragged on for months. 
Bratiano demanded the Pruth and the Theiss as her 
future frontier, a demand that meant the incorporation 
in Roumania of both the Bukowine and the Banat. 

From the point of view of her own national interests 
Russia was strongly opposed to Roumania’s acquiring 
the whole of the Bukowine, while neither she nor her 
allies felt justified in extending Roumania’s territory 
almost to the gates of Belgrade by promising her the 
whole of the Banat. But necessity is a hard taskmaster, 
and we could not afford to risk permission being given 
the Germans to despatch war material to the Turks 
through Roumania. Sazonoff first made the concession 
of allowing her to have the major part of the Bukowine, 
and then, bowing to the wishes of the Allies, he yielded 
on the question of the Banat. The latter concession 
was made subject to certain conditions proposed by 
Sir E. Grey for the safeguard of Serbia’s interests and 
for the protection of her capital as well as on the 
understanding that the allied Powers would undertake 
to compensate Serbia by facilitating her union with 
Croatia if the latter consented. Sazonoff further 
attached the condition that Roumania should take the 
field within five weeks. This Bratiano declined to do. 
He was ready to conclude a political agreement on 
the above basis, but insisted that the actual date 
for taking action must depend on the military situa- 
tion and on conditions to be embodied in a military 
convention. 

The military situation, indeed, at the end of July 


230 My Mission to Russia 


was such that Bratiano was probably right in saying 
that for Roumania to march at that moment would 
be to court certain disaster. It would have been dif- 
ferent had we won over Bulgaria to our side, for her 
intervention would have so improved matters that 
Roumania could have afforded to run the risk. On 
the other hand, a definite assurance of Roumania’s 
co-operation would have greatly facilitated our negotia- 
tions with Bulgaria. But we had, as Sazonoff remarked 
to me, been moving in a vicious circle. We had, he 
said, been trying to please everybody and had signally 
failed, as it was impossible to satisfy one of the Balkan 
States without offending the others. We had, there- 
fore, to ask ourselves which of them could render us 
the most effective assistance and which would prove the 
most dangerous were it to join our enemies. Greece 
had had recourse to every pretext in order to evade 
coming to Serbia’s assistance, and it was impossible to 
count on her co-operation, while, were she to side with 
Germany, her coasts would be at the mercy of the allied 
fleets. Serbia, on the other hand, could never make 
terms with the Central Powers, and it would not be 
a matter of great moment to us if she did, out of pique, 
delay taking the offensive against Austria. ‘The one 
important factor in the situation was Bulgaria. Both 
for political and national reasons the forcing of the 
Dardanelles was of vital interest to Russia, and the 
co-operation of the Bulgarian army would greatly 
facilitate the accomplishment of that task. We ought, 
therefore, he maintained, to concentrate all our efforts 
on securing that co-operation even at the risk of offend- 
ing other States. 

His Majesty’s Government had from the very outset 


Our Negotiations with Bulgaria 231 


realized the importance of Bulgaria’s co-operation, but 
in spite of their untiring efforts they had failed to 
induce the Governments of Belgrade and Athens to 
make the sacrifices necessary to secure it. Greece had 
refused to give up Cavalla, Serbia had declared that she 
could not cede national territory without the consent 
of the Great Skuptschina, and that it was impossible to 
convoke that assembly on account of the war. Rou- 
mania, on the other hand, had agreed to the eventual 
cession of Dobritch and Baltchik. During the course 
of these negotiations it became clear that the minimum 
price at which we could purchase Bulgaria’s co-opera- 
tion was the cession of the so-called uncontested zone 
in Macedonia. That zone had been recognized as hers 
under the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty of 1912, but had, 
after the Second Balkan War, been assigned to Serbia 
by the Treaty of Bucharest. 

At the end of July it was decided, on Sir Edward 
Grey’s suggestion, that the allied representatives at 
Belgrade should make an urgent appeal to the Serbian 
Government to consent to its cession on the termina- 
tion of the war in return for Bulgaria’s immediate 
effective co-operation. The Allies, they were to add, 
would engage to secure for Serbia such ample com- 
pensation as would fully realize the most important of 
her political and economic aspirations, and would also 
guarantee that her territorial connexion with Greece 
should be preserved. In order that this appeal might 
carry more weight, I was instructed to ask for an 
audience and to suggest that His Majesty should 
remind the Prince Regent that he had, at the begin- 
ning of the war, placed the fate of Serbia in the 
Kimperor’s hands and that the whole course of the war 


232 My Mission to Russia 


would be imperilled should the Serbian Government 
refuse to comply with our request. 

The Emperor received me in audience on July 28, 
and after I had explained the situation to him, said that 
he fully recognized the importance of ensuring the 
success of our operations in the Dardanelles by securing 
the co-operation of the Bulgarian army. He could 
not, however, send such a telegram to the Prince 
Regent. It was perfectly true that it was on Serbia’s 
account that we had become involved in war; but Serbia 
was our ally and we had not treated her quite fairly. 
We had, without consulting her, sacrificed some of her 
important interests in order to satisfy Italy, and we 
were now about to give Roumania the Banat. A 
refusal on the part of the Prince Regent would, the 
Emperor added, place him in a very awkward position. 

I replied that Serbia’s heroism had our unstinted 
admiration and that we fully appreciated the services 
which she had rendered during the early stages of the 
war, but that for some months past she had not been 
in a position to take any action of importance. The 
Allies, on the other hand, had never ceased making 
enormous sacrifices, and Serbia could not expect them 
to do so indefinitely without herself making some 
counter-sacrifices. However much we might sym- 
pathize with her, we were fully justified in asking her 
to make a concession that would help to shorten the 
war. At the time of the First Balkan War access to 
the Adriatic and not Macedonia had been the main 
object of her ambitions, and that ambition would now 
be realized in a measure which had never before been 
contemplated. Macedonia, moreover, had only been 
Serbia’s since the summer of 1918, while previous to 


Concessions Demanded of Serbia 233 


that date it had been recognized as Bulgarian by the 
Emperor Alexander II in 1877, and by Serbia herself 
in 1912. We were, moreover, only asking her to do 
what was necessary for her own safety, as, were Bul- 
garia to join the Central Powers, her very existence as 
a nation would be at stake. 

The Emperor was impressed by what I had said 
and promised to reconsider the question, adding that 
it would be easier for him to act as had been suggested 
were King George, the King of Italy and President 
Poincaré to address similar telegrams to the Prince 
Regent. Sazonoff, to whom I communicated the sub- 
stance of this conversation, entirely concurred in the 
Emperor’s suggestion, which was eventually adopted. 
Sazonoff also remarked that he was very glad that I had 
spoken as I had done, as all the Emperor’s sympathies 
were on the side of Serbia. 

The Serbian reply to the communication eventually 
made them by the allied Powers was in the nature of a 
compromise. It was an acceptance in principle, but 
hedged round with reservations which, as the Bulgars 
would be content with nothing less than the whole of 
the uncontested zone, rendered it valueless for our 
purpose. Under the treaty of alliance which they had 
concluded in the spring of 1918, Greece and Serbia 
had agreed not to cede any districts to the west of 
the Vardar. Greece, who had been careful to evade 
rendering Serbia the assistance which her treaty obliga- 
tions prescribed, pressed for the observance of this 
particular clause. Though the negotiations at Sofia and 
Belgrade were continued, every day that passed ren- 
dered the prospect more hopeless.’ Russia’s attitude 
during the Second Balkan War had not been forgotten 


234 My Mission to Russia 


at the former capital, while after the fall of Warsaw 
and Kovno the cause of the Allies was regarded as lost. 
King Ferdinand, who had throughout been intriguing 
with the Central Powers, was not the man to attach 
himself to the losing side, more especially when Ger- 
many was prepared to pay him double the price which 
the Allies were offering for his co-operation. Our pro- 
posals, moreover, were generally regarded as too vague. 
Nothing, indeed, short of an absolute assurance of 
Bulgaria’s acquisition of the uncontested zone would 
have stayed the march of events, while the idea of 
paying off old scores on Serbia was popular with the 
army. 

O’Beirne, who had been with me at Petrograd as 
Counsellor of Embassy, and who afterwards lost his 
life when travelling with Lord Kitchener to Russia, 
had been sent as Minister to Sofia, but unfortunately 
too late to retrieve the mistakes of his predecessor. He 
had early in September expressed the opinion that, 
though Serbia might reject some of our demands, she 
would acquiesce were they imposed on her, and he was, 
in my opinion, right. I had myself, in the conversa- 
tions which I and my French colleague had daily with 
Sazonoff, spoken in a very similar sense. Paléologue, 
on the contrary, protested that we could not hold such 
language or inflict such a humiliation on an ally. The 
stakes, however, for which we were playing were too 
high to allow considerations for the feelings of any 
Government to influence our policy. Could we but 
have won over Bulgaria to our side, Roumania would 
almost certainly have cast in her lot with us in the 
autumn of 1915. Turkey’s fate would then have been 
sealed, and the whole course of the war would have been 


Bulgaria Dominates Situation 235 


changed. It was, perhaps, natural that Serbia should 
hesitate to cede what she regarded as her national 
territory, but it would have been different had the 
allied Governments dictated such a course to her. 
Had they insisted on her allowing Bulgaria to occupy 
the uncontested zone then and there it is doubtful 
whether Bulgaria, no matter how far King Ferdinand 
had committed himself in the negotiations with the 
Central Powers, would, even at the eleventh hour, 
have marched against us. She certainly would not 
have done so had we taken such action earlier in the 
year. Sazonoff did all that it was possible to do under 
the circumstances, but he was not empowered to hold 
the only language that would have turned the scales 
at Belgrade. Strong pressure would, no doubt, have 
been required to induce the Emperor, whose sym- 
pathies, as was but natural, were all on the side of the 
Serbs, to consent to the Allies imposing their wishes 
at Belgrade. But had they done so the war would 
have been considerably shortened and Russia might 
have been spared the horrors of the Bolshevik 
revolution. 

With Bulgaria definitely engaged on the side of 
the Central Powers and with the Russian army 
exhausted after its long retreat, it was useless to 
expect Roumania to march. Even before the fall of 
Warsaw the Emperor had admitted, in the course of 
my audience recorded above, that it would be a mis- 
take to press her to take the field till the Russian army 
was in a position to resume the offensive. The Allies 
had, therefore, to content themselves with the political 
agreement and to leave the date of her entry into 
action to be settled later on by a military convention. 


CHAPTER XVIII 
1915 


ARLY in 1915 the Russians had taken the great 
fortress of Przemysl and advanced to within a few 
miles of Cracau. They had also crossed the Carpathians 
and made a descent into the Hungarian plain. But, 
owing to the shortage of shells and rifles, they were 
unable to follow up these victories; and the Germans, 
who were aware of this, determined to restore the 
situation in the eastern theatre of war by the transfer 
of several army corps from the west. Mackensen, who 
had been sent to take over the command of the Austro- 
German forces, commenced operations early in May, 
and the Russian army—exposed to a terrific bombard- 
ment, to which it could make no effective reply, and 
weakened by the absence of the troops detached for 
service in the Carpathians—retired all along the line. 
One after another of its hard-won conquests had to 

be abandoned. In June Przemysl and Lemberg fell, 
and in August Warsaw, Novogeorgievsk, Kovno, 
Grodno and Brest Litowsk surrendered in rapid succes- 
sion. During this long and disastrous retreat the losses 
in killed, wounded and prisoners were colossal. The 
shortage in rifles was so great that a considerable 
percentage of the men had to wait unarmed till they 
could pick up the rifles of their fallen comrades. The 
only wonder was that the army remained intact. At 

236 


Emperor in Supreme Command 237 


one time Petrograd itself was in such danger that steps 
were taken to transfer the archives and gold reserve 
to Vologda. There had also been a question of 
removing the art treasures of the Hermitage, but the 
Emperor had vetoed the proposal for fear that it might 
create a panic. Happily, the further German advance 
was stayed, and the arrangements for the evacuation 
of the capital were suspended. The German offensive 
in Courland was attended with equal success, and as a 
precautionary measure the plant of the Riga factories 
was removed eastwards. For the next nine months 
the Russian army was virtually immobilized on the line 
which it had occupied towards the middle of September, 
though from time to time it achieved a few brilliant 
local successes. 

On September 5, when the military situation was 
at its worst, the Emperor assumed the supreme com- 
mand of his armies, with General Alexeieff as chief of 
the staff, although his Ministers had done their utmost 
to dissuade him from taking what they regarded as a 
dangerous step. The allied Governments, who. had 
received the announcement with considerable appre- 
hension, were naturally precluded from expressing 
their preference for the retention of the Grand Duke 
Nicholas as commander-in-chief. ‘To have done so 
would have been to intervene in a purely internal 
question on which the Emperor had already taken a 
decision. I had once, indeed—in February, 1915— 
been instructed to intercede in favour of a well-known 
revolutionary (Bourtzeff) who, on returning to Russia 
for the purpose of inducing his comrades to suspend 
their subversive activities and to work for the successful 
prosecution of the war, had been arrested and sentenced 


238 My Mission to Russia 


to deportation to Siberia. The patriotic letter which 
Bourtzeff had published before leaving for Russia had, 
as I told Sazonoff privately, made such a favourable 
impression in England that it was generally hoped that 
he would be pardoned. 

Sazonoff kindly undertook to plead his cause with 
the Emperor, and His Majesty, after some hesitation, 
was pleased to pardon him. But, in discussing the 
question with Sazonoff, the Emperor had remarked 
that it was curious what a much greater interest 
the English and French took in the internal affairs of 
Russia than the Russians did in those of England 
and France—a gentle reminder to us that to concern 
ourselves with questions affecting the Government 
of Russia was to tread on forbidden ground. I took 
advantage, nevertheless, of an audience which I had 
early in September with the Empress to tell Her 
Majesty that I shared the apprehensions with which 
the Emperor’s decision was viewed by the Council of 
Ministers. Not only, I said, would His Majesty have 
to bear the whole responsibility for any fresh disaster 
that might befall his armies, but he would, by combin- 
ing the duties of commander-in-chief with those of the 
autocratic. ruler of a great Empire, be undertaking a 
task beyond the strength of any single man. The 
Empress at once protested, saying that the Emperor 
ought to have assumed the command from the very 
first and that, now that his army had suffered so 
severely, his proper place was with his troops. ‘‘ I 
have no patience,’’ she continued, ‘‘ with Ministers 
who try to prevent him doing his duty. The situation 
requires firmness. The Emperor, unfortunately, is 
weak; but I am not, and I intend to be firm.’’ Her 


The Influence of the Empress — 239 


Majesty kept her word. ‘The Emperor, when in 
residence at Headquarters, could not keep in constant 
touch with his Ministers, and was too absorbed by 
military matters to give that close attention to 
questions of internal policy which the growing gravity 
of the situation demanded. The result was that the 
Empress, more especially after Stiirmer became 
President of the Council in February, 1916, virtually 
governed Russia. 

Among other reasons that had prompted Her 
Majesty to encourage the Emperor to take over the 
command was the suspicion that the Grand Duke’s 
prestige as commander-in-chief was gradually eclipsing 
that of his Sovereign. She was, in fact, jealous of 
him. On the other hand, the Grand Duke’s enemies, 
of whom Rasputin was one, had done their utmost to 
discredit him at Court by representing that the reverses 
of the Russian army were due to his faulty leadership. 
Rasputin, indeed, had a special reason for hating the 
Grand Duke, for when, earlier in the war, he had 
telegraphed for permission to come to the front to 
bless the troops, the Grand Duke had replied, ‘*‘ Do 
come! I will hang you.’’ 

So much has been written about that ignoble 
personage that there is little left for me to tell. A 
story was at one time current at Petrograd that during 
one of my audiences at Tsarskoe Rasputin suddenly 
entered the room, and that, on the Emperor naming 
him to me, I at once took my leave. Needless to say 
that this, like so many other stories of his sayings and 
doings, is a pure fable. ‘There were, however, many 
salons in Petrograd where he was an honoured guest 
and the centre of an admiring circle of lady devotees 


240 My Mission to Russia 


—in spite of the fact that he not only dressed like a 
peasant, but made a point of appearing unwashed and 
unkempt. My friend Paléologue tells us, in his book 
on Russia, how he met him in one of these houses, 
and how Rasputin, at the close of their conversation, 
‘‘me serre contre sa poitrine.’’ I, personally, never 
attempted to gratify my curiosity by meeting him in 
this way, as I did not consider it right to enter into 
personal contact with him. 

The native of a Siberian village and the son of 
an uneducated moujik, he had been nicknamed 
‘* Rasputin,’’? or the Debauchee, on account of his 
dissolute life. The Russian peasant is a curious com- 
bination of good and evil. He is full of contradictions 
—he can be gentle and brutal, religious and vicious. 
Rasputin was no exception to this rule. A drunkard 
and a sensualist, the mysticism latent in his character 
had in earlier life been awakened by the exhortations 
of a priest whom he happened to be driving to some 
distant village. This drive constituted what he himself 
described as his journey to Damascus, for, as in the 
case of St. Paul, a voice had spoken to him on the 
way. Deeply moved, he vowed to lead a new life. 
Wandering as a pilgrim from wilage to village, he 
lived on such alms as he could collect, preaching and 
effecting cures by his magnetic touch. In one of the 
monasteries, where he made a prolonged stay, he 
learned to read and write, and even picked up a 
smattering of theology. A few years later he went 
on a pilgrimage to Jerusalem. 

He thus gradually acquired the reputation of a 
holy man, or elder (staretz), and was credited with 
the gifts of healing and prophecy. He experienced, 


Rasputin’s Character 241 


however, many backslidings, and during most of the 
time he led a double life. He acted up to the doctrine 
which he preached that repentance can alone bring 
salvation, but that one cannot repent if one has not 
sinned. To yield to temptation was, therefore, the 
first stage on the road to salvation. The sect which 
he eventually founded was an offshoot of that of 
the Khlysty, or Flagellants. Its members aspired, 
in some strange way, to direct communion with 
God; but their services, which were held at night, 
savoured rather of the Bacchanalia of ancient Rome 
than of the rites of a Christian Church. Singing 
and shouting, they moved round in a circle, quicken- 
ing the pace at each turn till, after whirling 
round in a mad dance, they sank exhausted to the 
ground. There then followed a scene over which it is 
best to draw a veil. Rasputin was well fitted to be 
the high priest of such a sect, for he exercised an 
extraordinary fascination over women. ‘Though as a 
general rule he behaved abominably to them, his victims 
put up with every kind of ill-treatment sooner than 
leave him. Only one woman turned on him and nearly 
killed him by stabbing him in the abdomen. 
Rasputin’s reputation for holiness gradually spread 
to the capital, and in 1905 he was summoned there by 
a well-known Archimandrite, under whose auspices he 
made his entrance into St. Petersburg society. He 
had soon a large circle of admirers, including the two 
Montenegrin Princesses, the wives of the Grand Dukes 
Nicholas and Peter, and it was through their good 
offices that he was, two years later, presented at Court. 
There he was careful to reveal only the mystic side 
of his nature. By personal magnetism or by some 
Q 


242 My Mission to Russia 


form of hypnotic suggestion he did undoubtedly relieve 
the hemophilia from which the Tsarevitch—a charm- 
ing boy, the idol of both his parents—had long suffered. 
Believing, as she did, that Rasputin could by his 
prayers preserve her son’s life, the Empress centred 
all her hopes on him and regarded him with feelings 
akin to adoration. She absolutely declined to credit 
the stories of his debauched life, even when one of his 
drunken orgies had occasioned the intervention of the 
police. For her he was always blameless—a God-fearing 
man, reviled and persecuted like the saints of old. 

Rasputin had the natural cunning of the Russian 
peasant, but he was no ordinary impostor. He 
believed in himself—in his preternatural powers—in his 
gift of reading the decrees of fate. He warned the 
Empress that if his enemies succeeded in getting him 
sent away evil would befall the Tsarevitch, as his 
presence was indispensable to the latter’s well-being. 
So it turned out. He had to retire to Siberia for a 
time, and the boy grew worse. On one occasion, in 
the autumn of 1912, his illness, in consequence of an 
accident, took such an acute form that his life was in 
danger. Rasputin, who was at once communicated 
with, sent a comforting telegram, assuring the Empress 
that her son would live. An improvement set in, the 
boy recovered, and the Empress attributed his recovery 
to Rasputin’s intercessions. Still more curious was it 
that he should have warned her that his own destiny 
was indissolubly bound up with that of the Imperial 
family—for he had not been dead three months before 
the Empire had passed away. 

It had been through Madame Wyroubowa, the 
daughter of Taneiew, the head of the Emperor’s 


Rasputin at Court 243 


chancery, that Rasputin had in the first instance been 
able to get into such close touch with the Sovereigns. 
Madame Wyroubowa, who had made an unhappy 
marriage, had, since her separation from her husband, 
found consolation in religion, while she had become the 
inseparable companion and confidante of the Empress, 
who had taken pity on her when she was in trouble. 
She was one of the first to profess implicit belief in 
the staretz, and, as he foresaw, she proved an invalu- 
able ally. Acting as intermediary between him and 
the Empress, consulting him on all questions, corre- 
sponding with him during his short visits to Siberia, she 
consistently encouraged Her Majesty to be guided by 
his advice. She also made herself useful by reporting 
to the Empress what people in high positions were 
saying and thinking, and in order to draw them into 
an expression of their views on political questions she 
would give them to understand that she was consulting 
them on behalf of their Majesties. Too stupid herself 
to form a clear judgment about men and things, she 
became the unconscious tool of Rasputin and of those 
with whom he was acting. I both disliked her and 
mistrusted her, and saw her seldom. 

The réle actually played by Rasputin at Court is 
still veiled in a good deal of mystery. His ascendancy 
over the Emperor was not so absolute as that which he 
exercised over the Empress, and concerned questions of 
a religious or ecclesiastical kind rather than of policy. 
He interested himself chiefly, at first, in securing for 
his friends and adherents high appointments in the 
Orthodox Church and in dispossessing any prelate who 
had ventured to speak disparagingly of him. Thanks 
to his protection, a most undesirable friend of his boy- 


244 My Mission to Russia 


hood, an uneducated peasant, Varnava by name, was 
appointed Bishop of Tobolsk, while a little later 
Pitirim, a man of very doubtful morals, was made 
Metropolitan of Petrograd. | 

Gradually, however, he began to take a hand in 
the political game. He was on intimate terms with 
several of the more reactionary Ministers, who were 
at one and the same time his patrons and clients. 
A few words written on a slip of paper sufficed 
to secure the granting by these Ministers of. the 
requests of his protégés. He would, on the other 
hand, in his conversations with the Empress and 
Madame Wyroubowa, speak in the sense. which they 
desired, or he would advocate the appointment of some 
reactionary friend of his to a vacant Ministry. -He 
thus indirectly influenced the Emperor in the choice 
of his Ministers, and consequently in the course of 
his policy. This was more especially the case when, 
after the assumption by the Emperor of the supreme 
command, the Empress became all powerful. 

But, while it was Rasputin’s influence that was 
the dominating factor, the political strings were pulled 
by others whose interests he served and whose 
intrigues he countenanced. Uneducated, and engrossed 
by the pursuit of carnal pleasures, he was hardly the 
man to. conceive or formulate any concrete policy. 
He left that to others, and was content to follow 
their lead. Self-interest was his guiding principle 
through life, and no one knew better than he how to 
turn the tables on those who were rash enough 
to denounce him to the Emperor. Among others, 
Kokovtsoff, when President of the Council, had vainly 
endeavoured to open His Majesty’s eyes to Rasputin’s 





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Was Rasputin a German AgentP 245 


true character, with the result that he was eventually 
dismissed; while Prince Orloff, who had for years 
been at the head of the Emperor’s military cabinet, 
was, for the same reason, summarily relegated to a 
post on the Grand Duke Nicholas’s staff in the 
Caucasus. 

The internal situation, meanwhile, was going from 
bad to worse, and the general dissatisfaction with the 
conduct of the war was venting itself in attacks on the 
Emperor and Empress. ‘The latter was always spoken 
of as ‘‘ The German,”’ in spite of the fact that she had, 
as she told me herself, broken all the ties that con- 
nected her with Germany. Rasputin was at the same 
time accused of being in German pay—a charge that 
was not, strictly speaking, correct. He was not in 
immediate communication with Berlin, and he did not 
receive money directly from the Germans; but he was 
largely financed by certain Jewish bankers, who were, 
to all tents and purposes, German agents. As he 
was in the habit of repeating to these Jewish friends 
of his all that he heard at Tsarskoe, and as the Empress 
consulted him on both military and political questions, 
much useful information reached the Germans through 
this indirect channel. Without being their regular 
agent, he was, moreover, rendering them yeoman 
service by discrediting the Imperial régime and by 
thus paving the way for the revolution. 

The situation was one which the Germans were 
not slow to exploit. They had already started their 
peace propaganda among the troops at the front, and 
had their spies everywhere. Through one of them— 
Lieut.-Colonel Miassoyeidow, who was afterwards 
hanged—they had secured such valuable information 


246 My Mission to Russia 


about the movements of the Russian troops that 
they had been able on more than one occasion to 
counter the latter’s projected offensive. Petrograd 
was throughout the war infested with their secret 
agents and sympathizers. The atmosphere was gener- 
ally charged with pessimism, and exaggerated reports 
were constantly circulated respecting the hopelessness 
of the military outlook. At Moscow it was different. 
There the national spirit, instead of being cowed by 
the disheartening news from the front, was stirred to 
fresh efforts, and the anti-German feeling was so 
strong that in June all shops bearing German names or 
that were suspected of having any German connexions 
were raided. 

By its failure to meet the requirements of the army 
the administration had forfeited the confidence of the 
nation, and all parties, with the exception of the 
extreme right, were agreed that recourse must be had 
to extraordinary measures for the purpose of intensify- 
ing production. ‘Thanks to the initiative taken in the 
matter by President Rodzianko, the Emperor, early in 
June, appointed a strong committee, composed of 
representatives of the army, the Duma and industry, 
with powers to mobilize Russian industries for war 
purposes. But this was not sufficient in itself, and 
Rodzianko at the same time urged His Majesty to 
convoke the Duma and to purge the Ministry of 
some of its more reactionary and incompetent 
members. 

His Majesty yielded, and, in spite of the opposition 
of the Empress’s camarilla, Maklakoff, the Minister 
of the Interior, was replaced by Prince Scherbatoff, a 
broad-minded man of moderate views. As I happened, 


Three Liberal Ministers 247 


a few days later, to meet the Emperor at the launching 
of a battle cruiser, I endeavoured to encourage him to 
proceed further in this direction by referring to the 
recent reconstruction of Mr. Asquith’s Cabinet. In 
England, I told him, all party differences had been for- 
gotten, and Mr. Asquith had now formed a coalition 
of all the best brains in the country as the surest way 
of securing a successful prosecution of the war. The 
Emperor admitted that this was the only course to 
pursue in a great national crisis like the present, and 
for a time it almost seemed as if he was going to act 
up to this principle. Sukholimoff (the Minister of 
War), Schteglovitoff (the Minister of Justice), Sabler 
(the Procurator of the Holy Synod) were successively 
dismissed, and replaced in their respective offices by 
Polivanoff, Khvostoff and Samarin. It was while he 
was at Headquarters, and no longer under the 
Empress’s immediate influence, that His Majesty made 
the above appointments. 

One of the first acts of Samarin was to tell the 
Emperor that he could not be responsible for the 
administration of the affairs of the Orthodox Church 
if Rasputin was to be allowed to control them from 
behind the scenes. Rasputin was in consequence given 
a hint to absent himself for a few weeks. ‘The con- 
vocation of the Duma had also been conceded by the 
Emperor, and when it met, on July 30, deputy after 
deputy denounced the incompetence of an administra- 
tion that had brought such untold disasters on the 
Russian army. By a large majority the chamber 
invited the Government to try Sukholimoff, while a 
Liberal deputy (Maklakoff, the brother of the former 
Minister of the Interior) declared that what the country 


248 My Mission to Russia 


required was to have ‘‘ the right men in the nght 
places.”’ 

With the departure of the Emperor for Head- 
quarters to take over the supreme command the 
reactionaries once more gained the ascendant. On 
September 26 the Duma was prorogued. Two days 
later the more liberal-minded members of the Govern- 
ment—Sazonoff, Scherbatoff, Samarin, Krivoshein, 
Bark and Shahovskoi—addressed a collective letter to 
the Emperor, beseeching him to change the course of 
his policy and saying that it was impossible for them 
any longer to serve under Goremykin. ‘They were 
summoned by the Emperor to the Stavka and told 
that he could not tolerate such interference by his 
Ministers in the choice of his President of the Council. 
Owing to his having addressed the envelope containing 
that letter to the Emperor, Sazonoff was regarded by 
the Empress as the ringleader of this cabal. She never 
forgave him and never rested till she had secured his 
dismissal. 

About the same time the Union of Zemstvos and 
the Union of Town Councils had held a meeting at 
Moscow, in which a resolution was passed demanding 
the immediate convocation of the Duma and the 
appointment of a Government that possessed the con- 
fidence of the nation. Each union had further deputed 
three of its members to submit the above demands 
orally to the Emperor. Acting on the advice tendered 
by Goremykin, His Majesty refused to receive them, 
while he commanded Prince Scherbatoff to summon 
the respective presidents of the two unions—Prince 
Lvoff and the mayor of Moscow, M. Chelnokoff— 
to Petrograd, and to read to them the following 


Reactionaries Regain Ascendancy 249 


message: ‘‘I place a very high value on the noble 
work which the zemstvos and town councils have done 
and are doing for the wounded and refugees (from the 
provinces in German occupation); but I do not con- 
sider that they have any right to interfere in political 
matters, which are centred in the Government. I, 
therefore, command you to say what you have to say 
to the Minister of the Interior, who has orders to report 
to me.’’ The two delegates replied that they had been 
charged by their unions to lay Moscow’s representa- 
tions before the Emperor, and that for His Majesty to 
refuse to receive them would constitute a break between 
the Sovereign and his people. Prince Scherbatoff was 
so impressed by what they said that he finally consented 
to submit the matter for His Majesty’s reconsideration. 
He did so, and was at once dismissed. Chelnokoff, a 
man of very moderate views, subsequently summed up 
the situation by saying that it was intolerable that 
Russia should be governed by a doting reactionary 
like Goremykin and by a drunken scoundrel like 
Rasputin. 

Samarin, who was one of the most popular and 
respected members of the Government, shared Scher- 
batoff’s fate. It will be remembered that Rasputin 
had succeeded in getting his friend Varnava appointed 
Bishop of Tobolsk, and the latter’s conduct had since 
caused such a public scandal that Samarin had had to 
call him to account. His own dismissal was the result. 

Shortly afterwards another excellent Muinister— 
Krivoshein, who had as Minister of Agriculture 
rendered important services in carrying out Stolypin’s 
agrarian reforms—was forced to resign for no other 
reason than that he had incurred the displeasure of the 


250 My Mission to Russia 


reactionary party by his outspoken language on the 
situation. He was a personal friend of mine, and I 
had frequently urged on him the necessity of keeping 
the nation united by timely concessions, as well as the 
crying need of decentralization in such a vast Empire. 
A strong nationalist, he was nevertheless liberal- 
minded, and was in favour of reforming the adminis- 
tration, though he doubted whether it was feasible to 
introduce far-reaching reforms during the war. 

In an audience which I had during a flying visit of 
the Emperor’s to Tsarskoe in November, His Majesty 
made an earnest appeal to His Majesty’s Government 
to supply the Russian army with rifles. If only they 
would do so he could, he said, place 800,000 men in 
his field at once, and strike a crushing blow at the 
Germans while they were still exhausted after their 
long campaign. Were the present favourable moment 
to be allowed to pass, the Germans would have time 
to fortify their lines, as they had in the west, and any 
offensive which the Russian army might take later 
would be’doomed to failure. The position of that army 
was, indeed, a pathetic one, but I could hold out no 
hope of our being able to supply rifles on so large a 
scale. I regretted this all the more because, as I told 
the Emperor, there was a growing feeling of dis- 
affection among the Russian troops, who had been left 
almost defenceless before the enemy. 

I also pointed out that, apart from the question 
of supply, there was also that of delivery, and that if 
Russia was ever to receive from abroad the war material 
in which she was so deficient, drastic steps would have 
to be taken to expedite the construction of the 
Murman railway, that was to connect her capital with 


German Overtures to the Emperor 251 


the only ice-free port—Alexandrovsk. The Emperor 
agreed that the work of construction ought to be 
placed under the control of some energetic and com- 
petent official, but he did not approve of the candidate 
whom I had ventured to suggest for the post. He 
did, however, shortly afterwards appoint a new 
Minister of Ways and Communications—M. Trepoff 
—who, though belonging to the extreme right, 
proved an excellent administrator. It was thanks to 
his untiring efforts that the railway was completed by 
the end of 1916. 

While the Emperor’s internal policy, inspired as it 
was for the most part by the Empress and those in her 
immediate entourage, cannot be defended, the two 
following stories, told me by Sazonoff, will show how 
irreproachable was his attitude towards Germany. 

Early in December Count Frederichs, who had 
for years past been Minister of the Imperial Court, 
received a letter from his former friend, Count Eulen- 
burg (the Grand Marshal of the Court at Berlin), 
suggesting that they ought both to direct their efforts 
to putting an end to the existing deplorable misunder- 
standing between their Sovereigns, and to bringing 
about a rapprochement that would enable their Govern- 
ments to negotiate peace on honourable terms. The 
Emperor, on being told of this letter, commanded 
Count Frederichs to read it to him, and the latter pro- 
ceeded to do so in the original German. His Majesty 
at once stopped him, saying, ‘* Read it in Russian. I 
do not understand German.’’ When the Count had 
finished, the Emperor took the letter and, underlining 
a passage in which Count Eulenburg had spoken of 
‘*their old friendship,’’ wrote in the margin, ‘* That 


252 My Mission to Russia 


friendship is dead and buried.’’ He then sent for 
Sazonoff, and told him to prepare a draft reply. When, 
on the following day, Sazonoff brought him a draft, 
in which Count Eulenburg was told that if the 
Emperor William wanted peace he must address a 
similar proposal to all the Allies, His Majesty said that 
on reflection he had decided that the letter should be 
left unanswered, as any reply, however repellent, 
might be taken as evidence of his desire to enter into 
negotiations. 

A few weeks later further overtures were addressed 
to His Majesty through another channel. A Mlle. 
Wassiltchikoff, belonging to an old Russian family, 
had, when war broke out, been living in her villa on 
the Semmering, where she had remained ever since. 
She had recently gone to Darmstadt, on the invitation 
of the Grand Duke of Hesse, and had been sent by 
him to Petrograd charged with the mission of inducing 
the Emperor to conclude peace. She was empowered 
to say that the Emperor William was prepared to grant 
Russia most advantageous terms; that England had 
already made overtures to Germany for a separate 
peace; and that a reconciliation between Russia and 
Germany was necessary for dynastic reasons. The 
Grand Duke gave her a written statement in the above 
sense for her to give Sazonoff, as well as two open 
letters for the Emperor and Empress. On arrival at 
Petrograd she at once went to the Ministry and handed 
the Grand Duke’s statement and letters to Sazonoff. 
The latter told her that she had acted disgracefully in 
undertaking such a mission, and the Emperor, to whom 
he made a report on the subject, was so angry that he 
gave orders to have her interned in a convent. 


the’ G:G.B: 


Before concluding the story of the year 1915 I may 
mention that at the end of May I had the personal 
satisfaction of receiving from Sir Edward Grey a letter 
in which he said : 


I have followed with great appreciation the way in which 
you have conducted your conversations in Petrograd since 
the outbreak of the war. All your actions seem to me 
admirable in substance, form and opportuneness. 

I have therefore asked the Prime Minister to reeommend 
you for a G.C.B. in the forthcoming list of Birthday Honours. 

Meanwhile I wish you to know that all that you have 
done is really appreciated by His Majesty’s Government, as 
well as by me. 


PRINTED BY 
CassELt & Company, LIMITED, 
La Batre Savvace, Lonpon, E.C.4. 


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Wasa 








Kaneva 








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ecto tees 
PPLE OOOO OLE RL: 





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appease = 
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SUE Pete, 
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Re 
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hcnenrhaheya dhianben 
PLP ORACLE 





